MORAL VERTUES BAPTIZED CHRISTIAN:

Or the Neceſſity of

MORALITY

Among Chriſtians.

By WILLIAM SHELTON *M. A.* Late Fellow of *Jeſus Colledge* in *Cambridge*, and now Vicar of *Burſted Magna* in *Eſſex*.

Veræ divitiæ non opes ſunt, ſed Virtutes, quas ſecum Conſcientia portat, ut in perpetuum Dives fiat. Bernardus de Adventu Domini.

Monſtro quod ipſ[illegible] dare. Semita certe,
Tranquillæ per [illegible] unica vitæ.
Juv[illegible]

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N.S. Ogden
1887

TO THE
Right Worshipful
Sir THOMAS DARCY
Baronet,
At *Kentwell Hall* in *Suffolk*.

SIR,

I Have undertaken to recommend Moral Vertue, which I should very little understand, if I did not believe Ingenuity and Gratitude to be a considerable part of it. A Vertue which is rather more

Non est gloriosa res gratum esse nisi tantum est ingratum fuisse. Seneca de Benefic.

then less excellent, because the contrary Vice is not ordinarily punishable by Humane Laws.

What are the favours to a grateful acknowledgment of which you have obliged me; I could take no Vanity in telling the world, but that I would not bring you under a suspition of *Symbolizing* with those, who gave *Alms* for the *Trumpets* sake. Yet thus much I think my self bound to say: If there be any thing in these papers doth my Reader good, when he hath given thanks to God, for this help (among others) to a Vertuous and good life; let him be thankful to Sir *Thomas Darcy*, for those encouragements of my first and earliest

Math. 6.

A Studies,

Studies, without which it may be I had never been in capacity of doing this ſervice.

Beſides this Retribution which I was in Juſtice to make, if I would be *Modiſh*, I ſhould go on to take notice of your other Vertues. For Books are more commonly without *Epiſtles Dedicatory*, then thoſe *Epiſtles* without an *Elogy* of the perſons to whom they are made. Indeed *Sir*, you deſerve it, and the Argument I proſecute would fairly lead me to it: But I conſider, if I ſhould ſay little, I ſhould detract from your worth: For as he who with all ſeriouſneſs and pretended Faithfulneſs reproves another for ſome petty

eſcapes and inadvertencies of life, would have it believed that there are no greater faults to come under Cenſure: (a note whereby *Plutarch* diſtinguiſhes a *Flatterer* from a *Friend.*) So will he who ſlightly and ſparingly commends, give occaſion to ſuſpect, that there is nothing elſe worthy of commendation. But if on the other ſide, I ſhould be as large, as Applications of this nature uſe to be, and as your *Merit* juſtly *Challengeth*; They who are ſtrangers to your *Perſon*, would not believe but I were a *Flatterer*: A Vice ſo abhorrent to my Nature, (unleſs I flatter my ſelf) that I think I have ſometimes been too *Moroſe*, and have

De adulatore & amici diſcrimine.

have been wanting to give Te ſtimony of the *Value* I have had for many perſons, upon no other account, but becauſe I would not be thought to *Flatter*. To avoid which ſuſpition, I now ſay the leſs; yet I do not doubt, but my thoughts of *you*, and all other *Lovers* of *Vertue*, are as *Honourable* as theirs who complement and brag more.

Such there are in the world, baſely Mercenary *Paraſites*, *who have Mens perſons in admiration but for their own advantage*; who under pretence of Honouring Vertue, do it a great deal of diſſervice; for while they commend Men as if they were Vertuous, and that at all adventures; they

encourage many to be ſtill *Vitious*: And yet there is ſome good comes out of this evil; for when they who do not deſerve it are flattered and ſpoken well of, it is a great Argument that Vertue is very Excellent and Praiſe-worthy where indeed it is: for why ſhould a Picture be drawn handſomer then the Face, but becauſe Beauty is a deſirable thing? This is ſome advantage, in as much as it is a conviction to the world, that, that Vertue which is ſo much commended, ought to be more practiſed: Elſe it is as true here as any where----- *Laudatur & Alget.*

Sir, If you pleaſe to give this *Book* a *Patronage* when you are

at

at leisure to read it, I hope you will find the Argument as not unworthy of a *Christian*, so neither of a *Gentleman*. However there may be some *Gallants* of the Times, (as there have always been) who think it *below* them, and *dishonourable* to them, to be tyed up to the same Rules of *Vertue* with *Ordinary* Men: yet Vertue of old hath been counted so *Generous* and *Noble* a thing, that it hath not only made Men *Gentlemen*, but *Gods* too in the account of the *Heathens*. So *Cicero* gives this Reason why *Hercules*, and *Æsculapius*, and others were reputed *Gods*; because while they lived they were excellent and useful Men. And even still

Generosum Honestum. Persius.

De Natura Deorum. Lib. 2.

throughout the world, the design and intent of conferring Titles of Honour, is this, to reward and encourage Vertue. Go on *Sir*, by your Vertuous Example to let the world know, that you believe Vertue to be Excellent and Honourable. Go on to
2 Phil. *shine as a light in this World*, that hereafter you may *shine as a Star in Glory*: Which is the hearty Prayer of,

March 6th 166$\frac{6}{7}$.

SIR,

Your most Obliged

and Humble Servant,

William Shelton.

THE EPISTLE To the READER.

OF *those two Ends why Books are written, to make men* wiser *or* better; *the latter is therefore to be preferred to the former, because it is incomparably more safe to be* good *without* Learning, *then to have skill in* Learning, *and none in Vertue; and so* cum doctrinâ descendere in infernum. Knowledge *is a rare accomplishment, and they who undervalue it, betray their want of it; for it hath no* Enemy *but* Ignorance. *Yet is it not a* Star *of the first* Magnitude, *nor the* one thing needful. *It hath many times the Honour to be as* John Baptist *was to* Christ, *a* præcursor *to goodness; yet we must*

say

1 John. *say as he did*; That which comes after it, is preferred before it. *It were well if they were always together in the same subject, yet sometimes they are not: Though I will not say of the* Learned men *of this Age, what* Lactantius *said of the* Philosophers *of old*, Ex philosophis perrarò fuerit qui aliquid in vitâ fecerit laude dignum. Si quis mores eorum diligenter inquirat, inveniet iracundos, cupidos, libidinosos *&c. No doubt but there are many in whom* Religion *and* Learning *dwell together; yet the other part of his observation is fully true:* Innumerabiles existunt & semper extiterunt, qui sunt & fuerunt sine ullâ Doctrinâ boni. *There have been many men, of mean parts and small improvements, have had* Grace *and* Vertue *enough to carry them to* Heaven. *But bare* Knowledge *gives no man a title to those* Heavenly Joyes. *This is a manifest and a considerable disproportion between these two; answerable to which, there must be some difference assigned, between* Practical writings, *and* Controversial (*though for some other reasons it may be the difference is not so great.*) *If I should speak any thing to the dis-*

De Falsâ Sapientiâ Lib. 3. Cap. 15.

Ibid.

disparagement of the Learned Books *of* Learned men, *I should deserve to be counted an* Envious Fool, *who for want of abilities to attain to what they have attained, envy the fame of their names. That small measure of* Learning *I have, I thank* God *for; and without arrogance I may say, I have so much as to make me wish for more, and to* honour *it where ere I find it. I have a great veneration for those men, whose* Reason *being serviceable to their* Religion, *are able solidly, and accurately, to dispute a controversy, and* contend earnestly *for the* Truth. *It was a brave* atchievement *of* Hannibal (*in regard it was successful*) *to break himself a way through the* Alpes *with* Fire *and* Vinegar: *Such are there within the* Church of God, *men* valiant *for the* Truth, *whose way lies through* Rocks *and* Mountains *of opposition and difficulty; yet there is a certain* sharpness, *and* piercingness *of wit, whereby they make their way plain; and it is easy to follow them, whom it was almost impossible (for ordinary men) to go before. These men have not their desert, if they be not* men *of* renown, *and* famous *in*

their

their generations. This I have ſaid, that I might not be thought to derogate from them, nor by any thing that follows, eclipſe or darken the ſplendour of their names.

For notwithſtanding all this, though Books *of* Controverſy *be very excellent in their kind, yet* Practical Books *do more nearly concern us, than many* Controverſial: *Thoſe* diſputes *are moſt* excellent *that are moſt* uſeful; *and then are they of greateſt uſe, when they inform the judgment, in order to the directing and bettering the life; from which end, thoſe controverſies which are more remote, have leaſt of excellency, and may beſt be ſpared. But* Books of Practice *are therefore ſo called, becauſe they do immediately tend to the bettering the lives of men. There are many things concerning which controverſies are moved, which we may ſafely be ignorant of; There are others which it is fit we ſhould have a right underſtanding in; yet if we doubt, or it may be are in Errour, it is ſuch a miſcarriage as holy men may be obnoxious to, and yet continue holy. But there are not ſo great allowances given us in matters of practice, as that we may count our ſelves unconcerned in them.* Be-

Besides, it is not for every one to write, nor for every one to read Books of Controversy: we whose employments fix us in obscure corners of the Country, far from Books, *but what our own poor* Libraries *furnish us withall, and far from frequent converse with* Learned men, *it cannot be expected that we should manage disputes equally with those who have better helps; or if we should, what little notice would the greatest part of our people take of them; they who little understand, would as little regard these things: But every* Body *hath a* Soul *to save, and is therefore obliged to understand the way that leads to that* Salvation, *and more than so, to walk in it. So that there is a peculiar excellency in those writings that teach us how to* order our conversations aright, *which is not in many speculations and parts of Learning.* Archimedes *did well to study the* Mathematicks, *and the skill he attained in that Noble Science was so great, that few mens inventions did better deserve an* ὕρηκα. *But when the* City *was taken, and his life in danger, it had been better for him if he had more studied his own preservation. So they who retch*

their

their faculties as far as they can, to-wards the comprehension of Omne scibile, do well, & provided that they do not in the mean time neglect that which is more necessary, the study of a good life. To promote which, in the design of this Book, a design certainly good, for it aims to make men good. What I have done in it is not for me to say; sure I am, I have meant honestly, and have faithfully endeavoured. If any wonder why I spend so many words in so an acknowledged an Argument (as if a man should write a Book to prove, that so long as the Sun shines the day lasts) the first part of my undertaking will answer him, that though it be acknowledged in Thesi, yet there have not wanted those, who for several Reasons have had but a mean opinion of Moral Vertue: Or if it were not so, yet the lives of men do greatly need some such discourse. Wickedness and Immorality is very bold, and bare-faced, and it is no easy matter to put it out of Countenance: yea in all likelihood, where Immorality discovers it self so shameless in the life, there is Atheism setled at the heart. Something therefore I take occasion to say to the Atheist more then once;

Indeed

Indeed he deſerves to be more ſharply and ſeverely dealt with, but that there is little to be got by Caſting pearls before Swine. *That little I have ſaid is too much for him to anſwer, if he read and conſider it; if he will not, nothing can be enough. For the reſt I will not pre-occupy my Reader (onely I interpoſe, that for the greater perſpicuity of the Method, I caſt it into* Books, *and* Chapters, *and* Sections) *but leave him when he hath read the whole, and conſidered the manners of mankind, to judge whether I have not choſen a needful ſubject, and that which was fitting to be ſuggeſted. If I have any where failed, as I am not the firſt who have appealed to a* Candid Reader; *ſo I hope my offence is not ſo great, as that I ſhould deſpair of the ſame* Candour. Math. 7.

Moral

Indeed he deserves to be more sharply and severely dealt with, but that there is little to be got by Getting pearls before Swine. That little I have said is too much for him to answer, if he read and consider it; if he will not, nothing can be enough. For the rest I will not pre-occupy my Reader (onely I interpose, that for the greater perspicuity of the Method, I cast it into Books, and Chapters, and Sections) but leave him when he hath read the whole, and considered the manners of mankind, to judge whether I have not chosen a needful subject, and that which was sitting to be suggested. If I have any where failed, as I am not the first who have appealed to a Candid Reader; so I hope my offence is not so great, as that I should despair of the same Candour.

Math. 7.

Moral

Moral Vertues Baptized Christian:

OR,

The Neceſſity of Morality among Chriſtians.

BOOK I.

CHAP. I.

WHen we diſtinguiſh our ſelves from the Heathen World by a Profeſſion of the Chriſtian Religion, it is to be ſuppoſed we believe the Chriſtian Religion to be the beſt in the World, or we are fools to be what we profeſs: But the Excellency of this Religion doth not lye in a ſupercilious condemning of whatſoever may be found good and laudable elſewhere, but rather on the other ſide; for the Doctrine of the Goſpel (though it have this principally to glory in, that it doth reveal *the Myſtery hid* Sect. 1.

Col. 1. 26. *from ages and generations*, viz. the redemption of the world by a Crucified Saviour; yet withal) doth owne and comprehend within it self, yea and further improves, *whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are*
Phil. 4. 8. *just, whatsoever things are pure*, &c. *and if there be any vertue or any praise* doth require us *to think on these things*. There have been some Notices of God, and some acknowledged principles, tending to the bettering of the lives of men, ever since there were men in the world: But if it be lawful to allude to a fable; as some have feigned the Sun all night to be clipt into Stars, which in the morning do re-unite in the body of the Sun, so hath it been in this case: The knowledge of God and those precepts of the Law of Nature, which grew up in the world, by being propagated from *Adam* to *Noah*, and so downwards; after the multiplying of Languages and dividing of Nations, were as the Sun broken into Stars; for the further they scattered, the weaker and fainter they grew, till at last the Gentile world was benighted; for the Gentiles did *walk in the*
Ephes. 4. *vanity of their mind, Having their understanding*
17. 18. *darkned, &c.* Thus it continued to be, the world for the greatest part of it, was governed by dim lights, or indeed shadows rather than
Mal. 4. 2. lights, till *the Sun of righteousnesse arose*: Yet still there was some star-light in this night of Ignorance, there did remain a Conscience of good and evil; the *Gentiles who had not the*
Rom. 2. 14. *Law of Moses did by Nature the things contained in the Law*. The more sober Heathens did believe

believe themselves to be under an obligation of being vertuous, and accordingly we find in many of their writings, good precepts that direct us in our behaviour in the world; which though of themselves they cannot attain the end for which the holy Scriptures are profitable, *that the man of God may be perfect, throughly furnished unto all good works*: yet are not these precepts of Morality to be despised, in as much as our *Blessed Saviour* himself, from whom our Religion takes its name, doth frequently urge and inculcate those very rules of a good life, which were acknowledged among the Heathens; and as he did himself assume our humane Nature to his divine at his Incarnation, so doth he assume Morality and incorporate it into Divinity: so that the Gospel doth require of *every one that names the name of Christ to depart from iniquity.* That is as much as to say, he that pretends to be a Christian (though he must be somewhat else; yet withal) he must be a Moral man: which is the position I undertake; *It is necessary for a Christian to be a Moral man.*

2 Tim. 3. 17.

2. Tim 2. 19.

That is: He who professeth faith in *Jesus Christ*, and therefore is called a *Christian*, whether he be so onely by outward profession, or also by an inward *participation of the Divine Nature*; this man is not at his liberty, but he is bound up, he is under a necessity (of what kind will hereafter appear) of practising moral vertues; (*i. e.*) He owes obedience to the Moral law. There is a certain manner of life, which the law directs to, and is therefore called

Sect. 2.

the moral law, becauſe *circa Mores*, it is concerning the manner of a mans converſation, his behaviours towards other men; or his carriage towards himſelf: A Chriſtian ſhould be *moral* as well as *Religious*, he muſt live *ſoberly and righteouſly* as well as *godly*: He muſt be juſt and honeſt, and temperate and meek; and in a word, fullfil the whole law by an univerſal obſervation of that comprehenſive precept, *Thou ſhalt love thy neighbour as thy ſelf*. Which is enough to be ſaid for the explication of the Terms, they are plain to any one that is willing to underſtand them.

Tit. 2.12.

Mat. 22.39

Sect 3. 3. That I may the more orderly proceed in the proof of what I have undertaken to prove; namely, that it is neceſſary for a Chriſtian to be a moral man, I comprehend all my ſubſequent diſcourſe within theſe two Propoſitions.

1 Prop. Whatever reaſons may have induced ſome men to ſpeak ſlightly and undervaluingly of morality, yet none of them all conclude againſt the neceſſity of it in a Chriſtian.

2 Prop. When we have yeilded to theſe as much as ſafely we may, yet do there remain great and ſtrong, and unanſwerable reaſons, why it is neceſſary for a Chriſtian to be a moral man, and abound in moral vertues.

By the firſt of theſe we ſhall gain an anſwer to all thoſe objections that may be made on the other ſide, and ſhall proceed thus far, that there doth not appear any thing to the contrary, but that it may be ſo; the ſecond will be a more full demonſtration of the caſe, that not onely it may be, but ſo it is, and ſo it muſt be,

be, and cannot be otherwise, because it is necessarily so.

CHAP. II.

THe first Proposition will take up the first Book; and that is, Whatever reasons may have induced some men to speak slightly and undervaluingly of morality, yet none of them all conclude against the necessity of it in a Christian. Sect. 1.

In the making good of which Proposition, it must be enquired what may have been the reasons that have induced men thus to speak: in each of which it will be found that they do not conclude moral vertues unnecessary; for they are such as these.

An extream opposition to the doctrine of the the Papists concerning the merit of good works. 1.

A sense of the insufficiency of moral vertues for Salvation without the addition of Faith and Repentance. 2.

A desire to save the prerogative of the Scriptures, and to prefer them before the writings of all Heathen Moralists or Philosophers. To these three there is much to be yelded, but not so much as to prejudice the cause; but in the two following there is a great deal of danger, as in these a great deal of truth. They are; 3.

An opinion that the obligation of the Moral Law is not consistent with the perfection of a Gospel-state; and as *Antinomianisme*, hath fre- 4.

quently uſhered in *Libertiniſme*.

5. The vitious inclinations of men of corrupt affections, have prompted them to break all theſe bands of humane ſocieties, that they may range and rant without controll, who have therefore caſt off the yoke of all goodneſſe, becauſe it is too heavy for their fleſh and blood; yea and ſometimes have emboldened themſelves to ſay, as they *who have ſaid, with our tongue* Pſal. 12. 4. *will we prevail: our lips are our own, who is Lord over us?*

Sect. 2. 1. An extream oppoſition to the Doctrine of the Papiſts concerning the merit of good works. Indeed it is eaſie for oppoſition to be extream: when two adverſaries have turned their backs upon one another, they will be ready to think, that whatever is contrary to error muſt needs be truth, and therefore though they go never ſo far from each other, yet ſtill they are in the right way: whereas commonly truth lyes in the middle between both, and doth frequently ſuffer as *Chriſt* did, with a *Thief* on each hand; for whether we add to truth or diminiſh from it, on both ſides an injury is done to it. Thus is it between the Papiſts and ſome of their eager adverſaries: for the moſt part the Papiſts erre by adding to the word of God, by being wiſe above what is written: To the *Scriptures* they add *Traditions*, and make them of equal Authority. We acknowledge a *power in the Church* Artic. 20. *to decree rites or ceremonies, and authority in controverſies of Faith*, they add *Infallibility* to that Authority. We acknowledge a ſuperiority of order and juriſdiction, they add the ſupremacy

of their Pope. We own two Sacraments; they add five more. We believe in *one Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus*; they make many. And so in many other cases: particularly to our present purpose, we acknowledge a necessity of good works; they added that they are meritorious. Now because the Papists go so far to ascribe so much to good works; therefore some unwary men have adventured in contradiction to them, to ascribe too little: if they be necessary, the Papists make them meritorious; on the contrary, lest they should be thought meritorious, some have judged them little or not at all necessary. The extream opposite to the *Papists* in this case is the *Antinomian*, whom yet I reserve for another Head afterwards, their Doctrine being of so dangerous concernment, that it doth deserve a distinct consideration; now I only consider them as those who in contradicting the Papists have run themselves into as great a danger on the other side. 1 Tim. 2. 5

Utrinque in contrarias partes velut in extremitates scindunter adversarii: Hinc Pontificii plus æquo ad dextram vergunt, dum causam salutis nostræ in legis operibus ponunt; illinc Antinomi ad sinistram, dum legis usum omnem & obligationem explodunt. *On either hand adversaries run into extreams: The Papists erre too much on the right hand, by making good works the cause of our salvation: The Antinomians on the left, by denying that there is any use of, or obligation to the law.* Holdsw. Lect. 19. P. 158.

Thus it appears to have been in the difference between *George Major* and *Nicholas Amsdorfius*, two German Divines. *Major* defends Sect. 3.

Melch. Adam. in vitis eorum.

fends this Propoſition according to Scripture, *Bonorum operum ſtudium eſt neceſſarium ad ſalutem. The ſtudy of good works is neceſſary to ſalvation.* Againſt this *Flacius Illyricus* and *Amſdorfius* cry out amain, It is a Popiſh Doctrine, and would introduce merit; and therefore they oppoſe this bold and wicked ſpeech to it, *Bona opera ſunt noxia & perniciosa ad ſalutem. Good works are hurtful and pernicious to ſalvation.* Which proceeding, out of a diſlike to the Popiſh Doctrine of merit, had been juſt if it had gone no farther; for it *is a doctrine which* (as a very Learned and Reverend Prelate ſaith) *from our very hearts we deteſt and abhor.* But ſee how eaſie it is for men to contend for victory rather than truth, and rather than not oppoſe an adverſary, they will condemn him though he be Innocent. Many men contend for the truth as men run for the ball; when they come at it, they ſtep over it or kick out of the way, to wreſtle with their adverſary: whereas the truth of the caſe is, we do not merit by good works, yet we are obliged to them; we do not merit, ſo we acknowledge. *Good works which are the fruits of Faith and follow after juſtification, cannot put away our ſins, and endure the ſeverity of Gods judgement*; yet we believe them to be neceſſary for us; for it follows in the ſame place, *Yet are they pleaſing and acceptable to God in Chriſt, and do ſpring out neceſſarily of a true and lively faith.*

Uſher anſw. to Jeſu. challenge. p. 498.

Artic. 12.

And ſurely theſe have been thought by learned

learned men to be very consistent; though good works do not merit, yet they are necessary, else a Reverend Doctor, afterwards a Prelate of our Church, did little understand himself in his disputation upon this argument, where this is one conclusion; *Bona opera justificatorum, sunt ad salutem necessaria, necessitate ordinis, non causalitatis, vel planius ut via ordinata ad vitam æternam, non ut causæ meritoriæ vitæ æternæ.* That is in few words. *Good works are ordained as a necessary means to eternal life, but they do not deserve eternal life.* *Davenant de justit. actual. Cap. 31. Con. 7.*

This Objection hath hitherto been considered as concerning good works in the general; but it doth manifestly relate to the Argument in hand; for moral vertues so qualifyed as shall afterwards be said, works of Justice, and Mercy, and Sobriety, *&c.* these are exercises of morality; and so far as good works are necessary, so far will these be found to be: the necessity of which is not now to be proved, but asserted, and vindicated from this Objection, which vulgar people that do not know how to distinguish, are ready to burden it with: when we are industrious to urge upon men the duties of honesty, and righteous and just dealings between man and man, let it not be suspected that this is done out of a secret design to symbolize with the Papists. For may not a man go 10. mile unless he go 20.? True it is we do go on part of the way with the Papists for the truths sake; that is, to assert good *Sect. 4.*

works

works and moral vertues necessary, and here we fix: they would draw us on further to a perswasion that they are meritorious; that doth not at all follow upon the necessity we ascribe to them: there is a necessity upon other accounts, as shall be demonstrated in due time.

And this is enough to be yeilded to this plea, whereupon some speak but meanly of moral vertues; and there does not yet appear any thing to the contrary but they may be necessary for a Christian.

CHAP. III.

Sect. 1. 2. Object.

A Sense of the insufficiency of moral vertues to salvation, without the addition of faith and repentance, hath been another reason why some other men have attributed less to moral vertues, than otherwise they would have done, if they had been considered out of that competition. The merit of good works, and the perfection of them, are two different things, and diversly and apart handled by a fore-cited Author; although therefore they be not supposed to merit, yet if they be thought so perfect, as that faith and repentance may be laid aside; no wonder if sometimes they be lightly made of and seemingly disparaged; for it is to preserve our due esteem of faith and those spiritual graces which are required in us over and above those Moral Vertues, which the Heathens at any time could attain to. We do not wonder when we read, *Moral Principles to such as rely upon them,*

Davenant, ut supra.

Arrowsm. Ch Princ. p. 413.

and

and seek no further, prove Moral Principles: or as another likewise of our own: *If Moral Vertuousness were able to put on the greatest Magnificence and applause that ever it anciently enjoyed among the precisest Romans, whereby it might worthily draw into admiration and just challenge, even these times of Christianity; yet in respect of acceptance with God, and conformity to his will, and being not guided and sanctified by supernatural grace; it is but at the very best the very filthiness of a menstruous cloth.* For if this be true, it may be said, and be no prejudice to the necessity of Morality; for the same Author in the same place, in words a little before saith, *I deny not, but that Moral Vertuousness is good and excellent in it self.* Yea in the Articles of our Religion we do profess thus much: *They also are to be had accursed, that presume to say, that every man shall be saved by the Law or Sect which he professeth, so that he be diligent to frame his life according to that Law and the light of Nature. For holy Scripture doth set out unto us only the name of Jesus Christ whereby men must be saved.* Wherefore, as St. *Paul* could preach Faith in *Jesus Christ* without making void the Law, *Do we then make void the Law through Faith? God forbid: yea, we establish the Law.* So can we and ought we to say, do we then make void *the Righteousness of God which is by Faith* (which is the phrase in the same Chapter) through the Law, or through our preaching of Vertue? God forbid: yea, we establish Faith.

Bolton's Discourse of True Happiness p. 14.

Artic. 18.

Rom. 3. 31.

V. 22.

Yea, far be it from a Sinner to undervalue Faith

Sect. 2.

Faith and Repentance, there being no other way of freedom from guilt and recovering our Innocency. Yet thoſe whom God hath joyned together let no man put aſunder; together with Faith and Repentance muſt go

1 Pet. 1. 15. *holineſs in all manner of Converſation*, which certainly includes Morality. He that hopes to climb to Heaven by a Ladder of bare Moral Vertues will do it as ſoon as build a Caſtle in the Air; that is, he goes about a work, which becauſe it wants a foundation, can never be brought to perfection: So that Vertue is ſo far from deſtroying Faith, that it doth ſuppoſe it as that without which, howſoever it be neceſſary, yet without Faith it is inſufficient to attain its End. Yet notwithſtanding it is true, though a man cannot build without a foundation, a bare foundation is no perfect building; wherefore Faith and Vertue do mutually require one another: There muſt be Faith, and Vertue added to this Faith, as we are directed:

2 Pet. 1. 5. *And beſides this giving all diligence, add to your Faith Vertue*; of which words more hereafter. Together with this let it be conſidered that, that which pretends to be Faith, if it be without works, is not Faith univocally and properly ſo called; It is but a *dead Faith*; It may

James 2. 17. *have a name to live but is dead*, and therefore

Revel. 3. 1. in truth is no juſtifying ſaving Faith: which makes it the more evident, that though Morality be inſufficient without Faith, yet together with Faith it may be neceſſary. I ſay it may be, becauſe however there may be ſomewhat of Argument already hinted, in what is before

ſaid

ſaid to prove it; yet it is not my preſent buſineſs to prove that it is neceſſary, only that it may be notwithſtanding its inſufficiency without Faith and Repentance. There is then no great difficulty in reconciling theſe two; the Dignity and Excellency of Faith, and the neceſſity of Moral Vertues: Yea without any diſparagement to Faith, after that we have given it its due preheminence, yet we may ſafely ſay, that though it be more excellent in ſome kind, yet it is not ſo in every reſpect; for there are ſome excellencies of a good, upright, ſober Converſation, which cannot properly be affirmed concerning either Faith or Repentance, of which ſort are theſe two.

Faith and Repentance are rather *Conditional* duties then *Abſolute*; they are our duties upon ſuppoſition that we have ſinned againſt God, but not otherwiſe; they are neceſſary to ſinful Creatures, elſe if man had never ſinned, what need he repent? And there being no Attonement to be made for that which never was, what Saviour would there have been for man to have believed in for Juſtification? Wherefore Faith and Repentance ſuppoſe man fallen into ſin, and then indeed they are altogether neceſſary; but not neceſſary to man as a Creature: But now Juſtice, and Charity, and Meekneſs, and Humility, *&c.* are abſolute perfections belonging to our Nature; and ſuch as our Innocence (which would have made our Repentance needleſs) would ſo little have exempted us from, that we could not have been innocent without them. Now though we are Sinners, Sect. 3. 1.

we

we do not cease to be men; therefore as because we are Sinners, we must repent and believe; so because we are men, we are obliged to Vertue.

Moreover Faith and Repentance are but purgative Vertues (as the *Platonists* speak) but Charity, &c. are paradeigmatical; that is, by Faith and Repentance we are purg'd from Sin, and so prepared for Communion with God; but by the other we do properly resemble God. It is therefore to be observed, we are commanded to be *holy* as *God is holy*, particularly to be *Merciful*, to *Love* and *do good* as *God* doth, to be *Meek* and *Lowly* as *Christ* was: But we are not commanded to believe as God believes; for Faith and Repentance in that notion in which we now speak, as supposing sin to be repented of, and by Faith to be justified from, cannot without Blasphemy be attributed to the infinite and holy God: yet those other things are resemblances of the Divine perfections, as might be at large shown; but I reserve it to another place. Book 4th. Sect. 4.

So that now laying these things together; as when we preach Morality, we do not go about to undermine Faith; so neither on the other side, when we extol Faith, may we be so understood as to deny the necessity of these Moral Vertues; nay if I should say yet a little more, I should but speak the mind of a very Learned and holy man, whose words I will therefore use, that I may be sure to express his meaning. *True profession without honest Conversation not only saves not, but increases our weight of punishment: But a good life without true profession, though* Hales Remains p. 39.

though it bring us not to Heaven, yet it leſſens the meaſure of our Judgement; ſo that a moral man, ſo called, is a Chriſtian by the ſurer ſide. So then, though our morality will not ſave us without Faith and Repentance; yet for our immorality we may be damned for all our pretences to Faith, which is dead without works, and to Repentance, which muſt be again repented of, if it be not a forſaking of ſin together with a confeſſing of it. And this is the anſwer to the ſecond Objection; Notwithſtanding the inſufficiency of moral vertues for ſalvation, without Faith and Repentance, yet this doth not prove them unneceſſary.

CHAP. IV.

A Deſire to prefer the holy Scriptures before the writings of Heathen Philoſophers, hath been another reaſon why ſome have ſpoken but meanly of morality, to magnifie Divinity properly ſo called. Upon which account, they that ſhall be laviſh in the commendation of Moral vertues, and for that purpoſe do frequently make uſe of Heathen Authors, may be ſuſpected thereby to undermine the credit of the Scriptures. For did not *Abraham* know *Sarah* to be barren when he turned in to his hand-maid *Hagar*? and ſhall we not be thought to blaſt the authority, or disbeleive the ſufficiency of the Scriptures, when we quote and turn to *Plato* and *Ariſtotle* together with or inſtead of the Apoſtles: wherefore it may be judged ſafe 3 Object. Sect. 1. Gen. 16.

safe to keep to Scripture-language: Yea, it hath sometimes been given out of the Pulpit (and that in no mean an Auditory) as a sign of a false Teacher, *to teach the Law and Moral Vertues, Philosophy and Philosophical subtleties, which the Apostle long ago forbad; the greatest mystery in the World is in Christ, and what have we to do with Philosophy?* Now lest this apprehension should get into some less understanding minds, that this preaching Morality (which the Heathens likewise urge) is a prejudice to the Scriptures, it will be worth our while to vindicate it in this particular; and to shew, that though the Scriptures be highly to be honoured and admired above any other writings whatsoever; yet this is no argument but there may be a necessity of morality: and those Heathens did well to recommend to the world the practice of those vertues, which the light of Nature taught to be such. Yea there will be a further advantage by making stay upon this argument; for by comparing the word of God and the writings of Heathen Moralists together, there will be found so great a defect in all them, that it will be necessary for us even upon this account to search the Scriptures: for the moral Vertues that we now recommend, though they be the same for substance with those that found praise among the Heathens; yet we enforce them after another manner then they did: It is a more Divine, Evangelical Morality; we preach Divinity and Morality both together: we do not think that *Abana* and *Pharpar*, rivers of *Damascus*, are as good as the *waters of Israel*.

Mr. *Dell* at St *Maryes* Cambr.

2 Kings 5.

We

We draw water out of the wells of Salvation, from the word of God we derive our authority, and urge commands for sobriety and righteousnesse; and thus doing it ought not to be wondred at: if we sometimes make use of Heathen Authors, as Christ himself though he had greater witnesse than that of *John*, yet did not deny his Testimony altogether. Isa. 12 3. John 5.

I must therefore go on here in the same manner as before, (but more distinctly and largely because the matter in hand requires it:) 1. Grant what is to be granted, and discover the faultinesse and imperfection of all Heathen Moralists; and yet shew that, that very morality which they have (though not advantagiously enough) commended, (it being a diviner thing than they were aware of) is necessary for us to practise. In which undertaking I am not much discouraged by the observation of a man otherwise Learned and Wise; who conceits, *that the Philosopher handles this subject more sweetly and pleasingly, the Divine more austerely and drily: again the vertue and honesty of Divines is too anxious, scrupulous, dejected, sad, fearful, and vulgar: Philosophy is altogether pleasant, free, bucksome, and if I may so say, wanton too, and yet notwithstanding puissant, noble, generous, and rare.* These words I take to be the lash of a Lawyer against men of another profession. However if there be any truth in it, it is the fault of the Divine not of the Divinity; and possibly it may presently be found, that this puissance and nobleness of Philosophy is one of its faults, and an unwarrantable Luxuriancy in their pens; Sect. 2. 1 Charron preface to his book of wisdome.

whereas the Morality of the Scriptures is, though more humble, yet certainly more safe. I proceed therefore,

1. To acknowledge that our rule of Morality of a well governed and orderly Conversation, is that *Regula vitæ & morum*, which we have in the holy Scriptures; the *word of life* is the *rule of life*: for there is some fault to be found with the best of Heathens and their best writings. We must dress Vertue in another fashion than either *Plato*, or *Plutarch*, or *Seneca* have done, before we can become *Proxenetæ* for it, and bespeak men that live in the Christian world to fall in love with it. For not to mention their gross ignorance and manifold errours concerning the right worship and service of God, even here, where their excellency chiefly lay; it is easie to observe a double failure among them, which because they themselves have not sufficiently corrected, we may not take their writings as a just and adequate rule of Moral actions. They are, 1. An excess in their boastings. 2ly A defect in their attainments; they have been unmeasurably confident in their pretences; they have slenderly performed, what they have so pretended to; they have boasted of a *perfection of degrees*, but they have not attained to a *perfection of parts*: The discovery of these will be a full discharge of my first task under this Objection.

1.
2.

I am therefore first to shew, that they have been too presumptuous and bold in some Cases, for which I give these Instances.

1. The *Apathy* of the *Stoicks* is one great Argument

gument of their vanity in assuming to themselves a perfection, which neither Humane Nature is capable of, nor would it properly (*rebus sic stantibus*) be a perfection if it were attained, but rather a stupid debasement of those who glory in it: And so some Philosophers yeild; *Plutarch* for one, τὸ γὰρ ὅλως ἐξαιρεῖν παντάπασιν, ὅτε δυνατὸν ὅτε ἄμεινον. *To cast away our passions altogether is neither possible nor Expedient for us.* Wherefore *Lactantius* hath passed this Censure upon them, that they are furious and mad men, in these two passages, to omit others of the like nature: *Stoici furiosi qui (affectus) non tam temperant quam abscindant, rebusq; à Naturâ insitis cassirare hominem quodammodo volunt.* And again a little after. *Quare nihil aliud dixerim quàm insanos, qui hominem mite ac sociale Animal orbant suo nomine; qui evulsis Affectibus quibus omnis constat humanitas, ad immobilem stuporem mentis perducere volunt.* It is a madnesse to boast of a freedom from all manner of passion, which is so connatural to us. Neither is this the onely instance of their Arrogance. *De virtu. morali.* *De vero cultu.* Cap. 2. 15. Ibid. Cap. 17.

There is a kind of a self sufficiency they attribute to themselves, because of which they need not make those applications to God by *Prayer*, which is so great and so excellent a part of our Religion. So says *Seneca* in those infamous words of his often quoted: *Turpe est etiamnum deos fatigare. Quid votis opus est? fac te ipse felicem, It is a shameful thing to weary God with your prayers, make your self happy.* It may be those words are not so proud as some would make them, especially *Epist.* 31.

if compared with another passage before in the same Epistle: *Si vis esse felix deos ora, &c. If you would be happy pray to the Gods, &c.* which last words by their Connexion do suppose the providence of God to order events for us; but there is a great suspition, that the former contain an opinion, That if man will he cannot but be happy; because he hath the free use of his faculties so much in his own power, that as *Epictetus* sayes τὴν προαίρεσιν οὐδὲ ὁ Ζεὺς νικῆσαι δύναται. *God himself cannot conquer the choice of our wills.* Wherefore wee shall find that the Stoicks parallel the case of a good man to that of God. So *Seneca*, this Philosophy promises me, that I may be *Par Deo*, equal to God, and he repeats it in other places: I add but one more; *Deus non vincit sapientem felicitate, etiamsi vincit ætate, &c. God is longer happy than a wise man, but he is not more happy*, & other expressions to the same purpose. He that would see more of this Argument, may read *Gatakers Annotations on Antoninus*. If I listed to be censorious I might observe the method of *Antoninus* his first Book; wherein he doth make all his other acknowledgments of *gratitude* to his *friends*, before he gives his *Thanks to God*. But it shall suffice to pass him with this observation, though he seem freely to acknowledge where he got good, whether from God or man; yet I do not remember, that he is sensible of humane frailties, but he seems to be of the same mind as to the whole carriage of his life, as in the case of his anger towards *Rusticus*: though he were often angry, yet he did

Dissert arri. Cap. 1

Sen. Ep. 48.

Ib. Ep. 73

P. 65.

Cap. 1. Vers. Finem.

did nothing to make him repent. From such instances as these I gather that the Philosophers had too great an opinion of themselves, & did not wel understand their dependance upon God, and how necessary it is to pray without ceasing. 1 Thess. 5. 17.

It is true *Seneca* makes a handsome excuse not onely for the Stoicks but for other Philosophers (who have been vain-glorious enough to see it in one another, though not to acknowledge it in themselves; witnesse the retort of *Plato* upon *Diogenes*, *Calco Platonis Fastum, at cum Majori fastu.*) In his Book of a happy life: *Aliter loqueris aliter vivis* &c. *If you object thus to me, you discourse better then you live: I answer, this hath been objected to Plato, to Epicurus, to Zeno, all these did not so much tell us how they lived, as how vertuous men ought to live.* An excuse which Mr. *Gataker* makes in favour of *Antoninus* who hath been observed not to be without a Tincture of this same fault, though may be not βεβαμμένος εἰς βάθος as his own phraise is. But let us consider, if they did really beleeve what *Seneca* says of himself in the foresaid Book: *Ego in alto vitiorum omnium positus sum: I am sunk into all manner of Vice:* how infinitely did they shame themselves who beleved it was in their own power to be good and happy, and yet they were guilty of all manner of sin? And moreover how shall we understand their Paradox, That vices and vertues are all equal, if not by *Tullyes* explication, *Pares esse virtutes nec bono viro meliorem nec temperanti temperantiorem & facile potest perspici?* Vertues are

Sect. 4.

De vitâ Beatâ. Cap. 18.

Prælog.

Ibid. C. eodem.

Tully parad.

equal; if one be good, another cannot be better, &c. Now did they not believe *Socrates* and *Cato*, &c. to be good men, if so they must by this rule be perfectly good or not at all so. They did ascribe a perfection of Vertue to vertuous men; which is enough to be said of the Stoicks, who were but one Sect of Philosophers.

Sect. 5. It would be tedious to insist as largely of other Sects: of the Platonists especially much may be said, and not a little of the rest. Let it suffice to say this of them all; none of them were sufficiently sensible of the weakness of humane Nature; none of them but did believe their Philosophy was their perfection and the way to Happiness; they had too high an opinion of that Morality, which will by and by appear to have been deficient in many things: and one of them seems to speak for all, who might have been a happy man if he could have made his words good; for none needed it more then he, who did so violently oppose the Christian Religion; his first words upon *Pythagoras* are, φιλοσοφία ἐστὶ ζωῆς ἀνθρωπίνης κάθαρσις καὶ τελειότης: *Philosophy is the purgation and perfection of humane life:* and he gives the reason of both in the next words; which being spoken of Philosophy in general, may be supposed to be the opinion of all Philosophers, and is the first thing laid to their charge; they are too *Thrasonical* in their boasting; they do assume too much to themselves, and though their expressions in this kind may be look'd upon as generous, puissant, and noble, a thing before observed they have been commended for; yet

Hierocles.

yet were they never the better men for all this, for the second errour is worse; then the first, and helps to make the first worse, for when it shall be considered that they who have brag'd of more then they needed, have yet performed less then they ought, it will then be so much the more evident, that all this is with good reason brought to prove what it intends; *viz.* That the writings of the Heathen are not a sufficient rule without the Word of God of Moral Actions.

CHAP. V.

THey are chargeable as to have exceeded in their boastings, so to have been deficient in that, of which they did boast. When *Zeno* profest that piece of Stoicism, to be free from passion and so from grief, *Antigonus* caused a report to be raised that his house and lands were spoiled, and his Wife and Children carried Captives; τοῦ δὲ σκυθρωπήσαντος, sayes the story, the man betrayed by his sorrowful looks, what he denyed with his tongue, *that he was of like passions with other men.* So would another Philosopher be above all fear; but an unreasonable Creature was enough to convince an unreasonable man; he run away at the barking of a Dog, and acknowledged *Difficile est hominem exuere, It is hard to be more than a man.* Such a μέγα χάσμα there is between the presumptuous confidences of these men, and their slender performances, an Ob-

Sect. 1. 2. *Illustr. de Philosop.*

jection which Chriſtians to their great ſhame are lyable to; but then it is to be obſerved that it cannot be objected againſt Scripture Morality, that which we object againſt the Inſtitutions of the Heathen, for we do not now only tax them for their unanſwerable lives (which yet might be done,) but there is a defect in their very Philoſophy it ſelf, it doth not ſufficiently inſtruct a man, how he ſhould be a good man, which becauſe it cannot be ſaid againſt the Scripture, doth give this force to our preſent Argument, that therefore we muſt fetch our inſtructions for a Moral life from the Scriptures, not from Heathen moraliſts. The thing then to be proved is, That none of the Philoſophers have perfectly inſtructed us in moral Vertue, for which there will be a double proof, if we conſider the matter of their precepts and the manner of them; 1. They have recommended ſome things for good and Vertuous which are 2. not ſo: 2ly thoſe things which we acknowledge to be Vertuous, yet they have failed in the manner of their recommendation. It will be moſt methodical to bring all the firſt inſtances into this Chapter, which will make it ſo much the larger, for there are many things to be ſaid under this head.

Sect. 2. 1. They have erred concerning Vertue, they have thought ſome things to be ſo, which we who are taught by Scripture dare not allow; for ſuch and ſome things they charge for vitious, which we own for good and warrantable; concerning which latter, *Lactantius* hath a Chapter on purpoſe to prove; *Quòd ea quæ Philo-*

De vero cultu Cap. 17.

Philosophi putant vitia, virtutes sunt, si tamen ad finem debitum referantur i. e. *ad Deum*; wherefore referring to him in that case, the whole of this proof shall be taken up in the former, they have set off some evil things with good names: there are some things which because of their gay appearances and specious pretences they have taken for flowers, but when we come to consider them closely they are stinking weeds; and that which first offers it self to consideration is,

1. Their *Suicidium* or their *Self-Murder*: They have thought it lawful if a man be weary of his life, or be urged with some difficulties or troubles, which he knows not how to bear, to dispatch himself out of the World, and this is a great piece of Fortitude for a man to dare to kill himself; whereas we Christians who profess that we ought to have *vitam in patientiâ*, as well as *mortem in desiderio*, we ought to be willing to live as well as glad to dye; we who believe we are not at our own but at Gods dispose, and withal who think it greater glory to suffer and live patiently, then dye peevishly; we believe it to be nothing less than valour, for a man in discontent to kill himself; it is as sneaking and cowardly, as for a Souldier to run away out of the Field, because he is afraid to fight. Men pretend to be gallant and noble spirited men, and dare kill themselves in a bravado, that they may not be thought to be afraid of Death, why is this, but because they are afraid to live? they chuse a short pain of Death (not considering what follows after)

before

before the tedious and uncertain troubles of life. Now this is neither Valour nor Vertue, we come into the world to be serviceable to our Creator, and if it be his will we should serve him by suffering, it is not for us to be Judges in our own Case; we ought to be willing to dye when ever God calls, but we may not run before we be sent: Yet now this hath been look't upon as a great attainment, as an Heroick degree of Courage and greatness of mind, for a man to be able to destroy himself. So did the Romans admire *Cato*'s valour who killed himself at *Vlica*, because he did not like to come into *Cæsar*'s hands. It is somewhat that *Florus* says of him; *Acceptâ partium clade nihil cunctatus (ut sapiente dignum erat) mortem lætus accivit*; It was wisely done of him to kill himself. But *Seneca* much more in one of his Books, *Non video quid habeat in terris Jupiter pulchrius, si convertere animum velit, quam ut spectet Catonem*; and afterwards he describes his death; *gladium sacro pectori infigit, & illam sanctissimam animam manu educit*, and more to the same purpose in the same place: It was such a glorious sight to see *Cato* kill himself, that if God should look down from Heaven, he could not have a more pleasing sight. Indeed all the Philosophers were not of this mind, but the Stoicks generally are; and it is a Phrase often used by *Epictetus*, Ἡ θυρὰ ἤνοικται: The door is open for any man to go out of the world when he hath a mind to it. And *Antoninus* to the same purpose, τοῦ ζῆν ἔξιθι, and ὥσπιθι τὸν ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν: This is the valour of the Heathens

Cur bonis mala fiant. Cap. 2.

V. locum

Disser lat. Cap. 9. alibi.

Lib. 5. 8. 29. alibi.

Heathens which we may not imitate because it is cowardlinesse nicknamed.

If we proceed to another sort of men, we shall find an unnatural sin among the Platonists (at least as some understand it) tolerated and allowed, which the Apostle severely reproves. *The men leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in lust one towards another, men with men:* or males with males. A sin which *Socrates* himself is supposed to have been guilty of towards *Alcibiades*. So *Diogenes Laertius* reports it from another Author: ὃ [Ἀλκιβιάδου] ἐρασθῆναι φησὶν αὐτὸν Ἀείστιππος. which probably is the reason of that verse in *Juvenal*, *Inter Socraticos notissima fossa Cinedos*. I should be immodest to give a plain translation of those words. Sure *Plato* speaks very broadly in one of his *Dialogues*, and brings in a story between *Socrates* and *Alcibiades* to confirm what was before said of *Socrates*; concerning which discourse although *Ficinus* make a mystical interpretation in his Commentaries, and quotes a passage in *Plato* in another place, which seems to detest this wickednesse, in the sum he gives of the Dialogue; yet in that same place he confesses, *quod autem tam crebram* παιδεραστίας *injiciat mentionem abominanda est in ipso audacia, nisi eo consilio id fecisset ut eam detestandam esse hominibus suis voluisset demonstrare.* But there needs abundance of Charity to make a man believe he had this end. Now were this onely *Plato's* opinion it might be the less charged upon other men, but it seems it did so generally obtain among the *Platonists*, that so grave and sober a man

Sect. 3. 2. Παιδεραστία. Rom 1. 27. *Diog. in vitâ Socratis.* *Sat. 2.* Εὐμπόσιον.

V. Helvicum. man as *Plutarch* who lived at the leaſt four hundred years after *Plato* was in a great doubt whether to affirm or deny the lawfulneſſe of this Fact. I do not remember ſuch a doubtful paſſage in all his *morals*, as are thoſe words of his in this caſe, where he could find in his heart to condemn it, but the Authority of *Socrates*, *Plato*, *Xenophon*, *Æſchines*, &c. incline him to allow, whence I conclude the morality of the Heathens did not enough cenſure this deteſtable enormity.

Plut. De Liberis educand. p. 11. XJ l.

3. To this might be added another opinion of the ſame kind of men, the *Community of Wives* which *Plato* in his Common-wealth would perſwade to be very advantagious if it were but feaſible. But having obſerved ſomewhat of the *Stoicks* and *Platoniſts*, it is neceſſary that ſomewhat be added of the *Peripatetick*s, who are not without their errors in this kind.

Lib. 5.

Sect. 4. 4. That Ευτραπελία, that jeſting which *Ariſtotle* makes a vertue, *St. Paul* reproves as inconvenient. In the expoſition of which place ſome there are that think, that which *Ariſtotle* called a Vertue, is not here taxed as a vice but the extream of it, and among the reſt, one hath this note; *Hæc ſimpliciter ab Apoſtolo non damnatur, cum non dedeceat viros bonos, ſed ſuo tempore & loco, ſed ſæpe capitur pro* βωμολοχία *which Ariſtotle* makes the extream of it: likewiſe *Beza* and *Heinſius* though not often, yet here they do agree, making the third word exegetical to the ſecond, then is *jeſting* condemned when it is *fooliſh talking* and not otherwiſe: Now to ſpeak as favourably as may be in the caſe,

Eph. 5. 3.

Zanchy in locum.

case, if it be not directly a vice, yet sure it may not be reckoned as a moral Vertue; no more than other *innocent recreations* are to be accounted Vertuous: for if it be a Vertue for a man to be witty, then why may not bare knowledge be as well accounted goodness, between which certainly there is a vast difference, but if the words should be more severely interpreted, there would not want probability for a conjecture, that that very thing which *Aristotle* makes a Vertue is here judged inconvenient, for the two other words ἀηδὴς and μωρολογία, *filthiness* and *fooliſh talking*, may not unfitly be called the extreams of this *Urbanity*: If discourse be obscene and filthy on one hand, it exceeds, if it be ridiculous and fooliſh that is the other extream; now not only these, but even jesting it self may seem to come under censure, as being joyned with them. But because Learned men have given a more favourable interpretation of it, I do not conclude it unlawful altogether, though I have as little reason to judge it a Moral Vertue, for then certainly it would be a duty, and then it would be a sin for a man not to be witty; and withal it would be considered, that for a man to make a trade of it, or to be frequent in it, it will be found that *Hæ Nugæ Seria ducunt in Mala* —— *Horace.*

These things are toyes and yet they doe,
Bring many a man to many a woe.

There lyes as great an Objection against the Sect. 5.

Aristot. the μεγαλοψυχία of the same Author, that greatness and magnanimity of mind, whereby a man ought to judge worthily of himself, and to aspire to those Honours and greatnesses he apprehends himself to be capable of; which howsoever excusable it may be, if it be possible to keep it from that arrogance and ambition which is made an extream of it, yet considering the general temper of those Heathens, who were counted most magnanimous, we shall find not only the Philosophers but all other sorts of men that did publickly appear in the world to have been *Animalia gloriæ*. Sure *Aristotle* would comprehend his Emperour *Alexanders* daring bravery of Spirit, under this *Magnanimity*, and so were all the Usurpations of the *Roman State* reckoned for Illustrious instances of the greatness of their Spirits; wherefore *Livy* in the *preface to his History* says, *Cæterum aut me Amor suscepti negotii fallit, aut nulla unquam resp. nec major, nec sanctior, nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit.* And if all their unjust encroachments upon their Neighbours be instances of Magnanimity, it is easily seen, they mistook glory for Vertue: And the Trophies they erected as tokens of their Triumph are so spoken of by one of their own *Satyrists*.

Juven Sat. 10. *Humanis majora bonis creduntur, ad hæc se*
Romanus, Graiusq; ac Barbarus Induperator
Erexit, Causas discriminis atq; Laboris
Inde habuit: Tanto major Famæ sitis est quam
Virtutis, quis enim Virtutem amplectitur ipsam
Præmia si tollas?

To

To raise a name and get renown,
Is all that's now in fashion grown;
For this the Roman and the Greek,
And *Annibal* and all did seek;
For this men hazard all and sweat,
Not to be good so much as great;
That all mankind is more in Love,
With Fame than Vertue this doth prove;
Scarce any body cares to be,
A Vertuous man without this fee.

Sect. 6. It were easie to give more instances in this kind, but that we may not take a pride or pleasure in discovering the errors of others; and were there not some necessity of all this, as will appear after the next consideration is dispatch'd, I could with as great content have let them alone. So much shall suffice to prove that the Heathen Writers have fail'd in the matter of their Precepts; some things have been judged Vertue which are not so; baser mettals often go currant and unsuspected, because they have the same stamp with Silver; So have some base actions been warranted and allowed among them, because they have look't like Vertues.

CHAP. VI.

Sect. 1. BUt as it pleased God to give *Abraham* leave to argue in case of *Sodom*: *Wilt* Gen. 18. *thou destroy all the City for lack of five?* So now may

may it be said, Shall we despise all morality that the Heathens taught, because five or six or some few mistakes may be found among them: what disparagement was it to *eleven* of the *Apostles*, that the *twelfth* was a *Traytor* and a *Devil*? and why should the other precepts of Philosophy suffer, because of some few escapes among them, if the rest be good and sound, it may rather be wondred that they erred no more, then that they did at all erre.

It remains therefore to make good the second part of the charge, that they have failed not onely in the matter but manner too. In some things they have put evil for good, and good for evil; Vertue and Vice have exchanged their names and garbs, and so have deceived the unwary world: But this is not all: In those things which we acknowledge to be Vertues abstractly considered, yet we deny the men that practised them, to have been compleatly vertuous and good: which is evidently true, if the Rule be good, *Bonum ex integrâ causâ, malum ex quolibet defectu.* To make an action throughly good it is necessary, that all due circumstances should concur, if there be any defect either in matter or manner, the Action is not good; or if it be, it is not well done. Wherefore it is further to be considered that the Gentiles not having learned Christ as we have done being ignorant of some misteries which the Gospel reveals to us, have by this ignorance been alienated from a Godly life. And two things especially (to name no more) they have been ignorant of, which serve to our present purpose. They

Ephes. 4.

They knew not what our Blessed Saviour Jesus Christ hath done to redeem us, and what the Holy Ghost doth to Sanctifie us; without which two we are unable to any thing that is good, without which our best Vertues, could not be pleasing to God, and therefore must needs have some imperfection in them. *Works done before the grace of Christ, and the Inspiration of the Spirit are not pleasing to God, forasmuch as they spring not of Faith in Jesus Christ.* Indeed the Heathens did well to follow their Reason so far as it was right, but they did not know that their Reason was to be rectified before it could be right; That they were *to be created in Christ Jesus to good works* before they could *walk in them:* For how can the fruit be good till the Tree be so? that therefore a man may live justly and righteously, he must first be just; and what Mortal man can be just till he be justified? We have all sinned, and if we be justified, it is by Faith in Christ, and then we may be bold to say our works are good, when we put in this condition, as Mr. *Herbert* did, *It is a good work if it be sprinkled with the blood of Christ.* When likewise together with Christ dying for us; The holy Spirit of God lives within us; we are now put into a State to *walk so as to please God.* Upon which accounts the Morality, Justice, Honesty, *&c.* which the Scripture obliges us to, is more perfect, then that which the Heathens by the light of Nature attained to. Sect. 2. Artic. 13. Eph. 2.10. 1 Thes. 4.1.

In prosecution of this Argument much might be added; but I consider I have been more Sect. 3.

large upon this third Objection, then upon either of the former, and alſo that ſomewhat hath been already ſaid in the Caſe, under the ſecond Objection where it was declar'd, that our Chriſtian Morality doth neceſſarily ſuppoſe Faith in Chriſt; and Chriſt without us would be little to our advantage, without the work of the Spirit within us; wherefore it having been ſuppoſed already, I inlarge not upon it, but conclude, that what hath been ſaid is enough to diſcover an imperfection, in the Heathen Philoſophers and Moraliſts, notwithſtanding they have been ſo vain glorious in their boaſting of perfection, yet have they had no ſuch Cauſe; for they have failed in many things, and we alſo ſhould fail, if we had not a better and ſurer rule to walk by, *viz.* the Word of God.

Which was the thing to be granted to this Objection, though we urge Morality, Integrity, and Honeſty, and a good Conſcience towards man; yet we do not refer our ſelves to the writing of the Heathen, as to our only or perfect Rule; but we believe the Scriptures teach us much better.

Sect. 4. Object. To all this it may be ſaid, It is a thankleſs office to tell men of their faults; ſo may it ſeem, yea and unmanly too, to inſult over the dead, who are not able to plead their own Cauſe: Wherefore it will in likelyhood, be enquired; for what Reaſon are all theſe things produced againſt a ſort of men, who ought rather to be pittyed, and it may be thought much better to bury their faults in ſilence.

To

To this I Answer, that they who least understand these things, yet do most need them, and this is principally for their sakes, that they may not mis-understand the design of that which they call preaching of Morality: something I can by experience say, that when Ministers have thought it necessary sometimes to insist upon the Doctrine of good works, as well as upon Faith at other times, when they have urged upon their Auditors a just, and honest, and peaceable Conversation, and for these purposes may have had occasion to Quote Heathen Authours, that have recommended the same thing; presently there hath this prejudice arisen against such Sermons: These men are sure better studied in the Philosophers than the Scriptures. They talk of *Plato* and *Aristotle* and we cannot tell who, and doe not seem to make any difference between their writing and the word of God. (And it is very likely there have been some who have been over-lavish in this kind.) Now as *Elijah* said to the Messengers of *Ahaziah*, *Is it not because there is no God in* Israel, *that ye goe to inquire of* Baalzebub *the God of* Ekron? so will it be suspected: Is it not because these men slight the Scriptures, or it may be understand them not, that they speak so much in the Language of the Heathen? *as they speak half in the speech of* Ashdod, *because they could not speak the Jews Language.* At least it will be thought that such men doe too much magnifie the light of Nature, and give too much honour, to those men, who were *without Christ* (unless revealed unto them by a miracle)

Answ.

2 Kings 1.

Nehem. 13.

Eph. 2. miracle) *and ſo without hope and without God in the World.* And it is very likely this Treatiſe may meet with the ſame fate; For I doe not think ſo well of my ſelf, as to expect more Candor than other men have found; Yet am I willing to prevent miſtakes if it may be, and for that purpoſe have I made all theſe acknowledgments of the Errours and Imperfections of the Heathens, that it may not be thought we attribute too much to them, or refer to them as to perfect guides.

Let it not therefore trouble any whoſe leiſure and want of better books, may give them leave to look into this; I ſay let not this be a ſcruple, that I have choſe a ſubject, wherein it is not improper to make uſe of Heathen Authours; for it is already confeſſed, that they have erred and failed in many things, and are not to be compared to the word of God: And what more to ſay for the ſatisfaction of ſuch perſons, I cannot tell. So then at laſt I have done with thoſe conceſſions which are to be made, in this Caſe to preſerve the Honour and Eſteem of the Scriptures inviolate, and to prefer them to all other writings whatſoever; which was the firſt thing promiſed uuder this head, to grant what is to be granted to this Objection: In all which, I ſhould doe very vainly if I thought I did contradict my ſelf, or that any of theſe things did ſignifie any thing againſt the practiſe or neceſſity of morality; which was the ſecond thing to be conſidered under this head, but that which need not take up ſo much time as the former.

Chap.

CHAP. VII.

THough the Heathens did fail in many things yet they did not fail every where; Sect. 1. 2. ſometimes they do give good precepts yea many times, and thoſe very rules of Vertue which they gave, ſo far as they are according to the Scriptures (but not where they contradict) are fit for us to take notice of, and being improved by Scripture they are neceſſary for us to conform to. To argue that becauſe they erred in ſome things, therefore they are not to be believed in any thing, is as vain as to ſay becauſe a man ſometimes tells a lye, therefore we will not believe him, where we know he ſpeaks true. There are ſome things in which we know the Philoſophers have ſpoken true, for the Scriptures ſpeak the ſame: As God bare witneſſe to the *Iſraelites*, *they have well ſaid in all that they have ſpoken*, though there wanted in them an heart to do it: ſo verily though in their lives theſe men be weak as other men, yet they have well ſaid in many things, they have ſpoken very ſelfe-denyingly and like mortified Chriſtians, concerning the contempt of the world and worldly things: They have given good rules for the government of a mans ſelfe, both as to his paſſions within, and outwardly for his diſcourſe and actions; they have diſparaged wickedneſs and vice, and they have done what they could to repreſent Vertue amiable and lovely, that if it might be, that might come to paſs which *Plato* ſpeaks of it as *Tully* quotes him: Deut. 5.

Tully Offic. l. 1. *Formam ipſam, Marce Fili, & tanquam faciem honeſti vides quæ ſi oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores (ut ait Plato) excitaret ſapientiæ.* Were it poſſible to ſee Vertue in an humane ſhape, ſhe would wonderfully, draw all mens eyes and affections after her. That Moral Vertues are ſo excellent is not now to be prooved, but hereafter, when theſe diſadvantages are all remooved, for the preſent it is ſufficient to ſay, that becauſe we have the Scripture to ſupply the defect of all other Authors, it argues nothing againſt the neceſſity of morality, that others have been imperfect in the deſcriptions and recommendations of it.

Sect. 2. Yea moreover it may not be amiſs to adde for a concluſion of this Argument, that, ſuppoſing we have the word of God to correct their errors, there may be very good uſe made of the writings of Philoſophers and if it be done without arrogance, or affectation of being thought to have read a great deal, it may be lawful and convenient to imitate St. *Paul* whom we find to have inſerted into the body of the New Teſtament three ſentences out of three ſeveral Heathen Authors, *Aratus*, *Menander*, and *Epimenides*, and that for theſe three Reaſons.

Acts. 17. 1 Cor. 15. Tit. 1.

1. That we may juſtifie the Scriptures as to a main part of them, the ſevere precepts they give for the right ordering our converſation ought not to be lookt upon as ſtrange things, for they are ſuch as the world hath been long acquainted with, where the light of the Goſpel hath not come: yea as *Balaam* had a deſire to curſe

curse the Children of *Israel*, yet did altogether bless them; so have some Heathens unwittingly given an honourable Testimony to Christian Religion and the Gospel, though they have persecuted the Professors of it, in as much as they themselves have said many the same things; though they could not lay so sure a foundation for a good life, nor build so high towards perfection, as the Scriptures have done; yet somewhat they have done, in the same kind, by which rude and imperfect Modells they have justified that excellent platform of a new Creature, created to good works, that God hath given us in his word.

It is lawfull to quote Heathens, that we may shame our selves, where we fall short of those Vertues, to the knowledge and practise of which, the more Ignorant Heathens have attained: with what astonishment may we look into the Christian world to see, how many there are, that know more and better then the Heathens, but do worse: we Christians that ought to follow the Example of Christ and the Apostles, are many degrees below the more sober Heathens. This is to the shame of many that name the name of Christ, and yet depart not from those iniquities, that *Cato* or *Socrates* would have been ashamed of. *Solomon* expresses his indignation against idleness, by sending the *Sluggard* to School to *the Ant, who having no guide, overseer nor ruler, provides her meat in the Summer*, &c. Now if so ignoble a Creature be fit by its Example to teach a man, as it is *Parvula nam Exemplo est magni formica laboris.* Sect. 3. 2. Prov. 6. 6. 7. 8. Horace.

See how the little Piſmires be,
Inſtances of great Induſtry.

Then may a Heathen be fit to teach a Chriſtian. Go to the *Philoſopher* thou degenerate *Chriſtian*, thou haſt the word of God for thy Rule, the Spirit of God for thy guide, which they wanted; yet did they better provide for their credit while living, and for their ſafety after death: Would *Ariſtides* have played the Knave, and have cheated his Neighbour who was ſirnamed *the juſt*? Were *Fabricius* and *Curius* ſo ſordid and covetous as many Chriſtians are, of whom the *Roman Storyes* report how little they car'd for gold and Silver, or the bribes of *Pyrrhus*? Would *Regulus* have been Treacherous to his own Country, who was reſolved to be true to his Enemies? How was Luxury and riot diſcouraged among the *Lacedemonians*, when the places where they uſed to feaſt together, were called φειδίτια *Plutarch.* becauſe of their frugality in their expences. And ſo in other caſes, It is good to ſee what they have ſaid and done, that the *Man* may ſhame the *Chriſtian*; for it is a very ſhame for us who have better helps than they, if we doe not go beyond them in all Vertue and goodneſs.

Sect. 4. 3 It may be worth the while to borrow ſome paſſages from theſe Authours; becauſe though the Scripture be more perfect, yet in ſome things, where it is not ſo particular, inſtances from others may help to illuſtrate, what is more

more closely couched in them: It is no defect in the Scriptures to be short, but their glory, that in so little a compass, so much should be contained: But in regard they are so much shorter, then many discourses of the Heathens, it cannot be imagined, but that some things should be more dilated on elsewhere, which may help to convey what is here commanded, with the greater force to our understandings and affections: The gay addes nothing to the sense and meaning of the book; yet it encourages the Child to take the book into his hand, and so he may learn the sooner. So are those illustrations, and similitudes, and examples, and apposite sentences, which we bring out of other Authours, not by way of supplement to the word of God; but to try if by any way or means, we can make any impression upon the minds of men. And this is Apology enough for the use of Heathen Authours, in the use of which it is to be acknowledged it is easy to over-doe: And it is a witty comparison of a Learned man, *That to stuff a Sermon with Citations of Authours, and the witty sayings of others, is to make a feast of Vinegar and Pepper; which may be very delightful, being used moderately as sauces, but must needs be very improper and offensive, to be fed upon as dyet.* Wilkins Ecclesiastes.

So much (if not too much) in answer to the third Reason, why some have spoke so slightly of Morality, to save the prerogative of the holy Scriptures, by preferring them above the writings of all Heathen Moralists.

Chap.

CHAP. VIII.

Sect. 1. 4. Obj. THere is another ſort of men, with whom I have next to deal, to whom I muſt not be ſo facile and yielding as in the former caſes: They are the *Antinomians*, who are of opinion that the Obligation of the Moral Law is not conſiſtent with the perfection of a Goſpel ſtate; and therefore no wonder if they during that perſwaſion, undervalue Morality. Who firſt gave theſe men their denomination, and of how long ſtanding they have been in the World, is almoſt as hard to find, as the *Head of Nilus*. *Holdſw.* *A Learned Doctor of our Church* hath taken pains in it, to whom I dare add nothing. He finds *Antinomianiſme* among *the Manachees*, Lect. 19. and higher a great deal: *In hoc ſe ſpeculo intueantur Antinomi, & agnoſcant proſapiam ſuam, Quis Pater ipſorum? Manes. Quis Avus? Tatianus. Quis Proavus? Marcion. Abavus? Cerdon. Tritavus? Simon.* Yea further then *Simon Magus* he purſues the Serpent to his firſt Den. The Devils firſt temptation was to make our *firſt Parents Antinomians*. How this wretched Ch. 2. Sect. 2. ſort of men, are the oppoſite extream to the Papiſts, hath been obſerved before out of this ſame Authour, but no more then ſaid of them, becauſe this is their proper place: Certainly they are direct Adverſaries to this Doctrine of the neceſſity of Moral Vertues, for they own no Obligation to the Moral Law; and ſo they ſay if we may credit thoſe who have peruſed their writings: There is a Sermon extant with

with this Title *Gods eye on his Israel*, which is in the design of it a refutation of the *Aminomians*; in the Preface to which, the Author reports one of their positions in these very words: *That the Moral Law is of no use at all to a Believer, no rule for him to walk, or examine his life by, and that Christians are free from the mandatory power of it.* Another borrowing this from the foresaid Author, addes this to it as another of their sayings. *Neither Faith, nor Repentance, nor Humiliation, nor Selfe-denyal, nor use of Ordinances, nor doing as one would be done, to are dutyes required of Christians, or such things as they must exercise themselves in, or they can have no part in Christ.* Mr. Gataker. Edwards Gangr.

Yea foreign Authors have quoted as bad passages, as these, though some of them to our grieve from *English* mouths. *Lex non est digna ut vocetur verbum Dei.* And again *Non admittunt Antinomi, quod nos de bonis operibus dicimus, esse ea viam ad regnum non causam regnandi.* Afterwards he reports *Richardson* to say, *condemnamus nos aliquid agere ad nostram salutem.* Yea it seems there is a Book written by one (whom *Bishop Hall* bewails, to have belonged to his Dioceſs of *Norwich*,) and set out by another, the same man I suppose who was used to such midwifery, for it was such a name, that set out Dr. *Crispe* (whom I dare not joyn with the worst *Antinomians*) which Book hath this Title: *The Honey-comb of free justification by Christ alone.* In which he discourses of the great priviledges of Believers: *That now since the death of Christ upon the Cross, sin it self and guilt* Sect. 2. Hoornb. Sum controv. Eaton peacem. Lancaster. Gataker ut supra.

guilt and puniſhment, are ſo utterly and infinitely aboliſhed, that there is now no ſin in the Church of God, and that God ſees no ſin in us, and whoſoever believes not this point is undoubtedly damned.

Sect. 3. Surely if this were all the Scriptures were good for, give me the ſting rather than the Honey; Theſe ſweet allurements of men to licentiouſneſs, *plus Aloes quam Mellis habent.* The ſting the ſeverity of threatnings is more ſafe for us to lye under. It is better to be terrified to obedience than to bee flattered to ſin: But bleſſed be God we find Honey in the Scriptures too, yea that which is *ſweeter then the Honey and the Honey-comb.* Pſa. 19. There are glorious priviledeges we hope to partake off, but then it muſt be by keeping in Gods way; that is the way of obedience to Gods commands, ſome of which will hereafter be found to require good works and Moral Vertues. It ought not to be expected that I ſhould now undertake to confute theſe dangerous and blaſphemous poſitions; that will be ſufficiently done, if the ſecond Propoſition be proved, which will give good reaſons for the neceſſity of Moral Vertues, where it will appear, that what this wretched generation of men hath filthily deviſed, hath proved nothing to our prejudice; they have ſpoken ſwelling words, but they are words of vanity, and none of them conclude againſt the neceſſity of Moral Vertues. So I diſmiſs theſe men likewiſe onely with this one Obſervation.

So many *Antinomians* as have proceeded to be *Fift-Monarchy-men*, as they are commonly called,

called, must needs contradict themselves: For that man that believes Christ will come to raign personally upon the Earth, and introduce the Glorious Kingdome of the Saints; and yet, shall not at the same time believe himself obliged to be an honest man, and Morally Vertuous; he must not think that the Kingdome of Christ will be like the *new Heavens and the new Earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness.* Which yet the Scripture sayes: And surely if Christ be Head of this Kingdome, either he must Countenance Unrighteousness or be unable to suppress it, or there shall be no unrighteousness there, or if there be, it will be no glorious Kingdome nor any such great advance, from the present Administration of things in the World. 2 Peter 3.

CHAP. IX.

THere is but one sort of men more to be considered, and they are such as make good the words of St. *Paul*, *Evill men and seducers wax worse and worse*: *Antinomianisme* is the high way to *Libertinisme*: Wherefore it is not to be wondred at, if those corrupt principles have given occasion to rotten and abominable practices: Hence have proceeded those *Ranters* in Religion, that late years have abounded with, who have made themselves truly lyable to those criminations, that were falsly objected to the *Primitive Christians*, viz. *Promiscui Concubitus*, and the like; yea there 5 Obj. 5. 2 Tim. 3.

are

are ſome that have extinguiſhed all ſenſe of Religion; that laugh at Conſcience, and will not perſwade themſelves either of Heaven or Hell: Yea they will ſcarce profeſs to believe a God in the World but that by their execrable Oaths they doe out of their own mouths damn themſelves. This is their Motto:

Ede, bibe, lude, poſt mortem nulla voluptas:
Let's eat, and drink, and game, while we have leiſure;
For Death will put an end to all our pleaſure.

And if God do not give them Repentance and amendment of Life, they will find the latter to be too True; for then comes *wailing* and *gnaſhing of Teeth*: They will not be convinced now, to be ſure not perſwaded; but then comes an unanſwerable proof, and an intolerable Argument, The wrath of God executed upon Unrighteous men, is the greateſt, but dreadfulleſt demonſtration in the world, that it was neceſſary for them, to have lived ſober and Righteous lives. In the mean time ſome of them poſſibly, ſcarſe believe themſelves Reaſonable Creatures, and then it will be in vain to argue with them; if they pretend to Reaſon, I will endeavour to ſpeak pertinently to the caſe, by producing Arguments of ſeveral ſorts, to prove it neceſſary for them, and all the reſt of mankind, to be good and Vertuous, and preſuming upon the ſtrength of them (to which I am now approaching) I may confidently ſay, that theſe evill imaginations of men

of

of corrupt minds, add no more disadvantage to the Cause, then any thing that was before pleaded: Wherefore I conclude this first part of my discourse, and I hope I have prooved my first general Proposition, which was this; whatever Reasons may have induced some men to speak slightly of Morality, yet none of them all conclude, that it is not necessary for a Christian to be a Moral man.

Moral

Moral Vertues Baptized Christian:

OR,

The Necessity of Morality among Christians.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

2. THe second Proposition follows: Having now yeilded as much safely may be yeilded; there do yet remain great and strong, and unanswerable Reasons to prove the affirmative: *viz.* It is necessary for a Christian to be a Moral man.

Two wayes an Action may become necessary: *Necessitate præcepti*, or *Medii*: Some things are necessary becaufe they are commanded; other things may likewise be commanded, yet in their own Natures they are necessary as *means* to an *End*, and would be so if there were no other command for them, but what is included in the Law of Nature; according

cording to which distinction there is this double proof of the forementioned proposition.

It is necessary for a Christian to live in the exercise of Moral Vertues, because God hath commanded him so to do. 1.

Together with these commands the nature of the thing requires that so it should be. 2.

The first of these will not take up so much time as the second, yet to make the method more clear, I assign to each a distinct Book. 1

The first way of arguing is from the Testimony that God himself in his Word bears to Vertue: God hath in Scripture commanded us to abound in Moral Vertues; to be just and honest; to be temperate, sober and chast; to be charitable and meek, &c. These are things which we may be bold to press upon the consciences of men, for we may adde a more authoritative *ipse dixit* then the Scholars of *Pythagoras* contented themselves with, we say *Thus saith the Lord* to all of them. Concerning which Commands these four things are worthy to be considered: they are many, plain, particular, peremptory commands. 1.

The Commands of Scripture for Moral Vertues are *many*, that we may *easily find* them. 1.

They are *plain*, that when *found* we may *easily understand* them. 2.

They are *particular*, that when *understood* we may *easily apply* them. 3.

They are *peremptory*, that we may not *easily* shift off that *application*. 4

CHAP. II.

Sect. 1. THe Scripture doth contain many precepts
1. for the right *ordering of our Conversation*,
Psa. 50. the Old Testament not a few, the New Testament very many.

1. The Old Testament is Canonical, as in another, so in this sense; for it contains rules of Life, such are especially the *Ten Commandments*, whereof the six last directing our behaviour towards our Neighbour, comprehend Moral Vertues. As we are *Creatures* we owe our selves to *God*, who made us for his own glory and service; but this same God hath made us *fellow Creatures*, and some of the service he requires of us, is to keep a good conscience towards man: Wherefore as it hath pleased God to direct us in his worship, to those duties, which we call the duties of the *first Table*; so withal the same God, at the same time, in the same extraordinary manner, did speak *all*
20. Exod. *these words* as we read: so that the latter are
1. the words of God as well as the former; Yea there will be found so near an affinity between the *first* and *second Table* (a distinction which God himself hath authorized, by writing the Law in two *Tables*) that unless we obey both we cannot duly obey either. *Prima Tabula est magnes ad secundam, secunda est Lapis Lydius ad primam.* Those two *Tables* which were at first of *Stone*; The *first is a Loadstone to the second*, *The second is a Touchstone to the first.* If we heartily love God we shall be ingaged to keep

keep all his Commandments: *And this Commandment have we from him, that he who loves God, love his Brother also.* And by way of reciprocation, if we love our Brother, it is an Evidence of our love to God, and his to us: *If we love one another, God dwells in us, and his love is perfected in us.* But otherwise, *if a man say, I love God, and hateth his Brother, he is a Lyar; for he that loveth not his Brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?* So that the *Motto*, which hath sometimes been otherwise applyed, is not improper here: *Si Collidimur, Frangimur.* As *Moses* brake both the Material Tables, by throwing them upon the ground; so certainly the Laws written upon them, if they be made to clash one against another, they will all be broken: for whosoever shall oppose one to the other, and presume that his being *Religious to God*, will excuse him from being *Righteous to his Neighbour*; he that shall thus *offend*, though it be but *in one point*, will be *guilty* of a breach of the whole Law: And though the Reason there added be a little varied, yet it holds good. *He that said thou shalt not be an Idolater, or an Atheist, said also thou shalt not be an Adulterer, or Murderer, or Lyar, &c. Now if thou Commit no Idolatry, yet if thou kill or lye, &c. thou art become a Transgressor of the Law, of the same God who requires both.* That which the Law of God commands is necessary for a Christian man: But to abound in Moral Vertues is that which the Law of God (the Moral Law) commands:

1 John 4. 21. 1 John 4. 12. 1 John 4. 20. Exod. 32. James 2. 10. 11.

Therefore to abound in Moral Vertues is necessary for a Christian man.

Sect. 2. Obj. To which if it be Objected, that Christians or *New-Testament* Saints, are of a higher dispensation; *The Law was indeed given by* Moses, *but Grace and Truth came by Jesus Christ*, and that such Grace as makes void the works of the Law: It might be answered, 1. That the Moral Law was given to the *Israelites*, not as *Israelites* but *as men*; and then *à quatenus ad omne valet Consequentia*: So long as Christians continue men, Reasonable Creatures, so long they will be under an Obligation to this Law: And this appears, because before the promulgation of this Law upon *Mount Sinai*, *Cain* transgressed it in killing his Brother, *Ham* in mocking his Father, the men of *Sodom* in their uncleanness, which hath ever since bore the name of *Sodomy* from them: Now in those ages they must have this Law, else how could they trangress it; for *where no Law is there is no Transgression?*

John 1. 17.

1 Answ.

Gen. 4.

Gen. 9.

Gen. 19.

Rom. 4. 15.

2. It might be Answered, that a Law once in force, is presumed so to continue, till it cease of it self, or be repealed by the Law-maker; neither of which can be made good in this Case: Upon which Answer I do not in enlarge; partly because (especially in matters of Fact) *Affirmantis est probare*: If the *Antinomians* cannot produce how and when it was repealed, we may persist to say it is still valid: But chiefly because a determination of this question, when a Law as to the reason and foundation of it ceases and is null; if it be accurately

accurately done, would be some what too speculative for every vulgar reader, who I make account are most concerned in what I write, whose practice if I may be useful to direct, I shall the less care to make them wander in speculation. Scholars do not want Books that make out this argument.

Therefore it is sufficient to say, that those commands of the *Old Testament*, which are repeated in the *New*, are never the more out of date, because they are first found in the *Old*: such are the precepts of the Moral Law, which have been already named. Wherefore though other precepts and rules of Life might be insisted on, out of the *Old Testament*, which are not liable to any just exception, yet because there is so very great plenty in the *New* thither let us go. 3.

There are very many commands in the Gospel, that make it necessary for a Christian to abound in Moral Vertues; so many that it would be long to name all; yet that it may help us forward in the practice of them, it may be worth our while to consider, that we have a greater confirmation, then of two or three witnesses: There is no *Book* in the *New Testament* but hath some commands, or something very near commands, for this purpose. Sect. 3. 1.

It is no small advantage to our cause to consider first, That the first Sermon Christ preached doth handle much of this Argument, doth enforce many commands of the moral Law before mentioned, and doth require us to *love our Enemies*, not to be guilty of rash judging, to Mat. 5. 6. 7. chap.

do as we would be done to: and many the like
Mat. 7. ch. afterwards in St. *Matthew*'s Gospel. St. *Mark*
12. ch. doth likewise repeat some of these, of *Honouring Father and Mother*, and *loving our Neighbour as our selves*.

Luke. 6. ch. 10. ch. 11. ch. 12. ch. 21. ch. John. 13. 14. 15. ch. Acts. 5. Acts. 4. Acts. 20. Acts. 23. Acts. 24.

St. *Luke* also says the same things, and directs to *shew mercy* and to *give Alms*, and warns against *Covetousness*, and elsewhere against *surfeiting and drunkenness*. In St. *John* the same Saviour spoken of in the former *Gospels*, requires Humility and Love. The Acts of the Apostles being a History is fuller of examples then commands; the judgement on *Ananias* and *Sapphira* for lying, and of the Church for love, and one heartedness: but there are not altogether wanting commands there neither, for Charitableness, *Remember the words of the Lord Jesus, how he said, it is more blessed to give then to receive*: for submission to Authority: *Thou shalt not speak evil of the Ruler of thy people*: And we may presume that St. *Pauls reasoning with Felix* of *Righteousness and Temperance* was in an Authoritative commanding way; for it is an unusual thing for a *prisoner* to make the *Judge tremble*.

If we go on to the Epistles, they have much of the same Argument, *Rom.* 12. 13. *ch.* 1 *Cor.* 13. *ch.* 2 *Cor.* 13. 11. *v. Galat.* 5. 16. *v.* &c. *to the end of that chap. The latter end of the Ep. to the Eph. from the* 24. *v. of the* 4. *ch. the greatest part of the remainder of the Ep. Philip.* 2. *ch. beginning*, 4. *ch.* 8. *v. A great part of the* 3. *and* 4. *ch. to the Coloss.* 1 *Thessal.* 3. 12. *v.* 4. *ch.* 5. 6. *v.* 9. &c. 2 *Thessal.* 3. 10. 1 *Tim.* 1. 9. &c. 6. *ch.* 11.

ch. 11. 2 Tim. 2. 19. 22. Titus 2. 12. 3. 8. The *Ep. to Philemon* is in the design of it an exhortation to forgive an injury. *Heb.* 13. *ch.* 1. &c. 5. &c. 16. *The Ep: of* St. *James*, besides that it commends *Works* together with *Faith*, directs to the *government of the Tongue, to meekness, and against Envy*, *James* 3. *v.* 2. &c. 13. 14. St. *Peter* hath many such precepts, 1 *Ep.* somewhat in every *Chapter*, 2 *Ep.* 1. 5. &c.

The 1 *Ep.* of St *John* is known to commend *love*; so likewise the 2 *Ep. v.* 3. he wishes them *grace with truth and love*; yea likewise the third, as it doth commend the *hospitality* of *Gaius*, so doth it adde a precept, *v.* 8.

St. *Jude* after he had described the sins of some of his time, *v.* 8. 9. &c. some of which were Immoralities; he doth not obscurely insinuate the contrary, though not in so many words command it, *v.* 19. 20.

Yea for a conclusion of all, 22 *Revel.* 11. when unjust and filthy men are given over to their injustice and filthiness, yet righteous men are established in their righteousness, and blessed in it. *v.* 14.

These are many, but not all the directions that are to be found in the New Testament, which teach us in our behaviour in the world and in the exercise of Moral Vertues. The force of these commands is not now to be considered, but afterwards, when it must be made appear that they are peremptory and admit of no evasion or excuse. It is enough now to make an induction and enumeration of particulars, which is sufficient for the purpose, though not

so full as it might be made: I have mentioned so many, that I may well give this Advertisement to all those who are concerned in it; that they do us great wrong, who despise our *preaching of Morality*, and do not think it *Gospel preaching*: if we may follow the Example of *Christ* and the *Apostles*, we are then certain we do truly preach the *Gospel*, when we command *Moral Vertues*; for it is evident they did the like before us, and that not sparingly, but in abundant manner. This is the first part of the Argument from the Scripture: The commands for Moral Vertues are very many, and we may easily find them.

CHAP. III.

Sect. 1. 2. THey are likewise plain commands, that when found they may easily be understood: The *directions* which the *Scripture* gives about the management of our Affairs, are not so dark as the *Answers* that the *Heathens* had from their *Oracles*: They themselves called their *Apollo* λοξίας, because of his ambiguity: we may give him another Epithete, that which the *Pharisees* without any Reason gave to *Christ*, ἐκεῖνος ὁ πλάνος. That deceitful Spirit (the Devil that took upon him the state of a God) was ambiguous on purpose, that by those riddles he might salve his own credit amongst them, though they should chance to be deceived as *Cræsus* and others were: But the Scriptures are clear and plain, especially as

27 Math. 63.

to

to these matters of practice: The word of God is a *light shining in a dark place*: Such was the World till Christs time, *a dark place*, men were much in the dark, and that as to *Vertue* as well as *Religion*, as hath been before said, and made an Argument of the insufficiency of the writings of the Philosophers: But here have we *a lamp to our feet, and a light to our paths*. So our Divine Poet expresses it; 2 Pet. 1. 19. Book 1. 119 Psa.

But all the Doctrine which he taught and gave,
Was clear as Heaven, from whence it came; Herbert Poems.
At least those Beams of Truth which onely save,
Surpass in Brightness any Flame. Divinity.
Love God, and love your Neighbour, watch and pray,
Do as you would be done unto;
O Dark instructions even as dark as day,
Who can these Gordian knots undo?

What the Disciples once said to our *Saviour*. *Loe now speakest thou plainly, and speakest no parable*; So may we say of many of the commands of Scripture: for what can be more plain, whether for matter or manner, then for a man to *Love his Neighbour as himself*? who knows not how he loves himself, and he who will not believe he hath many Neighbours, will find that he ought to show himself neighbourly to whomsoever shall have need of him, if he understand the Parable; so to *recompence Evil for Evil*, and many others: These are such things, of which we use to say, he that runs may read them: There needs no Joh. 16. 10 Luke,

great

great intenseness of mind; it is not necessary to dwell long upon them to understand them, they are plain and easie to be understood. This is now another advantage we have by the Gospel; it doth both bring us light and open our Eyes to see that light; the directions of the Word, and the teachings of the Spirit, promised in that Word, make our Rule very plain and easily understood.

Sect. 2. These many plain Rules of life are not all general, so that the application of them may be easily mistaken, but directed to particular conditions, and Relations, and circumstances of life: we do not only read in the general 1 Pet. 2. that we must *abstain from fleshly lusts*, but we Gal. 5. have particular Catalogues of those Lusts: we 1 Thes. 4. are not only bid to *walk so as to please God*, but we are told what it is that is well pleasing to him: In so small a Volume as the Scripture is, it would be unreasonable to expect particular commands for every Punctilio, for every smaller Occurrence of Life: There are general Rules of prudence, which may easily be accommodated to particular circumstances; yet evident it is, that there are many commands for persons in such Relations; For *Husbands* and *Wives*, *Parents* and *Children*, *Masters* and *Servants*, *Magistrates* and *Subjects*. Moreover there are commands for particular duties; for Meekness, and Humility, and Charity, and Temperance, *&c.* if the Scripture sometimes speaks in *Parables*, yet many of them are such which we may easily apply to our selves, as 2 Sam. 12. *Nathan* did his to *David*, when he said *thou art*

the

the man. As *John the Baptist* gave directions in particular to the people, to the Publicans, and to the Souldiers, as they applyed to him; so will the Gospel answer us, if we come with the same question: *And what shall we do?* go and *search the Scriptures, see what is written, how readest thou?* It were a childish fancy to expect to be called by our Names (as once *Peter* was, *Arise* Peter, *kill and eat*) who will dare to say, that when the King issues out a Proclamation to all his subjects; because I do not find my name there, it doth not concern me? We are all concerned, and we are as good as named, and particularly directed, in many affairs of our lives, how to exercise our selves in righteousness, and goodness, and all Moral Vertues. 3 Luke.

Here are now 3 things said to prove that the Scripture doth make Vertue necessary, by giving many, plain, particular commands in the case; but that there may remain no question of our Obligation, the 4th. follows.

CHAP. IV.

THese many, plain, particular commands are absolute without any condition that may excuse, they are peremptory and severe, and strict, so that when they are found and understood, and ready to be applyed, there remains no evasion to shift off that Application. Certain it is, that where God doth not dispense with his Laws, there man may not; It is a- Sect. 1. 4.

gainst

gainst all Reason, that an *Inferiour* Magistrate should controul a *Superiour*; but it is monstrous, that the head and the feet should change places; that the Common people, whose duty it is to obey Laws, should usurp Authority over the Law-makers, and dispute their commands: And if it be necessary there should be such a distance between man and man, for the safety and preservation of mankind; Is not there the
Job. 35. 2. distance greater between God & man? *Thinkest thou this to be right, that thou saidst my Righteousness is more than Gods?* *Elihu* first puts the question, but afterwards God himself demands
Job. 40. 7. 8. the same; *I will demand of thee and declare thou unto me; wilt thou also disannull my Judgment, wilt thou condemn me that thou maist be Righteous? Hast thou an Arm like God, or canst thou Thunder with a voice like him?* Where is the power and Authority that dare oppose it self to God, before whom *the Hills melt like wax?*
97 Psa. 2. *for fear of whom and for the glory of his Majesty, the lofty looks of men are humbled, and the haughtiness of men is bowed down.* Yea moreover where is the wisdom that may better informe God, or alter what he hath once established? *Who hath directed the Spirit of the*
Isai. 40. *Lord, or being his Counsellour hath taught him?* Out of the mouth of the most High, and from infinite wisedom, have proceeded the directions we have for our Conversations: And it is Arrogance beyond an Epithete, to offer our selves as Counsel to the Almighty, or to presume or advise a change of that which hath gone out of the Mouth of God. Unless it please

God

God himself first to repeal his Laws, it is not possible that a Creature should have Authority to usurp upon his Creator.

All the question then is, whether God himself have not annexed some conditions to his commands, whether there be not some reserves and exceptions, which in case they happen, then upon performance of the condition, the obligation becomes void and of none effect. Indeed Christian priviledges, by which we ought to encourage our selves to Christian duties, have been abused (by those that *turn the grace of God into lasciviousness*) to patronize all manner of impiety; and three things especially have been made use of to this purpose, Faith, and Repentance, and Christian liberty; none of all which do give any indulgence to Immorality, or viciousness of life, or do weaken those commands which require Moral Vertues. Jude 4.

Not Faith. It hath already been acknowledged, that the necessity of Moral Vertues ought not to be understood as a prejudice to Faith; It must now be considered on the other side, that as Morality doth not make Faith useless; so neither doth Faith bring any excuse for Immorality. If it be said, I believe in Jesus Christ, for the pardon of my sins, and for the Salvation of my Soul, upon his alone merits I rely, who hath promised Everlasting life to me if I believe; therefore what need I do any more? To this I oppose the words of St. *Paul*, *This is a Faithful saying, and these things I will that thou affirm constantly, that they* Sect. 2. 1. Book 1. Object. 2. Titus 3. 8.

who

who have believed in God be careful to maintain good works; these things are good and profitable unto men. They who have believed in God may not sit down and bless themselves with the privileges of the Faithful, without any more ado, they must *maintain*, *i. e.* they must excel, must be eminent in good works; they must be προϊστάμενοι, a word which no body that understands but will allow it thus much, they must be Presidents of good works: And this they must take care of, and be sollicitous about, and lest there should be any that may doubt of it, he will have *Titus affirm it constantly*, he must be very firm and resolute in the case, without peradventure it is the duty of Believers thus to do; to all which it is some Emphasis, that he begins the Verse thus, *A Faithful saying*, a word which he doth elsewhere use in weighty matters, *It is a Faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptation, that Christ came into the World to save sinners.* To all which nothing can be objected by any man, that doth not magnify his own private Spirit before St. *Paul*, who did more than think he had the Spirit of God; unless possibly this should be imagined, that Moral Vertues are not here comprehended under good works: wherefore let one Apostle interpret another, let us borrow of St. *Peter* to explain St. *Paul*, *And besides this giving all diligence, add to your Faith Vertue*, &c. *Temperance*, *Patience*, *Charity*. A place beyond all exception to prove, that though we have Faith, yet we may not be without Vertue; for if there be any place in Scripture

προϊστάμενοι

Antistites esse, Beza *in loc.*

διαβεβαιοῦσθαι.

1 Tim. 1. 15.

2 Pet. 1. 5.

Scripture where we are to understand Faith in the most excellent kind, it is here; for it is that *like precious Faith*, which the Apostles obtained, it was a Faith joyned with such a knowledge of Christ, as that by *great and precious promises* they became *partakers of the divine Nature*; yet this Faith that makes men like God, is not too good to accompany with Vertue, nor can it safely be alone; for *he that lacketh these things* (i. e. these Vertues) *is blind and cannot see a far off*. Now if we must give diligence to add Vertue by way of supply to Faith (as the word imports) then Faith is no excuse for a failure in Vertue. To these we may add St. *James*, who speaks as confidently; *What doth it profit, my Brethren, though a man say he hath Faith and have no works, can Faith save him?* will such a Faith which is *dead without works* be a *saving Faith*? no surely, not till these contradictions can be reconciled, that a man may at the same time be an unholy, or an unsanctified Saint, a wicked Believer, an honest Knave. When *Judas* his kiss can be interpreted friendship, then when he comes to betray his Master, when the way to Heaven lyes through the midst of Hell; when these things come to pass, then may a man hope to be saved by his Faith, though he be and continue to be, the person whom God threatens to damn for the wickedness of his Conversation. Faith is a saving grace, if it be true Faith, but *Noscitur ex socio*; if it be not accompanyed with good works it is but dead, and will never entitle us to life. Therefore though it be our priviledge

V. 1.
V. 4.
V. 9.
ἐπιχορηγήσατε.
James 2. 14.

that

that we may believe, yet this is no excuse from Moral Vertues.

CHAP. V.

Sect. 1. NEither doth *Repentance* disoblige us any more than *Faith*. It is Mercy that Sinners can never enough admire, that upon Repentance they may be accepted into favour, so as that *their iniquity shall not be their Ruine*: Ezek. 18. But it is a wicked perverting of this Mercy, if instead of *leading us to Repentance*, it encourages us *to sin the* more, because *this grace doth thus abound*; Rom. 2. 6. yet how many are there in the World, who upon presumptions of Repentance some time before they dye, do think it less needful for them to be holy and Vertuous while they live. Whereas in truth this very thing is a sufficient Argument for the necessity of those Vertues, for a failure in which men hope to repent, and so to be excused: A *Drunkard* or *Swearer*, or any other vitious person, intending hereafter to *repent* and *amend*, now continues in those evil courses; but what do men mean when they say they will repent? Do they not believe it is sin that must be repented of? He that hath not committed a fault must lye if he cry *peccavi*; why should he be sorry and wish he had not done it? If this sorrow be for that which is amiss, then *Drunkenness* &c. are hereby acknowledged to be Sins, by those who say they will repent of them: If *Drunkenness* be a Sin, then it must needs be a

1.

duty

duty to be temperate and sober, and so for the rest; and if these Moral Vertues be our duties, then are we under an obligation to them, and they are necessary for us: It is therefore evident that *Repentance* is so far from excusing us in our Immorality, that it doth suppose the contrary Vertues necessary for us; if they were not, we were fools to repent that we have not practised them; but in regard they are, theirs is the greater folly, that make Repentance a Plea to excuse themselves: and this were enough to be said in the case, but it is not all.

For 2. if the Nature of *Repentance* be understood, the necessity of that proves the necessity of good works: Repentance in the comprehension of it, is an exercise of the life as well as of the heart; he that repents must not onely be sorry for his sins, but he must turn from them, and forsake them: *Let the wicked forsake his way*, &c. *and let him return to the Lord*, &c. and therefore Repentance and amendment of life are put for one and the same thing: The old English Translation did so express it, *Amend your lives; for the Kingdom of heaven is at hand.* And certainly if a man be sincerely sorrowful for his former sins, he will take care for the time to come to do so no more, there will be a change in his life as well as in his heart: So there was in his, who would not at first obey his father, *but afterwards he repented and went.* He that repents in earnest, will say, *If I have done iniquity, I will do no more.* When sorrow is after a Godly sort, it makes a man careful, studious and industrious,

Sect. 2. 2. Isa. 55. 7. Math. 21. 29. Job 34. 32.

2 Cor. 7. *What carefulness it wrought in you.* Now if this be necessary thus to amend and change, then so far as Repentance is necessary, instead of being an Argument the other way, it doth clearly prove the necessity of a holy life. He that repents of *Drunkenness* and *dishonesty*, must leave it, else he is an *Hypocrite*; he that must leave it, must practise the contrary; It is not possible a man can leave *Drunkenness*, if he be not *sober*: And he that *must* practise, is therefore under an Obligation, so that because it is necessary to repent of Immorality: and this wicked men acknowledge; If they understood the consequence of the Argument, they must needs acknowledge also the necessity of Moral Vertues.

Some answer.

Sect. 3. Much more might be said to convince of the danger of deferring Repentance, though it be not for us to determine the grace of God: if it please God to accept of a man that is just dying before he repent and return to him (according as it hath been sometimes said,

Betwixt the stirrup and the ground,
Mercy is sought, Mercy is found)

Yet certainly the hazard is great that they run who defer Repentance; It is very hazardous whether ever they may live to execute their Intentions; They give great provocations to God, to cut them off in their sins, and in Impenitency among the rest: They lay many hindrances and obstructions in their own way, because the longer they live in sin, it is the harder

harder for them to leave it at last, if they do not make themselves incapable: But these things are somewhat more out of my present purpose, and they are Arguments that may be more safely omitted, because they are more copiously handled in their proper places, by those that write particularly about Repentance. So much for answer to the second presumption; the possibility of Repentance is no Argument against the necessity of Moral Vertues; but the necessity of Repentance is a great Argument that they are necessary.

But is not Christian Liberty a salve for all Excesses? may we not understand that voice to *Peter* (*what God hath cleansed, that call not thou common*) of *things* as well as *men*, and of the *Moral* as well as the *Ceremonial Law*? are not all things now lawful to us? is there any difference between one action and another, now under the Gospel? are we not free so as *not to entangle our selves with any yoke of Bondage?* so sure they would gladly hope, that say, God sees no sin in his people: But it is a pitiful pretence to think, that Christian Liberty should deliver us from a necessity of Obedience. If men will make a *Gospel* of their own, and a *Religion* of their own, they must expect to be saved by a *Saviour* of their own: But then wo be to those men, *that neglect that great salvation*, which *Christ* hath purchased and procured, and will effect in his own way: If we make the *Gospel* of *Christ* our rule then, nothing is more plain then this; that the freedome which Christ hath purchased for us, though

Sect. 4. 3. Acts 10. Heb. 3.

Gal. 3. though it be from the *Curse* of the *Law*, yet it is not from our *Obligation* to the *Law*: *Being*
Rom. 6. *then made free from sin, ye became the servants of Righteousness.* There is more in the same Chapter to the same purpose: Indeed the whole *Gospel* is a proof to the contrary; there is no *Liberty* may be called *Christian*, but what is allowed in the *Gospel*: It is not imaginable, that the *Gospel* should allow us *Liberty* to transgress those commands, which it doth so frequently urge; unless we think *Christ* would
Luke 11. be *divided against himself*, which is the way (by his own confession) not to have *his Kingdome stand.* Wherefore it is enough to say, that the *Gospel* being the Rule both of our *Liberty* and *Duty*, though it be true, that we have allowances which the *Jews* had not, and that is our *Liberty*; yet we have commands which both *Jews* and *Gentiles* had, and that is our duty: And then it must needs follow, that the *Liberty* which would take us off from *good works* and *Moral Vertues*, is *Anti-Christian* and *Devilish.* It is not the *Seed* of *God* remaining in men, but the *Seed* of the *Serpent*, that teaches them to wind, and turn, and roll themselves about any way, so as they may but shift out of the paths of Gods Commandments. The commands of the Gospel for Moral Vertues, are strict and severe; neither the pretence of *Faith*, nor of *Repentance*, nor of *Christian Liberty*, is any sanctuary for men of unhallowed lives.

Necessitas præcepti. And this is the proof from Scripture: It is necessary for a Christian to live *Righteously* and *Soberly*, because there are many, plain, particular,

ticular, peremptory commands, whereby *God* requires these things of us; which was the first necessity assigned, because God in Scripture hath commanded them.

CHAP. VI.

TO which Argument, in regard it doth depend upon the pleasure and authority of the *Law-maker*, it will be fitting to adde another Consideration, which will be a great strength to it, and in likelihood may have greater force upon those that are most likely to transgress. And this it is, Sect. 1.

As it hath pleased God to command Moral Vertues, so he hath added in the same Word many severe *threatnings*, to those who shall break these *Commands*, and be guilty of the contrary vices. Neither would the Laws of God nor Man, signifie much to the greatest part of mankind, if they were not *penal Laws*. We ought *to be subject not only for wrath but Conscience sake*: But did not fear of wrath and punishment scare many Men, little would Conscience of duty prevail with them; for notwithstanding that there are good wholsome Laws made, and penalties annexed; yet how many *Robberies*, and *Murders*, and other *Enormities* are there committed in the world? But if these wild Beasts had not their way hedg'd up with Thorns, they would quickly over-run the world, and make it a desolate wilderness. The execution of the *penalty* adds life to the *Law*. So therefore it Rom. 13.

hath pleased God to provide, the more effectually to engage Men to a godly and righteous life, to declare his wrath against unrighteousness; to threaten Hell and Damnation, and Wrath to come, to *Immoral*, as well as to *Ungodly* Men. *The lake that burns with Fire and Brimstone* is very terrible; but such as *Murderers*, and *Whoremongers*, and *all Lyars shall have their part in*; but not only these; *Wrath, Strife, Sedition, Envyings, Drunkenness, Revellings, and such like; they that do such things shall not inherit the Kingdome of God.* To whom likewise, *Covetous Persons, Extortioners and Revilers* are added in another place. These and such like places of Scripture there are, whereby prophane and wicked Men are given to understand, what they may trust to, while they presume upon impunity in their wicked courses. As sure as God is in Heaven, these wicked and evil practices lead to Hell: as sure as Hell is dreadful and intolerable, it is necessary for Men to leave these sins; yea, because these things being to come are not not so much feared, we find by experience, that God doth (as he threatens *Gog*) *plead against the world with Pestilence and Blood*: And these now of late have we in *England* felt, what God can do; when within the space of one year, and within the compass of two Cities so adjoyning that they may go for one, together with their Suburbs and Liberties, have been swept away mostly by the Plague, (though not altogether) little less then an 100000 Persons, as by their *Weekly Bills* we are assured. *The good*

Revel. 21.

Galat. 5.

1 Cor. 6.

Ezek. 38.

1665. *London. Wistminst*

God

God give us every one to turn from the evil of his way, that God may *turn from his anger, that we perish not*: Moreover, God can send divers Plagues and Diseases upon Men, that they may know (what *Pharaoh* would not be convinc'd of, but by such kind of Arguments) *that God is the Lord*; that it is not safe to despise the commands of God, as if he were not in earnest when he gave them. Jonah 3. Exod. 14.

Among many instances that all Ages have abounded with, of the many judgements that come upon the world for sin; scarce any Age hath had a sadder proof, then we of late have had: For before *one wo* is quite past, *behold another wo comes*; after the Plague a Fire. Oh thou sometime one of the fairest of Cities, with what Lamentation shall we bewail thee! In what a sad sense may we apply those Words; *The Lord hath purged* (London) *by the spirit of Judgement, and by the spirit of Burning: The Lord hath created* (almost) *upon every dwelling place* (of the City) *yea and upon* (the place of) *her Assemblies also, a cloud and smoak by day, and the shining of a flaming fire by night.* How did we hope that that besome of Destruction (the Plague) having swept so clean, there would be no more work for new Judgements? and therefore we hoped those words would not have reached us; *For all this his anger is not turned away, but his hand is stretched out still.* But our old and our new sins have plotted together, to provoke God to lay waste *the City of our Solemnities*, the *joy of the whole Nation.* For how many Centuries of years, hath the Lord Sect. 2. Revel. 9. Isa. 4. 4, 5. Isa. 9.

kept that City, and bleſſed the *Labours* of the *Watchmen*, that they have not *watched in vain*? For how long together hath God *appointed Salvation for walls and bulwarks*? How many Fires have been quenched, and the breaches repaired? yea, we read the *whole City was once in a manner conſumed by Fire*, (*Anno* 1086.) yet out of the Aſhes did ariſe a new City, that in ſucceeding Generations had attained to greater Glories and Magnificence, then ever the Original Structures could pretend to. The ſtory or tale rather (for ſo even *Pliny* himſelf ſuſpected it to be) of the Phœnix, gives him 660 years to live, before he fires his Neſt. It is not yet 600 years, ſince that dreadful Fire in the latter end of *William the Conquerours* Reign: So that in this reſpect, we cannot make *London* parallel to the Phœnix; God grant we may in another, that we may ſee a new City grow out of the Aſhes of the old. In the mean time, we are very blind, if ſo great a Fire as this will not light us to ſee how angry God is with Men for their ſins: We would not foreſee our puniſhments in our ſins, now God himſelf undertakes to light us to ſee our ſins in our puniſhments: And ſurely our ſins are great, for our puniſhment is ſo. Methinks I find a weak fancy may imagine to it ſelf a repreſentation of this *deſolate City*, bewailing it ſelf in words to this purpoſe:

Iſa. 26.

Godwin Catalogue of Biſhops. p. 189.

Plinies Natural Hiſtory.

Lamen. 1. 12. *Is it nothing to you all ye that paſs by? behold and ſee if there be any ſorrow like unto my ſorrow, which is done unto me, wherewith the Lord hath afflicted me in the day of his fierce anger. Call*

[me

me not Naomi, *call me* Marah, *for the Almighty hath dealt very bitterly with me. I was full, but now am empty*: full of fair Churches, of goodly Houses, of rich Shops, of stately Halls, of large Streets, of many People, but full of sin too, and now I am emptyed; for see what a void space this Fire hath made. *Why then do ye call me pleasant, seeing the Lord hath testified against me, and the Almighty hath afflicted me? Have pity upon me, have pity upon me, O ye my Friends, for the hand of God hath touched me.* Doth it not grieve you to see these Ruinous Heaps? Have you no compassion for my once Wealthy Citizens, whose Wealth is now below Envy, and they themselves ashamed of their former Pride? The time hath been, when my *Poets* have thought nothing too much to say of me; and I my self thought, I deserved such an honourable Testimony as this from one of them.

Ruth 1. 20.

Job 19. 21.

Take heedful view of every thing, and then say thus in brief,
This either is a world it self, or of the world the chief.

Vide Weavers Funeral Monuments. p. 350.

But now I cannot find any hath given me my due so much as he, who after many admirations of my glory, and plenty, and populousness, yet adds,

Howbeit many Neighbour Towns, as much ere now could say,
But place for people, people, place, and all for sin decay.

Ibid. p. 352.

Yet

Micah 7. 8, 9, 10. *Let not rejoyce not against me, O mine Enemy: for though I fall, I shall arise, when I sit in darkness, the Lord shall be a light unto me. I will bear the indignation of the Lord, because I have sinned against him, until he plead my cause, and execute judgement for me: he will bring me forth to the light, and I shall behold his righteousness.*

Then she that is mine Enemy shall see it, and shame shall cover her, which said unto me, where is the Lord thy God? mine eyes shall behold her, now shall she be trodden down as the mire of the streets. But if it must follow, what follows in ver. 13. that Chapter; *Notwithstanding the Land shall be desolate, because of them that dwell therein, for the fruit of their doings. The Lord is righteous,* and *the will of the Lord be done.*

Indeed this astonishing providence is a most demonstrative Argument for my purpose; but such an one, as I was not aware of, when I first began to argue. For before it came to pass, who would have believed, that in so short a time, such a flourishing City could have been consumed? Who would not have hoped, that some of those many Engines would have been useful to have quenched the Fire? Some of those many Thousands, that the Plague had spared, might have been able to have stopt the Flames? But *the hand of the Lord was lifted up.* It hath pleased God by a very severe proof, to chastise us into a belief of the danger of wickedness and sin, and what less can we infer from it, then

Virgil Æneid. 6. *Discite justitiam moniti, & non temnere Divos.*

Which

Which I a little vary and translate.

Learn to be good and honest, don't provoke
That God, that strikes with such a heavy stroke.

My Reader will pardon this digression, occasioned by so remarkable an occurrence. I now return.

When God gave the Law upon *Mount Sinai*, it was accompanied with *Thunders, and Lightnings, and the noise of the Trumpet, and the Mountain smoaking*, that the people might be afraid to offend such a God. Though the voice of the Gospel be a stiller voice, yet there are as it were Thunder and Lightning: The voice of the Lord in his threatnings, doth loudly proclaim to the World his pleasure, that he will have his commands observed, else wo be to them that shall presume to transgress. Wherefore because some of these commands require Moral Vertues, and some of these threatnings condemn Vice; from the tenor of this Law, I gather my first general Argument, why *it is necessary for a Christian to be a Moral Man.*

Sect. 2. If it seem strange that I have dwelt so long upon an Argument, that carries with it self a plain and undoubted evidence; I answer, Arguments taken from Reason only, though they may be very strong and good, yet may they be liable to more suspition, by those who are not so capable to discern a true Reason from a false one: It is easie to judge of matter of fact, when a testimony is produced out of the

Word

Word of God; (if there be first a satisfaction that it is the *Word of God*) then we may be sure we are not mistaken; especially when the Texts mentioned are so plain as those formerly insisted on: But ignorant and mean Men may be imposed upon; if falshood be subtilly devised, it may go for depth of right Reason: Men may and sometimes do, *pro falso non minus quam pro vero, vires eloquentiæ intendere*; as is said of *Carneades*, who could declaim one day for justice with a great deal of zeal, and the next day as much against it: Certain it is, that many Books are written in contradiction to one another; they all pretend to Reason, and it is not always easie to distinguish between strength of Reason, and sleight of Wit: Wherefore I have first premised the Authority of the commands, and by a large explication of them, have endeavoured to free them from all exception; that it may help forward what is further to be said by way of Reason and Argument. So that when it shall be seen, what an Harmony there is between *Scripture* and *Reason*, how they do jointly defend the same Cause, it may make the greater impression upon those that shall happen to be my Readers, and more effectually perswade to these Vertues.

Grotius de jure Bel. & pac. proleg.

Moral

Moral Vertues Baptized Christian:

OR,

The Necessity of Morality among Christians.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

TOgether with the commands of God, it is evident from the Nature of the thing, that there is a necessity of Moral Vertues, and so there would have been if we should suppose the Scripture not to have been written; though now that we have *this sure word of Prophecy*, we do not abstract from it, but adde some other considerations to those already named; for which likewise we have Authority from the word of God: It is therefore further to be proved, that there is a necessity of Moral Vertue, to which (for a further confirmation) I adde there is likewise an excellency in it, and such an excellency, as (though it Sect. 1. 2.

it may be conſidered abſtractly from the foreſaid neceſſity, yet joyned to it) will give a further advantage to this argument; for by how much the more excellent it is, it muſt needs be more neceſſary for us to practiſe it.

The firſt of theſe is an argument ſo worthy to be conſidered at large, that it alone will enlarge this Book to the bigneſs of both the former; yet I hope I ſhall enlarge upon nothing impertinent or unworthy notice taking.

Sect. 2. 1. There is a neceſſity of Moral Vertue not onely out of obedience to a command, but it is neceſſary as *a means in order to an end.* So far as an end is neceſſary to be obtained, ſo far thoſe means muſt neceſſarily be uſed, without which we cannot attain that end. Now there are theſe four ends and purpoſes for the obtaining of which we ought to be vertuous in our Converſation.

Neceſſitas medii.

1. That our Lives may be good.
2. That our Deaths may be ſafe.
3. That both may be comfortable to our ſelves.
4. That by one or both we may be profitable to others. Which are all over and above and beſides this, that we may pleaſe God, which was the former Argument: for we cannot pleaſe God but by obedience to his Commands.

1. We muſt be vertuous that our lives may be good: for which two things muſt be proved.

1. That there is a goodneſs in theſe Moral actions.

2. Such a goodneſs as without which we cannot be ſaid to be men of good lives.

Sect. 3 1. There is a goodneſs in Moral Vertue

ἐστι τὰ καλὰ καὶ ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, *These* Tit. 3. 8.
things are good and profitable to men. The good-
ness of an Action consists in its agreeableness to its
rule: Now because these *Moral* Vertues are ac-
cording to *Rule*, therefore they must needs be
good. Which is easily proved, if one thing be
but supposed, *viz.* that Man is a reasonable
creature: Which proposition if any man shall
deny, or profess to doubt of, there is little to be
got by arguing with him; for he doth pro-
fess himself to be uncapable to discern of an
Argument: He must be taught by *Correction*
rather then *Instruction*: He must be taught as
we teach Dogs, *Argumento baculino, with a wood-*
en Argument. Wherefore supposing this, that
man hath some nobler principle in him, then a
Hog or a Dog, somewhat above life and sense
and motion; he is a Creature endued with
Reason, with an Understanding to discern what
is truth, and a Will to chuse what is good; I
am then to demonstrate that which if all men
were vertuous would need no other demonstra-
tion: But the wicked excesses and abominable
debaucheries of a great part of the world (not
excepting those that live in the Christian
world) give occasion to think, that wickedness
doth alter mens understandings. (*Malitia mu-* Wisd. 4.
tavit intellectum.) So that they are not sensible
of any difference betweeen good and evil: men
will not be perswaded (at least they live as if
they were not) but that it is as lawful to revenge
an injury as to requite a kindness; It is as noble
and generous, to inflame their souls by Intem-
perance to Lust, as it is to deny themselves and

to

to mortifie thoſe affections. *Dolus aut Virtus*, they cannot tell which to prefer; it is as creditable to cheat another, if it be done handſomely and ingeniouſly, as it is to be ſcrupulous leſt they ſhould do any wrong; and ſo almoſt in all ſorts of Vice.

Sect. 4. It is not like that theſe kind of perſons ſhould leave a wanton play, for a diſcourſe that pretends to Sobriety and Morality; if they will forſake the *Church* to go to the *Tavern* or *Alehouſe* or worſe places, it is not likely they will find themſelves in ſo melancholy retirements, as to be at leiſure to peruſe an argument of this nature: Yet it is not impoſſible but out of an humour at leaſt they may: An *Epicurean* would hear St. *Paul*; *Agrippa* and *Bernice*, very *fanciful* perſons, had a great mind to hear what he could ſay for himſelf: And I remember a ſtory in *Plutarch*, that when *Plato* had perſwaded *Timothy* the Son of *Conon* to leave his great feaſts, and one night to ſup with him, the next morning finding himſelf in a more happy temper of body, then he uſed to be after his luxurious meals, he acknowledged that ὁι παρὰ Πλάτωνι δειπνήσαντες, τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ καλῶς γίνονται: *They that ſup with* Plato *are better for it the Day after*: So poſſibly may it be with theſe my endeavours, if any body will be perſwaded to try, they will find it true, what upon the former ſuppoſition I am now to evince, that there is a goodneſs in Moral Vertues, and an unſuitableneſs, an unbecomingneſs and naughtineſs in every vice.

Plutarch Sympoſ. l. 6. prooem.

Which I prove by Propoſitions founded upon and drawn from one another.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

THe first whereof is this.

Man being a reasonable Creature, must of necessity have another and higher rule to act by, than brute Beasts are capable of. There is a *Lex Universi*, or a Law whereby the whole Creation may be said to act, or to be acted by Rule: The Motions of the Heavens we call orderly and regular motions, because they are by Rule, according to the appointments of that God, *who hath appointed the Moon for Seasons, and the Sun knoweth his going down.* Sect. 1. 1 Prop. Psa. 104.

The changes among the Elements are natural and according to Rule, the growth of Plants, the exercises of sense in Beasts, pursuing that which is convenient, and avoiding that which is inconvenient to their Natures; all these have a kind of a Rule to act by. Now how comes it to pass that Man alone above all the rest of the Creation should be lawless? In as much as we are Creatures, we have the Law of our Creation; but in regard we are Reasonable Creatures, of a higher and nobler Nature, than any beast of the Field; either our actions must be below our Natures, or we must have an higher and more excellent Rule, than other Creatures have. They have a Rule whereby they eat and drink, &c. They have a Rule for their bodies, which is all they are worth: We have Souls besides, and how can it be, but they must have a Rule proper and suitable to their Natures? Our wills and affections have their

proper objects to fix upon, as well as the Eye hath Colours, or the Ear Sounds: Now the objects of our wills being as different, as thoſe of our ſenſes, there muſt be ſome way and means whereby the Soul may diſtinguiſh between *good* and *bad*, as well as the Eye between *white* and *black*. It is not poſſible that every thing ſhould be fitting for us to do; becauſe of the contrariety that is in actions: If it be fitting to be ſober and temperate, then it is not fitting to be drunk; If fitting to love others, then not fit to hate and malign them, and ſo in other caſes: But how ſhall we know what is fitting or not, but by ſome Rule, whereby we may try and ſo paſs a Judgment upon our actions? Some Rule then there muſt be proper for us: Man being a reaſonable Creature, muſt act by Rule, and by a higher Rule than Brute Beaſts are capable of. Which is the firſt Propoſition.

Sect. 2. 2. The Rule which all men are to frame their actions according to, is the Law of Nature or the directions of right Reaſon. There is another Rule by which it hath been already proved, that there is a neceſſity of theſe Vertues, becauſe they are commanded by the Word of God; it would be *Actum agere*, now to inſiſt on that, which indeed is our beſt Rule. But there have been many Nations in the World with whom God hath not dealt as with the Jews of old, *as for his Judgments, they have not known them*, or with Chriſtians now: Many have not the Goſpel among them, yet they are not without a Rule; for even *theſe Gentiles*

Pſal. 147.

ſhew

shew the work of the Law written in their hearts, Rom. 2.
&c. the same Law which the Heathens call *non scriptam, sed natam Legem*, even this Law of Nature, which is an universal Rule all the World over.

If any should be so brutish as to think their sensual appetite, the measure and rule of what is good or bad; they do in effect deny themselves to have any Reason, because they suffer it to be over-born and over-ruled by sense; for if the actions of a reasonable Creature are governed by sense, what is the mans Reason good for? how can he be said to be Reasonable in his Actions, or to have Reason for what he doth? They who are thus enchanted by the pleasures of sense (*as* Homer *fains* Ulysses *followers to have been by* Circe.) it is time for them to renounce their Humanity, to go and keep Company with their Relations: Let them joyn themselves to their kinred, and wallow in the same mire with Swine; Let them go to graze with the beasts of the field, *till their understandings return to them*, as was said of *Nebuchadnezzar*; for they are not fit to converse with men. We who profess to have Reason, must make it our Rule, or we can have no Rule worthy of our Faculties. Odyss. 10. Dan. 4.

Nor is every Reason a sufficient Rule, but right Reason; if every mans apprehensions were his sole Rule, how soon would the world return to its first Chaos? into what a confusion would mankind fall? for mens apprehensions are many times either molded by their interests, or byassed by their passions, *Stat pro* Sect. 3.

ratione voluntas, their will usurps the place of their Reason, and gives a Law to it. Now mens interests and passions so often opposing and thwarting each other, this cannot be a standing Rule for all mankind, because of the manifest inconveniencies, and disturbances, and disorders that would follow hereupon. The former Rule of sense is too short, and therefore not adæquate, nor proportioned to the vast dimensions of a reasonable Soul: The latter is crooked, a *Lesbian* Rule, that will bend whither a man would have it; wherefore neither of these is fit to measure our actions by, if we would know when we do well or ill.

We must therefore distinguish between *the Reason of the man*, and *the Reason of the thing*: The Reason of the man is corrupt sometimes and depraved, and makes men put *good for evil*, and *evil for good*: But the Reason of the thing is constant, and certain, and uniform; that is, the Law of Nature and the directions of right Reason, which every man may attain to, if he do not blind himself by prejudice or passion; for it is that we are born with, *viz.* a Conscience of good and evil: And this Law and Conscience (especially as it is supported and confirmed by the Law of God, & his Commands in his Word) is a Rule whereby we are to guide our conversations. So then, if the Vertues we speak of will abide this Test, if they be found right according to this Rule, they must needs be good Actions; for there cannot be any goodness in any Action, if it be not

not in conformity to its Rule: which makes room for the 3. Proposition.

Honesty, and Justice, and Moral Vertues, as they have been before proved to be according to Scripture Rule; so are they agreeable to the Law of Nature, and therefore have a goodness in them, because they are so agreeable: which, to save a more operose manner of proof, is sufficiently manifest by this one Argument, which if it be true, must needs be convincing to all sorts of persons. The Argument is this; It is universally acknowledged by all men, whether good or bad; whether they practise Vertue or despise it, yet is Vertue acknowledged to be a fitting and becoming thing, and agreeable to our Natures. Sect. 4. 3.

1. Concerning vertuous and sober men it is no doubt: they would never take the pains to climb the Hill of Vertue, did they not believe, that when they had conquered the first difficulties, they should find afterwards a more suitableness to their Natures, and a pleasure in the attainment: For no man that studies to be Vertuous, but will find the *Philosophers* were not much mistaken in it, when they thought, as *Lactantius* represents them; *Viam, quæ sit assignata virtutibus, primo aditu esse arduam volnerunt, & confragosam; in quâ si quis difficultate superatâ, in summum ejus evaserit; habere eum de cætero planum iter, lucidum amœnumq; campum, & omnes laborum suorum capere fructus uberes atq; jucundos.* De vero Cultu cap. 3. The first attempts of Vertue are difficult: The bridling of our passions is like the backing of a

Gult, it cannot be done but warily and by degrees, and that not without Labour: Now were not these things *Pulchra*, as well as *Difficilia*, were it not an excellent thing thus to do; at least, did not those men that thus behave themselves believe so, there can no good Reason be given why they should take so much pains to no purpose. Vertuous men believe Vertue and Goodness to be the same thing, or else it would never draw them so powerfully to an admiration of it: τὸ καλὸν καλεῖ, *evocat ad sui amorem vi quâdam Magneticâ*. Men would never follow Vertue for Vertues sake, if they did not believe it carried its reward along with it. Now if the Rule be good, that *Credendum est Artifici in suâ arte*, Men are to be believed there, where they have most experience; though men of corrupt affections and vitious practices should deny that there is any goodness in Vertue, yet would it be no great Argument on the other side; for whom should we sooner believe than those who have tasted, and seen and tryed? for thus much is certain, that all men who practise Vertue, believe it to be agreeable to their Natures.

Sibbs *ad Clerum.*

CHAP. III.

Sect. 1. 2. BUt what if it be found that those who trample Vertue under their feet, and will not profess to owne any obligation to it, yet their Consciences recoil within them, and they themselves believe what they outwardly and

and in works deny; namely, that it is best to be Vertuous? this will be a great evidence in the case, and this witness is true: Wicked men bear witness to Vertue commonly when they dye, or if not so, yet certainly sometimes while they live.

Death brings Men to a sober sadness: The frolicks of life expire like a flaring Candle in a stink, and leave filthy and troublesome remembrances of themselves behind them. It is a common conceit of many people, that when the Devil assumes a humane shape, he alwaies betrayes himself by a Cloven Foot; surely so is it in the lives of Men, who *are of their Father the Devil*: whatever shapes and disguises they have put on, yet the lower end of their life is cloven-footed, they discover a breach, that they have made upon their Consciences; they acknowledge at the last that they have been Sinners, they have not done well to be Drunkards or Swearers, to cheat their Neighbours, *&c.* for which they now say, *Lord have Mercy upon us*: that supposes they are in danger of being *Miserable*, else they would not need *Mercy*: If they may be *Miserable*, then sure they have *sinned*, else how should they discern it? Now I argue, are these Mens *First* or *Second thoughts* like to be *Wisest*, and neerer to the truth of the case? Their eager pursuits of sin while they lived, have had much of their will and fancy, and corrupt Affections, but little of their Reason; and so when the Evil Spirit is upon *Saul*, it is no wonder if he cast a javelin at *David*, and afterwards at *Jonathan*, his best 1. 1 Sam. 18. & 20. ch.

Friends; but when his Reason returns to him, he acknowledges his errour, and says that
1 Sam. 24. *David was more righteous then he.* In like manner many Men hate those Vertues which are *according to Gods own heart*, as *David* was; but this is during the prevalency of the *Evil Spirit*; when they come to die, as the Soul is loosning from the Body, so by degrees they are wrought off from the deceits of sense and the temptations of the World; when they are at *Deaths door*, and see it opened for them, then they have another representation of themselves: Sculls and dead Mens Bones, and the Worms that are to feed upon them; and besides, a dismal pre-occupation of their thoughts concerning the dreadful day of Judgement; these things alter the case. Then the Men who would sometimes *fill themselves with costly Wine*
Wisd. 20. *and Ointments, and crown themselves with Rose-buds, to be partakers of their wantonness*, &c.
Wisd. 4. *yet shall be afraid and remember their sins, and their own wickedness shall come before them to convince them: Yea they shall change their minds, and sigh for grief of mind, and say within them-*
Wisd. 5. *selves; This is he whom we sometimes had in derision, and in a Parable of reproach: We fools counted his life madness, and his end without Honour: How is he counted among the Children of God, and his portion is among the Saints!* If this be *Apocryphal*, yet it is good sense, and the more likely to be true, because *Canonical Scripture* gives us a like instance; wicked *Balaam* did even before his death desire *to dye*
Numb. 23. *the death of the Righteous, and that his last end should*

should be like his. Herein are many wicked men like *Balaam*, of whom we read this passage: *Balaam the Son of Beor hath said, and the man whose eyes are open hath said. Dixit vir occlusus oculo*, says *Montanus*, according to the letter of the Hebrew: The *Margin* of our *Translation* hath this Exposition of it: *The Man who had his eyes shut, but now open.* There is a beauty and lustre in Vertue, against which Vitious Men shut their eyes, and *will not see, but they shall see and be ashamed*: When death is closing their bodily eyes till the Resurrection, then the understanding opens, and discerns the folly of the fore-past life; when it is growing too late to *amend*, then Men begin to *Repent*, and proceed thus far at least, to acknowledge they have done ill, and to owne a goodness in Vertue, and an agreeableness to their natures and right reason. Numb. 24. Isa. 26.

This observation is common and of easie notice taking, that many prophane Men are thus affected when they dye: But it is true withal, that this *General Rule* among others hath its *Exceptions*: The Consciences of some Men are past feeling while they live, and are not awakened when they dye: As *Pope* Boniface *the 8th lived like a Lyon* and *dyed like a Dog*. So is many a wicked Man in this sense, *Primus ad extremum similis sibi*, Sect. 2.

From first to last one and the same,
He lives in sin, dyes without shame.

They

They live like Beasts, and so they dye: they sin like *Lions* boldly, and undauntedly, and fiercely; they dye like *Dogs* wretchedly, and churlishly, and basely; without the understanding of a Man to consider whither they are going, without Faith in God, or love to Heaven, or Fear of Hell: Yet notwithstanding all this, as we say of Brute Beasts, that they have some semblances of Reason in many of their Actions, (of which *Plutarch* give many instances in his Book *De solertiâ Animalium*) so these Brutish Men while they live, have some Candle-light of their understandings (*The Spirit of a man is the Candle of the Lord*) not extinct, though it be shut up in a dark Lanthorn, and do not discover it self to others, unless it be at unawares.

Prov. 20.

Sect. 3. 2. For 2. There are some certain times and seasons wherein the most vitious persons that are, acknowledge the Vertues contrary to their practice to be agreeable to right Reason; for which there are these Evidences.

1. Many Men who will not leave sin, yet will dissemble it; It is not much more common for a Malefactor at the Bar to plead *not Guilty*, then for a Drunkard when he is sober, to deny that he was drunk: And so they that will swear, will lye, and deny that they did swear; and he that would revenge himself upon his Neighbour, will not owne it to be Revenge: he that would cheat his Neighbour, would be thought an honest Man, *&c.* wherefore now in all this, were not these vices contrary to right Reason, and the Vertues they oppose agreeable

greeable thereto? Why should any Man be ashamed of that, which he doth not believe to be unlawful? If it be a Vertue to be Drunk or Knavish, why do not Men avow and profess it, and make as much conscience of being Drunk, as others do to be Sober? Herein did *Gehazi*, *Ananias*, and *Sapphira*, and others betray themselves; when a Man denies a fact which he knows himself to have committed, he is therein a self-condemned Man: He denies it, because he is loth to owne it, and therefore Men do not owne their sins, because they know them to be sins, and the Vertues that are contrary to them to be good and reasonable Actions.

If it happen that wicked Men do for some time forbear their excess of wickedness, and do some good action: If a riotous debauched person continues sober, whether for want of opportunity or ability to sin; or if because others are, he be charitable to the Poor, or forgive an Injury, or the like; how quickly doth he proclaim his Righteousness, and take occasion to commend himself! As *Jehu* would have his *zeal for the Lord* taken notice of, when yet he was but a Hypocrite: And the *Pharisees* (likewise Hypocrites) would *sound a Trumpet when they gave their Alms*: Such Hypocrites still there are, who in a sense but little commendable, would make a Vertue of necessity; because they could not sin, they would be thought Vertuous because they did not. A Knave that is made to be Vertuous against his will, how ready is he to alledge that

Sect. 4. 2.

2 Kings 10.

Mat. 6.

as

as an Argument for himself, and to boast that he did no wrong! This supposeth Vertue to be praise-worthy, else why should they praise themselves for it, when yet they are not Vertuous out of love to it, but only because they cannot safely commit vice?

Sect. 5. 3. Yea once more: It is evident that wicked Men believe Vertue to be reasonable and good, by the apprehensions they have of it in others, especially when it makes for their own Interest: He whose conscience gives him leave to cheat another, yet would not have another cheat him: He who would not pay his Debts if he could avoid it, yet believes it to be honest and conscionable for another Man to pay him, if he be Creditor: He who scruples not to wrong another, yet would not receive wrong from another; nor doth he think it fair for another to revenge himself upon him. I argue therefore; with what conscience can a Knave expect honest dealing from another Man; why doth he demand a Debt, if he do not believe his Debtor ought to pay him? If he do so believe, then must he needs judge this just and honest dealing, a reasonable and becoming thing; wherefore though he will not practise it himself, yet because he requires it of others, it is a sign he doth in the inward sense of his Soul approve of such practices, and though he follow the worse, yet he allows the better. The case is the same in Revenge; he that will not forgive an Injury, yet will be glad to be forgiven when his Enemy hath an advantage against him: He that will not feed the Poor,

yet

yet would fain be fed if he were poor, and will commend the persons that shall so return good for evil. By these and by other such instances, it is easie to observe how these kind of men contradict themselves: As *Goliah* brought *David* a Sword to cut off his own Head, so do these Gigantick monstrous sinners, that seem neither to fear God nor regard Man, whose boundless wickedness neither the Laws of God nor Man can restrain; yet an Arrow out of their own quiver pierces them to the Heart: Out of their own Mouths they are condemned, their own consciences witness against them; their apprehensions of Vertue in others, will rise up to their Judgement and Condemnation, because they were not Vertuous themselves; for hereby they joyn in the same acknowledgements with Vertuous Men, of its becomingness and agreeableness to the light and Law of Nature. Which being so universally acknowledged, needs not be further proved, though it may be done by other kind of Arguments: It is enough that wicked men do owne a goodness in Moral Vertue; I adde no other Arguments under this Head, because I believe it true what *Grotius* observes to this purpose: *Esse aliquid Juris Naturalis, probari solet tum ab eo quod prius est, tum ab eo quod posterius, quarum probandi rationum illa subtilior est, hæc popularior.* To prove any thing to be according to the Law of Nature *à priori*, from the conveniency or inconveniency of it to our Natures and Reasons, is a more subtle way of arguing, and may be the strongest Argument

De Jure Belli & pac. l. 1. c. 1.

in

in it self considered; but Arguments *a posteriori*, from the consent of mankind (as he there instances) are more popular, that is, more taking with, and more suitable to the apprehensions of ordinary men, and so may be more effectual for their end, that is, to convince and perswade. Wherefore so much shall suffice to prove that there is a goodness in Moral Vertue; which was the first part of my first Argument, to evince the necessity of these Vertues.

CHAP. IV.

Sect. 1. BUt every thing that is good is not therefore necessary, for there may be another good to supply its place, or a greater good which may make it useless; wherefore that Moral Vertue may be understood to be necessary in order to a good life, it must be added:

2. As there is goodness in Moral Vertue, so is it such a goodness as without which men cannot be said to be men of good lives. It is not with *Vertue*, as it is with *Meats* and *Drinks*; there are many dainty dishes and delicious drinks, yet they are not necessary, neither for the supply of our need, nor for the satisfaction of our apperites: He that must say *non habeo*, may likewise say, *nec careo*, *nec cupio*; he that hath them not, may well be without them, for there are other savory meat he may feed upon. But there is such a necessity of Vertue, as that the defect of it cannot otherwise be supplyed: for if any thing would give a dis-

pensation

penſation to an Immoral life, it muſt be *Chriſtian Religion*; but it hath been before ſaid, that neither *Faith* nor *Repentance*, nor *Chriſtian Liberty*; and it might as well be proved of every *Chriſtian priviledge*; none of theſe will indulge a man, and give him leave to be wicked and vitious in his Converſation. *Chriſtian Religion*, and *Moral Vertue*, are not like two ſeveral roads, either of which do indifferently lead to the ſame place; but indeed they are one and the ſame thing; not that bare *Vertue* is *Religion*; but it is within Religion, as a part is within the whole: for the commands of the Goſpel do plainly and peremptorily require it, as hath been ſaid; and therefore one and the ſame thing (for example Charity, Humility, &c.) doth bear both theſe names of *Moral Vertue*, and *Chriſtian Grace*. From whence it might be ſufficiently proved, that a man cannot be a man of a good life, if he do not fulfil theſe Commands: yet for a further confirmation, let theſe conſiderations be annexed. Book 2.

Though Chriſtian Religion do bring us into new Relations, yet it doth not annul and deſtroy all the old: By Chriſt we become *Friends to God*, and *Children of God*; we come to be *Brethren*, and *all members of the ſame body whereof Chriſt is the Head*: Yet notwithſtanding there doth ſtill remain a Relation, between *Magiſtrate* and *Subject*, *Husband* and *Wife*, *Father* and *Child*, *Maſter* and *Servant*, &c. and this the Scripture doth ſuppoſe, by giving diſtinct precepts to theſe ſeveral ſorts of Sect. 2. 1.

perſons:

perſons: Moreover the Scripture doth require a continuance in theſe Relations, witneſs St.
1 Cor. 7. 24. *Paul: Let every man abide in the ſame calling in which he was called. Art thou called being a Servant care not for it, but if thou mayeſt be made free uſe it rather.* And is not that as much as to ſay, that our calling (to Chriſtianity) doth not make us free from this ſubjection? Yea (as there is a *Jus gentium* as well as *Jus Naturæ*, ſo) there are other Relations between one Nation and another: There is a neceſſity that one Nation ſhould traffick, ſhould maintain correſpondence with another: *Non omnis fert omnia Tellus. No Country is a Paradiſe.*

The Scripture tells us of a pearl of greater price, of better Riches then any Merchant can fetch from either of the *Indies*: but as there will be eating and drinking, ſo there will be buying and ſelling in this World, and our Religion doth not prohibit us to have intercourſe with other Nations. Bleſſed be God we live in a plentiful land, where we our ſelves are more churliſh and barren then our ſoyl; yet it is no diſparagement to us, that we are not planted in the Garden of *Eden*. Every herb doth not grow in our own Garden. There are ſome things of daily uſe among us, our Sugars, and Spices, our Silver, and Gold, &c. which we muſt go out of doors for, to fetch them in from other Nations; though we have likewiſe Commodities of our own to export to others. Now if the trade of a Merchant be a lawful calling, this likewiſe makes it evi-

dent,

dent, that all Relations between man and man are not dissolved, there where the Gospel takes place. So then there do continue such distinctions and Relations as these in the Christian World.

Wherefore so long as these Relations do continue, there are some duties necessarily resulting from these Relations. There is a carriage and behaviour due from one to the other, every Relation doth connote some duty, else if there be nothing required, they are as Strangers that are unconcerned in each others affairs, and not as Relations. A Father must provide and take care for his Child, and the Child reverence and obey his Father, and so in the like cases. It is non-sense for a man to say he owns such a one to be his Child, and yet he hath no more regard to him then to a meer Stranger. Again, the correspondencies of Kingdoms and States, and the Traffick from Nation to Nation, do not these suppose duty? Is it fitting we should rob other Nations to enrich our own? we have just reason to be angry with other Nations that would do so to us; or is it equitable we should import their Commodities, without making them a compensation? There is somewhat required by way of Duty, whether in war or peace; whether in buying, selling, or exchanging, or any other reference that one man speaks to another, or any business that one hath to transact with another; there is somewhat just, equitable, and due in our carriage and behaviour, that is, every Relation infers duty. Sect. 3 2.

Sect. 4. 3. These duties that are required for the due approving of our selves in these relations, are exercises of Moral Vertue. In the systematical or doctrinal part of Moral Philosophy, *Ethicks* are distinguished from *Oeconomicks* and *Politicks*; yet evident it is, that the latter do belong to the former generally taken. No man can live morally well according to the rules of the *Ethicks*, if he do not order himself in his family, and political capacities according to those rules. Subjection to Magistrates and protection of Subjects; Obedience to Parents, and respect to Children; and all those other just and charitable, and liberal actions which are necessary for us to practise as we are engaged in such relations, these are duties of the second table, commanded in the Gospel, and are exercises of Moral Vertue. So that the substance of the Argument contained in these premises is this;

For as much as we Fellow-creatures are in some relation one to another, which cannot be fulfilled nor managed unless we be vertuous; It remains that there is such a goodness in Moral Vertue, as that we being as we are, and must continue to be; without it we cannot be said to live good lives.

Sect. 5. This Argument hath proceeded upon the comparison of our selves with our selves, the several respects in which Christians stand to one another. Let one thing more be added, let the *Heathen* and the *Christian* be compared together, and it will be found true, that, if Morality were necessary for the Heathen, so that where they failed, their lives were not good;

then

then it must be as necessary for us Christians: Who doubts but that Justice and Temperance were vertues in the Heathen, how shall they be judged but by the Law of Nature, and will it not be for Immorality as well as for Idolatry and Irreligion? for wherein is the Light of Nature plainer, and they more inexcusable then in Unrighteousness and Intemperance, and such like Vices, which they themselves sometimes acknowledged to be such. Now need not a Christian be as vertuous as a Heathen? undoubtedly he ought; unless the Gospel exempt him, which hath already been observed to be plain and positive in the case. But furthermore, is not vice the same now that it was of old, as abominable and reproveable, and vertue as commendable and necessary? If mens lives may rather give them a denomination then their profession, a great part of the *Christian World* is still *Heathenish*. The *Devil* is a revengeful as well as a malitious spirit: It hath pleased God to spread abroad the Christian Religion far and wide, by his Almighty power. *His name hath been great among the Gentiles from the rising of the Sun to the going down of the same.* Mal. 1. But if Heathenism hath been dispossest in one kind, hath it not returned in another? Is not the *Devils Chappel* near *Gods Church?* Hath every one that hath been baptized into the name of *Christ*, put on *Christ*? Why then should it now be thought a strange thing, that Drunkards, and Swearers, and Murderers, and Adulterers, and Lyars, and Thieves, and Knaves, and Rebels, and Covetous, and Proud, and Peevish,

and Uncharitable men, ſhould be reproved for theſe ſins as well as Hypocrites, and Formaliſts, and Unbelievers, &c. did not *David* ſin in the matter of *Bathſheba* as truly as *Amnon* in the caſe of *Tamar*? and was he not accordingly reproved for it by *Nathan*? Would Treaſon be ever the leſs crime if one of the Court or Bed-chamber ſhould be guilty of it? was *Brutus* more pardonable then the reſt who conſpired the death of *Julius Cæſar*, becauſe of his near relation to him? Surely the *Iſraelites* are taught otherwiſe, *You onely have I known of all the families of the Earth, therefore I will puniſh you for all your iniquities.* There was a greater Communion between God and the *Jews* then with other Nations, and more plentiful Communications from him; by reaſon of which they knew more of God then other Nations did: This is now the caſe of us Chriſtians: We know more of God then the Heathens did, in particular we know what the word of God requires of us in point of Morality. *He hath ſhewed thee, O man, what is good, and what doth the Lord require of thee but to do Juſtice, and love Mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?* and that which is ſhewed us we do or may know; *Wherefore to him that knoweth to do good, and doth not, to him it is ſin.* And if it be a ſin to break theſe commands, then it is good to keep them; and if it be good ſo to do, then the firſt Argument is made good: There is a goodneſs, and ſuch a goodneſs in Moral Vertue, as that without it we cannot be ſaid to be men of good lives. Which was the firſt neceſſity aſſigned

Amos 3.

Micah. 6.

James 4.

aſſigned of Morality, that our lives may be good.

CHAP. V.

IT is neceſſary for us to be vertuous, that our deaths may be ſafe. I ſhall be miſtaken if I be thought to mean, that bare Moral Vertue will make our lives good or our deaths ſafe: Faith and Repentance, and the grace of the good Spirit of God have more then once been acknowledged neceſſary: Yet is it eaſie to apprehend that Vertue may be neceſſary for theſe purpoſes, though not ſufficient. Concerning life it hath been already ſaid: It remains to ſay, that if we deſire to die in ſafety, we muſt be vertuous while we live, and that for two reaſons. Sect. 1. 2 End.

Becauſe it is poſſible that theſe men of wicked and profligate lives may be miſerable after death. 1.

More then ſo, it is certain they ſhall, if ſo they live and dye in the ſame ſtate. 2.

Wicked Immoral men, ſuch as are Drunkards, and Lyars, and Unjuſt perſons, *&c.* cannot dye in ſafety, becauſe it is poſſible they may be miſerable after death: which poſſibility hath the force of an Argument, to perſwade men to provide better for their ſafety when they come to dye: The Husbandman makes his beſt advantage of a fair day, it is not ſafe to let his Corn lye abroad, if it be fit to take in, becauſe the next day may prove rainy. 1.

The Merchant makes uſe of the wind when it is lyes right; it is not ſafe to defer, becauſe it is poſſible afterward the wind may not ſerve him as now it doth. In all caſes about our worldly affairs, a poſſibility of danger is an effectual Argument for preſent care: And why ſhould it not awaken our Souls as well? It is at leaſt poſſible that after death, they who dye in theſe wickedneſſes, may periſh everlaſtingly for them.

Sect. 2. Now it may be wondred at, in regard the next part of the Argument pretends to certainty, why any time ſhould be ſpent in this which is not ſo clear and convincing, and therefore it may not be ſo much worth the while to ſtand upon it.

Anſ. To which I anſwer, there are ſome perſons may be more convinc'd and wrought upon by this kind of proof, then any other way. If the times be not made a great deal worſe then they are, there are many perſons ſo deſperately Atheiſtical, ſo devoid of all fear of God, or conſcience of ſin, or belief of a future ſtate, that they profeſs to doubt of all theſe: they cannot tell what will become of them, they acknowledg no reaſon to make them believe that there is another life after this; and therefore they diſowning the Scriptures, and mocking at the threatnings therein contain'd, it ſignifies nothing to them to ſcare them by threatning the wrath of God, and Hell, and Damnation for their ſins; they will not profeſs to believe any of theſe things: Wherefore though it be not like ſuch perſons will think what I have written worth reading, much

much less will they consider of it; yet to make my discourse as compleat as I can, I have brought in this among other things, and it is pertinent enough: for what Atheist in the world can deny it possible but that these things may be? who can tell any thing to the contrary? they who will not believe there is a Hell, yet it is not possible they should demonstrate that there is none. The Jewish Doctors do supply that part of Scripture, where it is said, Cain *talked with* Abel *his Brother*, thus: Cain *said there was no judgement, nor judge, nor world to come, nor good reward for justice, nor vengeance for wickedness*, &c. But how could Cain then, or any of his followers now, be assured of it? upon what account is it impossible that our Souls should out-live our Bodies, or our Bodies afterwards be rejoyn'd to our Souls? who can demonstratively answer St. *Pauls* question? *why should it be thought a thing incredible with you, that God should raise the dead*? and what contradiction is it to say, that they who do so live in another world, shall be either rewarded or punished according as they have lived in this.

Gen. 4. *Ainsw. in Loc. D. Helvic. de Chald. Bib. paraphras. cum Tena edit.*

Acts 26.

Plato seems to make *Socrates* doubt in this case, when almost twice together he says, εἰ ἀληθῆ ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα; and the last words of that Dialogue answers the question, whether it be better to dye or to live, thus; ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ: It is known only to God himself. Yet the Dialogue next but one, *Phædo* makes it evident, that however he would not exaspe-

Sect. 3. *Apologia Socratis vers. finem.*

rate his Judges by proving of it; yet he did firmly believe the souls immortality, and rewards and punishments in the world to come. Now put the case, every one doth not yield to his Arguments, (then which we have better elsewhere) yet who is there that can deny but it may be so, and then what if it should be so? what if possibly the lascivious person should roll and stretch himself in a bed of everlasting burnings? what if possibly the drunkard, whose reason is sunk and drown'd in his cups, should sink into a lake that burns with fire and brimstone? what if lyars, and cheaters, and knaves, should be found to have put the greatest cheat upon themselves at the last, when they have irrecoverably destroyed their own souls? were there nothing else to be said then this, It is possible all this may happen, it should be a powerful and dreadful amazement to careless and secure sinners: They are in a road that they do not consider whether it may lead, for ought they know (it is not possible they should know the contrary) all their mirth may end in everlasting bitterness. It is possible, they that live vitiously, and so dye, may be miserable for ever; therefore it cannot be safe for such men to dye; and if so, it is then necessary men should live vertuously, that they may dye safely.

Sect. 4. 2. But that which follows is much more convincing; it is certain that men of prophane wicked lives, who do likewise persevere in them till they dye, shall after death be infinitely more miserable then ever they were, or thought

thought themselves happy while they lived.

Certain from the testimony of the Word of God, as might be largely shown, but that it hath been said already; when the threatnings of the Word were added to the Commands, to prove a preceptive necessity of Moral Vertue; it shall suffice therefore summarily now to speak; However there be no sin so great or foul, which the blood of Christ is not of vertue enough to cleanse us from, (and therefore this is not to be understood as a prejudice to the free and over-flowing grace of God) yet in regard those men are suppos'd never to have truly and throughly repented and believed, whose repentance doth not proceed to a reformation of life, and their faith shew it self by good works; therefore they who thus live and dye, are under the curse of the Gospel, as well as of the Law: and the threatnings of the Gospel have been already produced: I only now say, the wrath of God is revealed from Heaven (and shall one day be revealed and executed in Hell) not only against all ungodliness, but also against all unrighteousness of men; unrighteous, immoral, wicked men, shall suffer for their faults, and how then can it be safe for them to dye? 1. Book 2. Rom. 1.

The thing it self is its own evidence, that they who thus live and dye in enmity to God, without being reconciled to him, it cannot be but they must needs be miserable after death. Indeed these two things must be supposed, that there is a God, and that our souls are immortal: which Atheists will expect should be proved Sect. 5. 2.

before

before they will yield. I think I ſhould too far digreſs if I ſhould undertake to prove theſe; which I ſhall the leſs need to do, becauſe they are ſo frequently and ſucceſsfully undertaken by others: there may be the ſame reaſon for this as for the former head about the poſſibility of theſe things, they are the ſame perſons who deny both. I took that in, becauſe it might be diſpatched in few words. But the exiſtence of a Deity and the ſouls Immortality, cannot be proved convincingly to Reaſon, without a large diſcourſe upon them: wherefore in hopes that this Treatiſe will find all thoſe it meets with ready to yield both theſe; then ſuppoſing them, it cannot be but wicked men who are enemies to God while they live, and dye in the ſame ſtate, muſt needs be deſerted of God & ſeparated from him after death. If God be not infinitely holy and pure, he cannot be God: his nature being abſolutely perfect, it muſt needs follow, that God muſt infinitely abhor ſin, and ſinners for ſin, where it is not purged away, as it is not in theſe men. Now how can it ſtand to reaſon, that thoſe men who have diſhonoured God all their life long, have lived in contradiction to his Nature, and Will, and Laws: He is holy, they are unholy; he is light and they are darkneſs; I ſay, it cannot ſtand to reaſon, that theſe men ſhould be received into the favour of God:

2 Cor. 6. *What communion hath light with darkneſs? what concord hath Chriſt with* Belial? what love

Job 21. can God bear to his deſperate enemies? *They*

Luk. 13. *that ſay to God depart from us*, why is it ſtrange that God ſhould command them *to depart from*

him?

him? Indeed if God were such a God as the Heathens made their *Jupiter*, and *Venus*, and *Bacchus* to be; then might God entertain such wicked persons into his Court, for it would be but like to like. And it may be feared it was one reason, why the Heathens did so allow themselves in all manner of wickedness and vice, because they had gods to be their Patrons, whom their Fables report to have practised the same things. But the Lord is our God, the Lord *whose name is Holy and Reverend*, and holiness is his nature: And it may be, it would not be a greater sin to say, there is no God at all, then to say, there is such a God as the Poets speak of: yea, and the more sober Heathens were of this mind; *Plutarch* for himself affirms as much, τί σὺ λέγεις ὁ μὴ νομίζων θεὺς εἶναι ἀνόσιός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τοιούτους νομίζων, &c. What say you, he that believes there is no God, is he not wicked? but he that believes there is such a God as superstitious men fancy him to be, is he not much more wicked? for my own part, I had rather men should say, there was never such a man as *Plutarch*, then that they should say, *Plutarch* was an inconstant, passionate, revengeful man, *&c.* It is very dishonourable to God, to think him any thing less then infinitely and perfectly Holy; and then what must become of those men, who are as unlike to God as the Devil is, or their natures are capable of? they must look to be separated from God, as the Devils are, they must keep company with their own kindred and allies; sin marries the soul to the Devil, and his company, and his torments

Psal. 111

De superstitione. p. 169. *Xyland.*

torments are the portion of a ſinner: Where-
Iſa. 3. fore *wo be to the wicked, it ſhall be ill with him; for the reward of his hands ſhall be given him*: and men of looſe, prophane, debauch'd, vitious lives, are wicked men, whoſe miſery that waits for them in the world to come, will expreſs and enforce this Argument with greater horrour then they are now aware of: Then will it be proved, that it was neceſſary to live honeſtly, and vertuouſly, becauſe they that live otherwiſe, are miſerable when they dye: Which was the ſecond inſtance of the neceſſity of Moral Vertue; as that our lives may be good, ſo that our deaths may be ſafe.

CHAP. VI.

Sect. 1. 3 End. *THere is a neceſſity of Moral Vertue, that both life and death may be comfortable:* what the world would be without light, that are our lives without comfort; light is gladneſs, and therefore it would be a melancholy world, if we were all benighted, and left to grope in the dark; and gladneſs is light: *The*
Eſth. 8. *Jews had light, and gladneſs, and joy.* We ſhould ſoon be weary of our lives, if we were debarr'd of all the comforts and pleaſures of life. But the queſtion is, where is the Palace of Pleaſure, and which are the paths that lead to it? where doth Hearts-eaſe and Comfort grow? how may we come to live in Pleaſure, and to dye with Joy? ſurely *there is a way that*
Prov. 14. *ſeems right unto a man, but the end thereof are*

the

the ways of death. So are the ways of wickedness and vice, in point of comfort as well as safety; and if ever we hope for comfort and joy, whether living or dying, we must apply those words to this case: *Enter not into the path of the wicked, and go not in the way of evil men, avoid it, pass not by it, turn from it, and pass away.* Prov. 4. And the reason added afterwards is not impertinent, *The path of the just is as the shining light, that shineth more and more unto a perfect day: The way of the wicked is as darkness, they know not at what they stumble.* And for the proof of this I offer two things.

1. There is no considerable Comfort to be had in, or from a wicked immoral life.

2. But in the exercise of Vertue, there is Pleasure, and Comfort, and Peace, and that in abundant measures.

Sect. 2. So long as a man continues wicked, he can 1. expect no considerable comfort in that state; I say no considerable comfort, because it cannot be denyed, but these men presume and boast, that they live the most merry and jovial lives: *They take the Timbrel and Harp, and rejoyce at the sound of the Organ. They spend their days in wealth,* (or properly *in good*) they *good* themselves in the pleasures of sense. Had not *Belshazzar* a merry bout? (as the phrase sometimes is) and have not the generation of Drunkards still the same, *that count it pleasure to riot in the day time?* yea their pleasures are too great to be confined to a day: *Instead of rising at midnight to give thanks to God,* they sit up till midnight to sin against God. By such kind

Job 21.

Dan. 5.

2 Pet. 2.

Psa. 119.

kind of persons as these, men of more severe principles, that dare not let out so fast to their sinful excesses, are counted melancholy fools, that will not allow themselves to be merry, and brisk, and take the pleasures of life while they last. These things are indeed so, and pity it is that men are so besotted, as not to understand true pleasure, nor to be able to distinguish blazing Comets from fixed Stars: that joy and comfort that makes the biggest show, that is most gazed after; whereas true joy is more inward and serious, *Res severa est verum gaudium*, quite another kind of thing then vitious men apprehend; and that which they partake of, is not so considerable, as that they deserve to be said to live comfortably. That appears thus;

Seneca. Epist. 23.

Sect. 3. 1.

The pleasures of wickedness and vice, take them at the best without their inconveniences, and they are but pleasures of *sense* or *fancy*, and therefore no great matter; or if they do reach the soul, they are but corrupt affections that are gratify'd by them, and still they do not amount to much; what are the pleasures, and joys of intemperate men, whether περὶ ἐδωδὰς πότους ἢ ἀφροδίσια, as they are distinguished? whether they be Drunkards, or Gluttons, or Unclean persons, these are carnal sensual pleasures, they are tasted and felt, and that is all that can be said of them. What are the pleasures of games, and plays, but to be heard, or seen or fancied? so is Covetousness *a lust of the Eye; for when goods are increas'd, they are increas'd that eat them, and what good is there*

Aristot.

1 Joh. 2.

there to the owner thereof, save the beholding of them with their Eyes? And the sweetness that is in revenge, and malice, or any like distemper of the mind, they do but please the fancy, not reason, or judgement, or conscience; these things men do to satisfie their humours, not that by reason they are satisfyed they are fit to be done: And are pleasures of sense so considerable, that men should lay aside conscience for their sakes? Was it not a ridiculous thing for an *Emperour* to raise an Army, and send them down to the Sea-side, as if there were some new Province for them to go and conquer; but when they come there, all their business is to gather *Cockle-shells*? so methinks do the men that thirst after the pleasures of wickedness; they awaken and stir up the powers of their souls; their fancy works; they have thoughts, and designs, and contrivances, and projects in their heads; to these are joyn'd their busie affections, their longing hopes, and their eager desires; and when all these are muster'd together, they are a great force: And what is all this for? not to conquer an Enemy, but to gather *Cockle-shells*; not to purge their souls of the remainders of sin, and so to march on Heaven-wards, when they have beat down all that stands in opposition; but to find out some rare inventions to tickle their senses. A goodly errand, for a man to come into the world to contest with the Brutes which shall be most happy! Vain man, dost thou not know, that thy Oxe, and thy Ass, is happier then thy self, if thou hast nothing else to glory in but

Eccles. 5.

Caligula.

the

the pleasures of sense? or if not they, yet some other more inconsiderable creatures do out-vye us in all these things. It is observed, there is no sense we have, but there is some unreasonable creature hath it in greater excellency then we; unless possibly the *Touch*, which is the most ignoble of all. And there is an instance of all in these two old plain Verses, but good enough for my purpose, unless the men they reprove were better.

V. Charron *Wisd.* p. 38.

Nos aper auditu præcellit, Aranea tactu,
Vultur odoratu, lynx visu, simia gustu.

Vultures, and Lynces, Spiders, Apes, and Swine,
Each hath a sense more excellent then thine.

Is it worth the while for a reasonable creature, to rise in the morning, and so from day to day, for no other purpose, but to be dress't fine, and then to *sit down to eat, and drink, or rise up to play?* Would *Solomon* have sent a Fleet to *Tarshish for Apes, and Peacocks, if there had been no Silver, nor Gold, or Ivory to be brought thence*? much less would they have brought them, and left their Gold behind them: yet thus do wicked men, they take more pains for toys and fancies, more for *what they shall eat, and drink, and put on*, then for *the Kingdom of God, and the righteousness thereof*. This is all men live for, to eat, and drink, and be merry; and if these things be so considerable, let us give *the right hand of fellowship* to the beasts of the field, who enjoy these pleasures as they

Exod. 32.

2 Chron. 9

Matth. 6

are

are capable, more undisturbedly a great deal then we do. The pleasures of sense are like the *wisdom* that contrives and pursues them, *sensual and devilish*: yea the most spiritual plea- James 3.
sures these men have, the gratifying their cor- rupt affections is no better; for *envying and* Ibid.
strife are named in the same place. This is one instance how mean, and low, and dreggy, the comforts of wicked men are; they ascend but to pleasure the sense, or fancy, or they descend rather; for it is as if a Gyant should put forth all his strength to encounter a Pigmy, when a spirit stretches it self to its utmost capacity, for no other thing, but to please the senses of the body.

It is evident that men of vitious lives have Sect. 4.
but little pleasure, because they are commonly 2.
most melancholy when they are alone: it is no natural pleasure that flows from any fountain within, but it is forc'd by outward means; small is their mirth, but when they are in company with men of the same principles and practices with themselves, whereby they check and silence the checks of their own conscience: They are jovial and frolick at a Tavern, where, as I may so say (the expression is not so uncouth as their practice) they drink a health, that is, they wish well to the damnation of their souls. Many are their feasts and revels abroad; but how are they, when they are in no other company but God and their own Conscience? then it is with them, as sometimes with *Saul*, there i an evil spirit upon them, 1 Sam. 16.
which cannot be charm'd nor lay'd but by

Musick, as his was; they are so dull and dumpish when alone, that they must go abroad again to seek for some pleasure to allay the smart of the inward guilt: It is a precarious pleasure that men must stand to the courtesie of others for, whether they will allow it them or no; those comforts are best, that are freest, and most within our own power. The feast of a good Conscience is such, as we may daily invite our selves to, *Nemine contradicente*: if it please God to allow us the rejoycing testimony of our own consciences, it is not all the world can make us melancholy; and therefore holy men are most merry when they are alone: but so are not drunkards, and swearers, *&c.* And it is of ordinary observation, that many men cannot abide to be alone, (especially not in the dark) they are glad of any company. And I believe, were it not for this, that men do not know how to spend their time alone, to their own comfort and satisfaction, Taverns and Ale-houses would not be so full as generally they are; it is no sign a man lives merrily, because his boon company makes him so: οὗτος μακάριος ἐν ἀγορᾷ νομίζεται ὅταν δ' ἀνοίξῃ τὰς θυρὰς τρὶς ἄθλιος.

Plutarch. p. 100.

John 7. *If we judge of men according to outward appearance, we shall not judge righteous judgment.* There are many are counted happy, but their hearts know their own bitterness. Now this pleasure that men are fain to go out of doors for, to get it where they can, to buy it by penniworths and small parcels, must needs be little and inconsiderable, in comparison of that which

which vertuous men have in a full ſtock within their own Souls. Beſides it may be added, the more our pleaſure comes from without, it is the more uncertain; for the ſame cauſes that give it may withhold it, if they either withdraw, or prove miſerable Comforters: Or if all ſecond cauſes ſhould conſpire together to make a man proſperous in his wickedneſs; yet it is but a forc'd mirth, not natural, and therefore not conſtant: yea all the noiſe theſe pleaſures make, cannot drown, nor ſtill the clamor of a guilty conſcience: but all this while, *in the midſt of laughter, the heart is ſorrowful.* And it is evident that ſo it is, becauſe the more men retire from the world, their pleaſure abates; the more they are alone, the more dejected and ſorrowful they are. Prov. 14.

There may be an objection againſt this concerning one ſort of men; and it is the obſervation of the Poet of covetous men, who ſeem to be never ſo well pleaſed, as when they are alone meditating on their wealth.

——*Populus me ſibilet, at mihi plaudo* Horace.
Ipſe domi ſimul ac nummos contemplor in Arcâ.

I don't regard what people ſay,
Let them laugh on, and flout me:
At home I'm merrier then they,
I have all my bags about me.

It is hard to find an anſwer in the next words of the ſame Poet; but *Plautus* doth it fully in his *Euclio.*

Aululer. *Nunc ibo ut visam esine ita Aurum ut condidi,*
Quod me sollicitat plurimis miserum modis.

I hid my Money in a cunning hole,
And yet I can't but be afraid 'tis stole:
I'm glad I'm rich, yet have a thousand fears,
Vexations, griefs, disquietments, and cares.

And if the solicitudes and perplexities of covetous men be set against their pleasures, they have little to boast more then other men: And even these men depend upon others for their comfort; for it is in the power of any body that hath to deal with them, to vex or disquiet them either by disappointing of them, or by making them afraid they shall be disappointed.

CHAP. VII.

Sect. 1. 2. THat which is a foundation to this Reason, is by it self another; Wickedness and vice is in its own nature disturbing and troublesome: It is so far from producing any considerable comfort, that it is properly the cause of trouble and discomfort. Vice doth rob and deprive men of that which it pretends to bring them; as Juglers perswade silly people they can make money, when at the same time they pick their pockets; such juglings and hypocrisies are there in sin; there is a shew of pleasure, and a semblance of mirth, but it is a deceitful, and

and a destructive play; such a play as was between *Abner* and *Joabs* men: *Abner said to Joab, let the young men now arise and play before us, and Joab said let them arise:* but what was their sport? *They caught every one his fellow by the head, and thrust his sword into his fellows side, so they fell down together.* Or such sport as *Samp-* 2 Sam. 2. *son* made the *Philistines, Call for Sampson that he may make us sport*; they did not know what would follow, *he pull'd down the house upon the Lords and all the People, and crusht them to pieces.* Judg. 16. Many are the woes and sorrows that men bring upon their own heads, by indulging themselves in sin, which when they feel they believe, though before they would not. Two waies sin is troublesome, formally and efficiently.

Formally. In as much as *forma dat esse & distingui*, beings are distinguished by their forms; Sect. 2. 1. therefore the properties of beings do arise from those forms, (whatever kind of things those forms be) thus is vice formally the cause of trouble, because it is a property inseparably annexed to it, or indeed more then a property. Sin is the sickness of the soul: as it is the property of sickness to be troublesome to the body, so is sin to the soul; and it cannot otherwise be, especially in the irregularities of passion, Anger and Revenge, and Malice, and Envy, and Ambition, and Pride; and such like exorbitances as these, they are grievous afflictions to those that are over-born with them. The impetuous workings of these affections are like the ragings of the Sea: *The wicked are like the troubled Sea, when it cannot rest, whose waters cast forth mire*

Isa. 5. 7. *and dirt*; and therefore no wonder that it follows, *There is no peace (saith my God) to the wicked.* How can that Nation be at peace that nourishes an intestine War? so is it here, there is an Army of lusts *that wars against our souls.* Our passions in their nature are disquieting & vexatious: So could a Philosopher challenge vice; Πῦ τὸ ἡδὺ τῆς κακίας ἐστὶν εἰ μηδαμῦ τὸ ἀμέριμνον, τὸ ἄλυπον, μηδ' αὐτάρκεια, μηδ' ἀταραξία, μηδ' ἡσυχία; Where is the sweetness and pleasure of wickedness? it is neither without cares nor grief; neither doth it satisfie and content, nor doth it remove trouble, nor produce ease. No verily, as the same word in the *Hebrew* doth signifie both sin and the punishment of it, so doth the thing answer the name. Vertue is not more its own reward, then Vice is its own punishment and torment. The sollicitudes and fears of Covetousness and Ambition, the heats and turbulencies of Anger, the impatiencies of Revenge, the frettings and pinings of Envy, and generally the dissatisfiedness of every Lust; what are all these, but plentiful demonstrations that sin and sorrow are so interwoven together that they cannot be parted, unless all be unravelled by Repentance? which yet is likewise an Argument to the purpose; for though Repentance be safe if it be sincere, yet it is a troublesome work: As it is the property of a Wave to roll, of the Wind to blow, of the Thunder to make a noise; so is sin in its own nature formally and properly disturbing and troublesome. There are *Crocodiles* in the River *Nilus*, for fear of whom the Dogs, who would

1 Pet. 2. στρατεύονται. Plutarch De virt. & vitio. p. 101.

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would otherwise be glad to drink largely to quench their thirst, can onely *lambere & fugere*, lick and be gone, to secure themselves: But wicked men are not so happy; if they will intoxicate themselves with the pleasures of the world, they must take them as they are, one with another, and there is a pain accompanies the pleasure. There is that in sin which embitters it: It is the property of vice to be disquieting and vexatious, and while it is so, there is little comfort to be expected in a vitious course of life.

As Trouble and Sorrow is a property, so it is an effect of sin. Men who are immoral in their lives, because of the pleasure they hope to reap from the liberty they give themselves, do administer to their sorrow faster then their joy. If they be bodily pleasures they adventure their souls upon, then is nothing more evident and notorious then the sad effects of Riot and Intemperance: *Who hath wo? who hath sorrow? who hath contentions? who hath babling? who hath wounds without cause? who hath redness of eyes? they that tarry long at the wine, they that go to seek mixt wine.* Dearly do men pay for their frothy pleasures, when sometimes they drink themselves to death; for which purpose there are many stories extant; or if not so, yet the aches, and pains, and surfeits, and fevers, or at the best, the unaptnesses of such mens bodies to any good employments, are testimonies that these are troublesome sins. And if the same cannot be said of all, yet somewhat else can, and that is the inward trouble that follows

Sect. 3. 2.

Prov. 23.

Bear's Theatre of God's judgment.

follows upon a ſenſe of guilt, after the ſin is committed. It is a fearful thing for a man to fall under the laſh of his own conſcience; how can that man avoid his miſery, that carries it about with him whereever he goes? we may as ſoon command our ſouls out of our bodies, as our conſciences out of our ſouls. There is a principle in man that cannot be always brib'd nor over-aw'd: A man may looſen his reins, and gallop furiouſly to his intended ſtage; but before he comes there he may break his neck. Men are purſuing their pleaſures in great earneſtneſs, and becauſe they can find no better mirth, they will try what they can find in ſin; but it is a Tragical ſtory in the end. I have heard of thoſe who in acting Tragedies, when their parts have led them to make a ſhew of killing themſelves, have by a venturous miſtake kill'd themſelves indeed; So do many men to their great grief find, they have been out of the way of true pleaſure, they have undone themſelves, and laid a foundation for their miſery and trouble as long as they live: There is little comfort to be had in ſin, for it is in its own nature the cauſe and original of many ſorrows and diſquietments.

Sect. 4. But this is not yet all: Men of vitious lives have no conſiderable comfort in thoſe courſes, becauſe not only *in the midſt of laughter the heart is ſorrowful*; but *the end of that mirth is heavineſs*. When men come to dye, then they themſelves underſtand, and acknowledge the folly and vanity of theſe toyiſh pleaſures: the comfort that wickedneſs affords during life,

Prov. 14.

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s but little, but at death it is none at all; hey who live sinfully, dye sadly, that is, unless they have some other comfort then what hey gain from their sinful courses; for how ould this be otherwise?

If thou do ill, the joy fades, not the paine. Herbert. Poems.

The pleasure that is taken in the commission of a sin, passes away together with the act; but the stinging remorses of conscience abide, and then return with greatest vehemence, when the pleasure of sin is gone and past. Concerning the agonies and throbs of conscience that sin procures, it hath been just now observ'd an Argument in the case: It is enough now to suppose that, and to adde this consideration to it; that when men are dying, their wickedness affords them no comfort, because their transitory pleasures are gone together with their sins. The pleasures of intemperance, of *rioting and drunkenness, of chambering and wantonness, of strife and envying*, of revenge and malice, of injustice and oppression, and wrong, or any such like sin; what is become of all these when the miserable man is approaching to his death? when all that a man hath is going out of his possession, where is the appendage of pleasure that belongs to him? Assuredly when death comes, as it changes mens minds concerning the goodness of Vertue, (a thing before observ'd, and doth not belong to this place,) so doth it give men to understand the unsuccessfulness of immorality, Rom. 13.

rality, that it cannot prolong those pleasures, which during life it did pretend to. As the *Greeks* use to call the night ἐυφρόνη, because it is a fit season for consideration and meditation, when in our retirements we may more wisely consider of our concerns; so may the evening of the night of death be very fitly called. When men are retiring from the hurries of the world, where they were not at leisure to distinguish between truth and appearance; then is *the evil day come*, when men
Eccles. 12. will speak as they find, they will *say, they have no pleasure in it.* And in the fore-knowledge of this it was, that the *Ægyptians* had a custome at their feasts to bring in an old dry
Rhodigius. Skeleton to the table, with such a kind of Apothegme,

Ede, bibe, talis post mortem futurus.

Eat, Drink, and welcome, for you see,
What after death you are like to be.

Which in the faireſt interpretation of it may be thought as a reſtraint upon their exceſs of mirth; but it ſeems their meaning was quite contrary; they would be merry while they lived, becauſe death would put a period to all their jollity: So are theſe Verſes quoted out of *Petronius* upon this occaſion.

Cauſin. Hieroglyph. *Sic erimus cuncti, poſtquam nos auferet orcus,*
Ergo vivamus dum licet eſſe, bene.

Such

Such after death is every man,
Let's then be merry while we can.

So it may be do many in the world, drink their full draughts of pleasures while they live, because they know there is no such thing *in the Grave, whither they are going*: But is not this as much as to say what I would now urge, the pleasures of sin are inconsiderable for this Reason; because they dye, if not before, yet certainly when we dye; and therefore is it that mens hearts dye within them, before their body dyes, as *Nabals* did. 1 Sam. 2.

Sect. 5. And for this purpose I appeal to the consciences of those men, who have at any time been upon their sick beds, and to their own apprehensions have been like to dye; what hath been the opinion of these men concerning the pleasures of wickedness? what remains of all their joys? what are the ecchoes of their songs? what relish have they upon their palates, of all the dainties that they have either eat or drunk? what are they now the better for the wrongs they have offered others, and for their revenge, and such like evil dispositions, wherein they have triumph'd in their life time? If I may make an answer, I do not doubt but it may be such an one as once *Esau* made *Jacob*: *Behold I am at the point to dye,* Gen. 25. *and what profit do all these things do to me?* And therefore I may argue a little further in the words of the Apostle: *What fruit hath any man in those things whereof he is now ashamed,* for

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(if the next words may be inverted) *Death is the end of those things.* Death puts an end to all the merriments of life, and now at death the remembrance of those things is grievous to them: Then succeed those wishes, (and it is well if they be not as vain as their former joys) I would I had better understood my self; would I had had more wisdom, and more grace, to have forsaken that evil company that led me away to consent and partake in their wickedness: would I had look'd on my pleasures, not as they came with their flattering and inviting aspects, but as they now go away from me, with repentance, and fear, and shame. Oh that I had taken more care to please God, and less to enjoy the pleasures of sense! Some such thing said *Cardinal Wolsey*, a little before his death: *Had I serv'd God as diligently as I have done the King, he would not have given me over in my gray hairs.* So say men of wicked and immoral lives; had I pleased God more, and my company and my self less, God would not have given me over in this my necessity; but I have had my portion in this world: I have sought for sin, and hunted after pleasure, and if God be not more merciful to my soul, I shall have no portion in the world to come, but everlasting separation from the presence of God. Surely these are the apprehensions of some men that send for their Minister, and though they would fain justifie themselves as much as they can, yet they cannot deny but they have been Company-keepers, they have been Gamesters,

Rom. 6.

Herberts History *Henry* 8.

sters, and it may be worse; they have spent a great deal of time idly and wantonly. Now what becomes of these men, whether peradventure God may give them grace to repent, is not for us to determine, our charity hopes the best: But whether so or not, these self-accusations, and these different apprehensions they have of things when they are dying, to what they had when they were lusty and strong to sin, is an argument of the vanity and shortness of that pleasure that men take in sin; and 'tis the fourth proof, that there is no considerable comfort to be found in sin, either living or dying.

This is the first part of this Third Argument: There is a necessity of Moral Vertues, that our lives and deaths may be comfortable; for so long as men continue wicked, notwithstanding all the brags they make that they live the merriest lives, yet it is found to be nothing so.

CHAP. VIII.

THe *ways* of Vertue *are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace.* It is said of *wisdom*, but it is such a *wisdom as dwells with prudence*, and such a *wisdom* of which *the fear of the Lord is the beginning*; and where it is so, it follows in another place; *And unto man he said, the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, and to depart from evil is understanding.* So that Vertue being comprehended under

Sect. 1.
Prov. 3.
Prov. 8.
Prov. 9.
Job 28.

under that wisdom which teaches a man to order his conversation aright; of that likewise may it be said, that her ways are ways of pleasantness. Pleasure is the satisfaction of an appetite, and according as the appetite is, whether sensible or rational, so is the pleasure. The joys and pleasures of sin, are but the pleasures of sense for the most part, and therefore inconsiderable: It will be now found, that the pleasure that arises upon Vertuous Actions, is in the mind and soul. *Delight is nothing else but the Sabbath of our thoughts, and that sweet Tranquillity of mind, which we receive from the presence and fruition of that good to which our desires have carried us.* Concerning which much might be said, and there is no Theme gives a man a greater temptation to try his skill in Rhetorick then this: But I intend to argue, not to declaim, I am therefore content to pass this over, only when I have added one description of joy and pleasure, which I find in an Author (though a *Jesuite*, yet) excellent in these kind of writings. *Gaudium est quoddam silentium appetitus, quædam Modestia Ambitionis, quoddam claustrum cupiditatis, quoddam sine fastidio epulum cordis, quidam Thronus jam considentis Affectus, quædam Mors desiderii,* &c. *deniq; ut hæc complectar quoddam satis:* And surely this Joy must needs be a glorious thing, when the glory that God will beam on his servants in the other world, is so express'd, *Enter into the joy of thy Lord.* Those great and immeasurable measures of joy, are reserv'd for the world to come: yet

Reynolds *Treatise of passions.*

Neiremberg. *de Arte voluntatis.* Prolep. 5.

Math. 25.

yet now in this life, in this *vale of tears*, there are *rivers of pleasure.* True it is, *the joy and peace which God fills his people with, is in and by believing*: And the joy we have out of *Christ* is unsound, as we out of Christ are unsafe: wherefore it hath been before said, that Moral Vertue is not to be separated from Faith, but they suppose one another; and then supposing the Vertue we speak of to be such, it will be easie to prove, that the exercise of Moral Vertues, Righteousness and Temperance, &c. do furnish us with a great deal of joy and comfort. Rom. 15. Book 1.

That I prove when I have but first suppos'd, that whereas the pleasures of vice are all, or for the most part, of the sense and outward man; the pleasures of Vertue are inward, in the mind. After what manner the mind is gratifyed, will appear in the following Sections; let it now be supposed, and then how much hath Vertue to say for her self, and to glory over wickedness and sin? If we may borrow a little of *Jothams parable*; *Vice* is *the Bramble*, that instead of shadowing, scratches the body: *Vertue* is *the Vine* that chears the heart of man: Vice is a plaister that skins over an old sore; Vertue is a cordial that preserves and refreshes the spirits: Vice gratifies the sense, Vertue the understanding; and he that doubts whether of these be the greater pleasure, doth in effect blaspheme God; for he doubts whether the Beasts of the Field be not more happy then God himself, and so becomes as ridiculous an *Idolater* as the *Ægyptians*, Sect. 2. Judg. 9.

Juvenal. tians, who had —*In Hortis Numina*— who worship'd *Garlick and Onions*, instead of *God blessed for evermore*. But hath the mind no greater pleasures then the body? Is not our reason more perfect and excellent then sense? Are not our souls capable of more happiness, then any of our bodily faculties? He that so little understands himself, and the worth of his own soul, as not to believe it, no wonder if he mistake true pleasure. But that it may not be said, this is *gratis dictum*, these questions are no proofs; I proceed to prove, that there is a great deal of joy and pleasure in the exercise of Vertue, and that such as doth hugely over-balance the pleasures of sin.

Sect. 3. 1. It is a great satisfaction to any mans mind, that he hath done his duty; and this satisfaction is great joy and pleasure: The man whose conscience is his witness that he hath done well, cannot be without an inward complacency of mind. *Our rejoycing is this, the Testimony of our Conscience, that in simplicity and godly sincerity, we have had our Conversation in the World.* It is true, he mentions *the grace of God* that assisted him, and so we acknowledge that our Vertue must be animated by grace; but it was his regular conversation (which certainly could not be so, if he had not exercis'd those Moral Vertues, which are necessary in our dealings between man and man) that gave him this joy, and our joy was great. Our boasting, or that glorying is this. In conformity to which example, it is easie for any man to find the same in his own experience.

2 Cor. 1.

καύχησις.

science. There are many vertuous actions are no otherwise rewarded in this World, but by the acquittance and discharge of a mans own Conscience. Many good endeavours succeed ill. Two Neighbours are at variance, a third would reconcile them, but one or both return him hatred for his good will. One man doth amiss, another reproves him; but receives more reproaches than he gives reproofs. So is the temperate man, *the Song of the Drunkards.* Psa. 69.

And may it not now be thought that Vertue is bitterness in the latter end? No verily: still

Ipsa quidem Virtus pretium sibi - - Claudian.
Vertue is worthy of regard,
For 'tis its self its own reward.

Abimelechs Apology is the Vertuous mans satisfaction: *In the Integrity of my heart, and Innocency of my hands have I done this.* Gen. 20. From this satisfaction of mind proceeds tranquillity, and joy, and pleasure; and if there were nothing else to be understood by that αὐτάρκεια, that self-sufficiency which the Heathens gave to a Vertuous man than this; that a man in the Exercise of Vertue can furnish himself with Joy and Comfort, without the external additaments of Fame and Honour, and being admired by other men; I should not before have reckoned it among the faults of the *Stoicks*, that they did put such a value upon themselves: They truly were blame-worthy in shutting God out; yet did they mean well, where they did mean no more than those words of *the Emperour* seem to import: φύσιν ἔχει τὸ λογικὸν ἡγεμονικὸν ἑαυτὸ ἀρκεῖσθαι δικαιοπραγοῦντι καὶ παρ' Antonin. Lib. 7. Sect. 28.

παρ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο γαλήνην ἔχουσι. *The mind of man is of such a Nature, that when it doth well, it is sufficient of it self to bless it self with a calm tranquillity.*

Sect. 4. Gen. 4. What God said to *Cain*, according as we translate the words: *If thou do well shalt thou not be accepted?* So saith the Conscience of an honest man: He that doth well is acceptable to himself, he is not a burden to himself, as those men are, whose guilty Consciences do heavily accuse them. It is a pleasant thing for a man to reflect upon himself when he knows he hath done well. We are not contented with the admirations and flatteries of other men: Fame and applause leaves us sollicitous, lest men may live to change their minds concerning us, as the Romans of *Sejanus*.

Juven. Sat. 10.

--- *Nunquam (si quid mihi credis) amavi*
Hunc hominem ---
I never lov'd him, whom before
I did admire and adore.

Acts 14. Or as the *Lycaonians* who ston'd the same man as a Malefactor, whom before they worshipped as a God. These outward appendages of Vertue, credit and praise, will never satisfie a fixed stayed mind: But when a man comes to judge of himself by his own actions, and sees that according to his best understanding he hath done his duty, and that which was fit for a man in his circumstances to do; the satisfaction that arises hence is very joyous: and if I would descend to particular Vertues, it were easie to show, how much content and pleasure arises

ariſes from this ſatisfaction. All the inſtance I for the preſent give, ſhall be in the caſe of being benevolous & kind: The courteous and charitable man, who makes it his buſineſs to do good offices, is plentifully rewarded into his own boſom. So was the experience of a man (not only otherwiſe qualified to merit Reſpect and Reverence, but) abundant in Charity to admiration, who would uſe to ſay; *It was one of the greateſt ſenſualities in the world to give.* They who delight thus to ſerve God by being Vertuous, their Vertue it ſelf is a delight and pleaſure to them, becauſe they are ſatisfyed that they are doing what they ought do. *Dr. Hammond in his life by Dr. Fell.*

Sweet and pleaſant is the Exerciſe of Vertue, becauſe hereby we conquer thoſe luſts and paſſions, which untam'd and uncontrolled, are very diſturbing and uncomfortable to us. It is now to be ſuppos'd that vice is troubleſome, as having been before prov'd in the Chapters immediately preceding. Now as that brings light that caſhiers darkneſs, as that introduceth heat which expels cold; ſo that muſt needs adminiſter joy that aſſwageth griefs, and removeth trouble. To inſiſt on particulars is not my preſent purpoſe, I only name them; Love ſubdues Hatred, Humility Pride, Meekneſs Anger, Fortitude and Conſtancy Fears and Griefs, Contempt of the World Ambition and Covetouſneſs, and ſo in other p ral'el caſes. Wherefore as the *Jews* had *light, and gladneſs, and joy*, when they had liberty to fight and deſtroy their Enemies; much more was it a good day, a day of feaſt- Sect. 9. 2. Eſth. 8.

ing and gladneſs when the work was done: ſo is it with Vertuous men, they are fighting, and conquering, and killing, and when their unruly paſſions are brought under, when they have got the Victory, then they triumph, that is, they are full of joy. Many a ſong of Thanksgiving do we find in Scripture for deliverance from Enemies: And great have been the triumphs of the *Romans*, when they return'd with the ſpoils of War. The feaſt of a good Conſcience, and the triumphs of a Vertuous Soul, may be leſs pompous as to outward ſhew; but what they have leſs of the faſhion of *Agrippa* and *Bernice*, they are the more like the *Kings Daughter*, *all glorious within*. The war that the *Spirit* manageth againſt the *Fleſh*, hath the ſame deſign with other wars, to procure peace; which when it is attain'd, we (*Engliſhmen* eſpecially) cannot but be ſenſible how deſirable it is: We are at the ſame time unthankful to God, undutiful to our Prince, and unnatural to our ſelves, if we do not rejoyce that we live in peace. There is no kind of peace that is without its kind of joy: ſo is the peace within our own minds, when we have bridled and reſtrain'd our irregular and exorbitant paſſions, when we have quell'd our luſtful inclinations, and have either in whole or in part, by the bleſſing of God upon our vertuous endeavours, attain'd that peace, which God himſelf twice ſaith, doth not belong to wicked men: when Temperance, and Juſtice, and other like habits are ſo firmly rooted in us, that we find none,

Pſ. 45.

Iſa. 48. and 57.

none, or no great reluctancy of the Flesh, in the exercise of them; then behold how the soul enjoys it self! how glad it is to find things in due order, the inferiour faculties subordinate to the superiour, and they to their supreme Lord, the Father of Spirits! Go now and see if a righteous and just man doth not rejoyce to consider, that temptations of Covetousness hath not made him unjust; go and ask of those men whom you observe to be most sober and upright in their conversations, they will tell you that they thank God, they have a peace within them *that passeth all understanding.* They will say, that Meekness, and Charity, *&c.* are lovely things, to be embraced for their own sakes: They rejoyce to think that their souls are delivered from their enthralling lusts, and disturbing passions. If I should say that Vertue doth this perfectly for us, I should my self incurre the censure which I before past upon the *Stoicks*; who have boasted of a perfection that they could not attain. Truely the *Spirits of just men*, are not yet in this life *made perfect*: *In many things we offend all.* Yet this is truth; though we are not in this state compleatly holy, so as to be sinless, (and therefore our happiness and comfort is incompleat) yet so far as we do arise towards a perfection of Vertue, we do thereby get the conquest of our lusts and passions, and the more they are subdued, the greater freedom and pleasure we gain to our selves: and for this reason, there is a pleasure and joy in Vertuous Action; which is the second

Phil. 4.

James 3.

Sect. 6. 3. There is a pleaſure in Vertue; for whereas wickedneſs and vice doth bring men firſt or laſt to repent; this is the property of Vertuous actions, that the farther a man proceeds in them, he is the more confirm'd that they are becoming and fitting things. The more Vertuous any man is, he doth the leſs repent that he did ever begin to be Vertuous: What *Simonides* ſaid of ſilence, *I have often repented that I have ſpoken, but never that I held my peace*; That ſays the Vertuous man: I have have often repented, that I have been no more Vertuous, that I have fail'd ſo often in my Duty; but where I have attain'd in any meaſure to any degrees of it, I am glad, and did never repent of what I have done. There may be ſome who for want of skill and proficiency in the School of Vertue, may repent of their good deeds: but what though they do? Is it an Argument that there is no pleaſure in Learning, becauſe a Dunce throws away his Book, and wiſhes he had never gone to School? Was St. *Paul* ever the worſe, becauſe the love of this world tempted *Demas* to forſake him? Doth it ſignifie much to the diſparagement of Chriſtian Religion, becauſe *Julian* prov'd an *Apoſtate*? Now this is the caſe; ſome men have ventur'd upon Vertue, out of an opinion that it was an eaſie thing, and when they find the difficulties of it, vice is not eaſily maſtered, nor paſſions eaſily ſubdued, then they fall back again; and before they were throughly redeemed from a vain converſation, they again make their bargain

Plutarch *de Garrulitate.*

2 Tim. 4.

gain

gain with the Devil, and sell themselves to work wickedness. But what shall we say of these men? even this, they are to Vertue as the many *Antichrists* are to Christian Religion; and of them may Vertuous men say, *They went out from us, because they were not of us, for if they had been of us, they would no doubt have continued with us; but they went out that they might be made manifest that they were not all of us.* 1 Joh. 2. They are not Vertues menial servants, they are but retainers and hangers on; they do but pretend to some Vertuous actions; some good things they may do, but they do not *Benè*, out of a love to Vertue: They may have a *procatarctick*, but they have no *proegumenal* cause; they may be outwardly drawn to the exertise of Vertue, but not from an inward principle of goodness. Now Vertue is not to stand or fall according to the opinions of these men.

Sect. 7. But now take a man that hath in good earnest set himself to be an honest and righteous man, and that hath made conscience of doing the duties that the Word of God and his own conscience have made appear to be his duties; and (whatever fears and grumblings he might find within himself when he first began, yet) as he goes on, he is the more confirm'd in his way; the more he sees into the mystery of Vertue, he admires it the more, and chuses it the rather; and a man by accustoming himself to it, will grow more acquainted with the pleasure of it, and will daily see less cause to repent of his choice. The rule that *Plutarch*

applies to Temperance, will be found true of all sorts of Vertue: ἑλοῦ βίον τὸν ἄριστον ἡδὺν δὲ αὐτὸν ἡ συνήθεια ποιήσει: *Chuse that manner of life that is best, and custome will make it pleasant.* This Argument hath somewhat of experience in it: for a man to disparage that of which he hath no knowledge, he talks for want of wit, and he must get into the company of his fellow-fools to be believed. Come to those who have experience what Vertue is, and they find the deeper the sweeter: The more Vertue, the less Repentance, and the less Repentance, the more Joy: for he that chuseth a course of life, of which he sees no cause to repent, he must needs good himself in it, and rejoyce to think he hath made a happy choice: He tastes the sweetness of it, and then because, *Contra gustum non est disputandum*: No man can be disputed out of his senses, nor perswaded that that is not sweet which he tastes to be so; it remains a certain Argument, that there is a great deal of pleasure in Vertuous Actions.

De sanitate tuendâ

Sect. 8. 4. I might go on to compare Vertue and Vice together; and then it would appe r by an enumeration of particulars, that there is much more pleasure in temperance, than in rioting and drunkenness; however, they that live in such pleasures, are dead to all such perswasions: also that just and righteous dealing, brings a man more content and comfort, then violence, and wrong, and oppression; yea, the forgiving an injury, is sweeter then revenge, and in many other like cases: but this would be

be to descend to particulars, which is somewhat without my purpose; I leave it to be consider'd by any that will enter into a sober comparison of these things. These Vertues have their marks in their fore-heads; It is easie to discern a difference, and then not hard to pass a judgement, that there is more pleasure in Vertue than Vice; which was the second thing to be proved in this Third Argument, and so it is dispatch'd.

It is necessary to be Vertuous, that both life and death may be comfortable.

CHAP. IX.

THere remains but one thing more to make this part of my discourse like Vertue her self, and like a Vertuous man, who is said to be τετράγωνος; that is square, and fix'd, and stable, one that can stand alone without being upheld by other props; or in our English phrase, one that goes of all four. There is a Fourth proof, *That it is necessary for us to be as hath been before said, that hereby we may become profitable to others as well as to our selves.* It hath been before evidenced that it is for our own advantage to be Vertuous, that our condition may be good, and safe, and comfortable: Whereby it appears that Vertue is *Bonum honestum*, and *jucundum*; *good and honest, good and pleasant*: there is but one other sort of good, *Bonum utile*, *good and profitable*, and so Vertue likewise is; for hereby we do not Sect. 4 End.

Rom. 14. Phil. 2. not *live to our souls alone, we look on the things of others as well as on our own.* That Vertue whereby we do good to others, is properly called *Beneficence*, and is comprehended under Charity: But as there is a justice in every Vertue, it is just, and equal, and fit to be done; so is there a Charity too, insomuch that unless we be good our selves, we shall do little good to others. But good and Vertuous men are Benefactors to the places where they live. Two things will finish this Argument, and

1. make it correspond to the former. 1. Men of vitious and loose lives do live idly and unprofitably, and as such they do no good in

2. the world. 2. The exercise of Vertue is much for the advantage of mankind.

Sect. 2. 1. Wickedness is a vain and unprofitable thing, and wicked men are unprofitable members of a Common-wealth: It may be by accident and beyond their intention, they may be an occasion of good done, and yet they are never the better men. The staggerings and reelings to and fro of the Drunkard, together with his sottish looks and behaviour, and the woful effects of his intemperance, may perswade another man to abhor that vice. When a Spend-thrift hath impoverish'd himself by Idleness, and Gaming, and Prodigality, another may take warning by his miseries, not to be guilty of the same folly: But what is this to the commendation of such men, whose bad examples do only by accident make others good? Thus the *Spartans* allowed their Slaves to be Drunk, to teach their Children

Children to abhor it; but it was no part of their wisdom so to do. Is the Devil to be commended for his malice against the Saints, because he thereby puts them upon their guard, to watch more strictly over themselves, and so may be an occasion to make them better? The Devil is a wicked malicious spirit for all this, for he means not so, but it is in his heart to destroy; as was said of the *Assyrians* against the *Jews*. What glory is it for a man to do that, in which the Devil doth as much or more then he? The vices of men are not the more excusable, because they may be an occasion of Vertue to other men; for though they may occasion good done, yet they themselves do none, nor do they intend any. The design of wickedness is not to profit and advantage others. For 1. It doth no good. 2. It doth a great deal of harm. Isa. 10. 1. 2.

It doth no good, and therefore is unprofitable and vain. I am not altogether of that mind, that they who are not good themselves, cannot do good to others: *Minimè absurdum est*, (said the Chancellour of *France* in a Solemn Assembly) *ut multi boni Cives sint, qui boni Christiani non sunt.* Sure it may please God both in *Church* and *State*, to make use of wicked men to do him service: for which there is no need of other instance then of *Judas* and *Saul*. *Judas* was one of the 12 *Apostles* that Christ sent on great errands, and gave them power and authority suitable to their employment: *Then he called his 12 Disciples together, and gave them power and authority* Sect. 3. 1. *Historia Concilii Tridentini. p. 382. Fello.* Luke 9.

thority over all Devils, and to cure Diseases, and he sent them to preach the Kingdom of God, and to heal the Sick. It is possible they *who preach* 1 Cor. 9. *to others*, may be *Cast-aways* themselves: God may bless their gifts to others, though they want grace for themselves. At the same time a man may out of his own mouth condemn himself and save others. And for State-Affairs, *Saul* is another instance, who though a wicked man, as he afterwards declar'd himself to be, so wicked that God would not own him, nor he God; yet at his first coming to the Kingdom, God made choice of him 1 Sam. 9. 16. *to save his people out of the hand of the* Philistines; and in a particular case, he was enabled to the rescue of *Jabesh-Gilead*, by the 1 Sam. 11. 6. *spirit of God coming upon him.* Accordingly it is easie to observe, there are many men who have wisdom as an Intellectual habit, when they have it not as a Moral Vertue; they have parts, and gifts, and abilities, which it pleaseth God to over-rule for the service of his Church and the good of others; yet they want that grace which is saving to themselves. The comparison will serve other men as well as *Ministers*; *There are many are like to Marks in the High-way, which rot away themselves, while they stand instructing others.* Greenham. There are many Physitians prescribe rules to others, which themselves will not observe: And thus it must not be denyed, but there may be many, who may continue bad themselves, and yet may have an influence upon the welfare of others.

But

But then it is to be observed, that this is no prejudice to the Argument in hand. Vitious men may do good, because they have some good in them; if not grace and vertue, yet parts and abilities, and some actions materially good they perform, which God blesses for good purposes: but all this while their wickedness and vice is unprofitable and unserviceable: A Drunkard when he is sober may work hard, to maintain his Family; but his Drunkenness is idle and vain, and doth no good; and the same is to be said of all other vices. For will any man say that Envy, and Spite, and Revenge is for the benefit of mankind? as well may recompensing evil be called doing good: or is a generation of Drunkards an advantage to a Nation, because they maintain and uphold Taverns and Ale-houses? or is cheating and lying for the profit of others, because thereby men scraping together great Estates, leave their Children rich? with as much reason may we say, the World is the better for Adultery, Fornication, yea and incest too; because the *Pope* gets money by toleration of Stewes, and dispensation in unlawful Marriages. There is a selfishness in wickedness: Men desire their own pleasure, which according to the third Argument is inconsiderable; or their own profit, which according to the second is none at all: for if it be not safe for such a man to dye, then *what is a man profited if he gain the whole World, and lose his own Soul?* Math. 16. And if the designs they propound to themselves cannot be accomplished, much less that which they

they did not design. Wickedness doth no good, intends none; it is as vain to expect any, as
Matth. 7. for *a man to go to a Thorn to gather Grapes, or to a Thistle for Figs; for a corrupt Tree cannot bring forth good Fruit.* This is now somewhat to the disparagement of vice, it doth no good; but there is more yet to come.

Sect. 4. 2. It doth not onely not do good, but it doth a great deal of harm. It is to the prejudice and disadvantage of Kingdoms, and States, and Corporations, and Towns, and Families, that some of the Members of these Bodies live vitious lives.

1. For first, it is greatly to the damage of mankind that there should be so many persons mis-employ their faculties, whereby they might do the world good service. What pity it is to see a house well built, neatly contrived, handsomely furnished, yet haunted and fit for no bodies use. Such are many mens Souls, curious fabricks, that discover much of the wisdom of their Creator, and fitted for excellent purposes, but they are possessed by evil Spirits, and haunted with furies; their furious passions and deviliſh lusts, over-rule and pervert their Reason, and make it unserviceable: And this is a great mischief to the World. For he that cuts off my hand, doth my body an injury, by depriving me of a member that is useful to the whole body: So is a man to the rest of mankind, a part of the whole, for whom the World might be the better, but that by his wicked life he cuts himself off from those opportunities of doing good, for which he was born

born into the World. If every Farmer should let his grounds lye fallow for seven years together, how soon should we starve, unless we could live by Bryars and Thorns? But this is the bad husbandry of Vice, mens Souls lye non-improved, they bring forth no fruit for the benefit of others; they take up the room of honester men, and croud them out of employment; but they themselves are good for nothing. Bare Idleness is a great mischief, and therefore the wicked and slothful servant is called an *Unprofitable servant*, and accordingly punished: If the man who had the five Talents, had managed that one, he would have made a good use of it, and done good with it: but so long as it lay hid up in a Napkin, it was as if there had been none at all. If Vertue had the management of those parts and abilities that are spent upon Sin, it would be better for the World than now it is: wherefore as he that throws away his money doth his Family harm, because he deprives them of that which should maintain them; so doth the man who sells himself to sin, he disables himself from doing good: and this is a great mischief comes by wickedness, as it is *Impeditivum boni*, the good it hinders is to be interpreted doing hurt. Math. 25.

The calamities of war are a sad proof that wickedness is a mischievous thing. For *whence come wars and fightings in the world, come they not hence, even of mens lusts?* There is an *insatiabilis libido* either *habendi* or *dominandi* (that is Covetousness and Ambition) which do lead Sect. 5. 2. James 4.

many

many Armies into the field; many I say, not all: It is to be hoped that they mean well, and they have a great desire to perswade the world to peace and concord, who are of opinion that it is not lawful for Christians to make war. Indeed it were to be wished that there were no need of it: But the world must be well amended, before it can be supposed, that the honestest and justest cause will alwaies without any force, by its meer justice obtain against its adversary. Wherefore without calling that into question which we are obliged to grant if we be true to our selves, it must be yielded, *That it is lawful for Christian men at the command of the* Artic. 37. *Magistrate, to wear weapons and serve in the wars.* Yet all wars are not lawful to be sure, not on both sides; and then if many be unlawful, either in their original, as occasioned by covetousnes or ambition, or oppression; or in their progress as managed by cruelty and revenge; then let it be considered, how unhappy they are in their end. How many millions of people hath the sword devoured? How many Countreys have been harrassed, and for a time dispeopled? How many Cities sackt and burnt? for the fire and the sword many times go together. And whence is all this? from some of the forementioned sins, or some other like them: *Una & ea vetus causa bellandi cupido divitiarum & imperii.* Sallust. The instances of Ambition and Pride are many. When *Bajazet* was taken Prisoner and carryed to *Tamerlane*, after that memorable battel, where some say more then 300000 men lost their lives, one question

queſtion that *Tamerlane* asked him was; what made him ſo proud as to adventure upon the *Greek Emperour*, in hopes to conquer him and win *Conſtantinople*; he gave him this anſwer: *Even the ſame thing that moved thee to invade me, the deſire of glory and ſoveraignty.* A truer account cannot be given of the adventures of *Alexander* in *Aſia* and the Indies, and of the expeditions of the Romans into other countrys. Sometimes Covetouſneſs hath marched along with Ambition; men have promiſed to themſelves, *We ſhall find all precious ſubſtance, we ſhall fill our houſes with ſpoil.* This *Florus* acknowledges to have been the reaſon why the *Romans* invaded *Cyprus*, becauſe of the fame of their riches. Sometimes Luſt hath begot war; So *Paris* his raviſhing *Helena* brought 10 years wars to *Troy*, and *Troy* to deſtruction. Sometimes revenge, ſometimes one ſin, ſomtimes another, wickedneſs and ſin brings war, and war wo and miſery, and calamity: and ſo it appears to be miſchievous to the world.

Turkiſh Hiſtory. Prov. 1. *Flor. expedit in Cypron.*

Wickedneſs and Vice doth much miſchief in the world; for this is the cauſe, at leaſt one cauſe of the decays of Kingdoms and States, and of the ruine of many particular families. The changes of the Moon, and the turnings of *Seſoſtris* wheel, are emblems too good to ſignifie the inconſtancy and inconſiſtency of humane affairs. The Moon decreaſes, and changes, and renews again; and the wheel riſes as faſt as it falls: But there are many Kingdoms and Empires have fallen to decay, without any viſible hope of a reſurrection: It is a ſmall thing to enquire of *Troy*, Sect. 6. 3.

where is *Babylon* and *Nineveh*, thoſe two great Cities, ſometimes the wonder and terror of the world? we may almoſt as well go to the mountains of *Ararat*, to ſeek for ſome broken planks of *Noahs Ark*, as to rake in the rubbiſh to find out where thoſe Cities once were. *The Virgin daughter of Babylon is come down to ſit in the duſt, and there is no Throne of the Caldæans*, none to be ſure in compariſon of what once was. Yea even *Rome* her ſelf, which is ſtill not onely in being, but in her glory and pride, yet hath changed its place, as well as its manner of government, as if the City it ſelf were beforehand taught, that it is moving towards a period. And as for the Monarchies that have made theſe Cities famous, and the *Ladies of the Earth*, how have they all ſupplanted one another? The *Medes and Perſians* tranſlated the Empire from the *Aſſyrians* to themſelves, but could not alwaies keep it; *Alexander* over-powered them, and laid the foundation of a Monarchy, but lived to do no more: the *Græcian* Empire was even ſtifled in the birth by bad midwifery; *Alexanders* ſucceſſors dividing it into parts, weakened the whole. Then came the *Roman Eagles* (thoſe birds of prey) they gather upon the Earth, and inſtead of finding make a carcaſs: They diſpirit other Nations, and by power and policy together prevail over the reſt, and make the world do homage to *Rome*.

Iſa. 47.

Iſa. 47.

Math. 24.

(---quæ de ſeptem totum circumſpicit orbem
Montibus, Imperii Roma Deumque locus.

Ovid.

Rome

Rome is enlarg'd from hill to hill so great,
That th'Empire and the Gods make it their
Seat.)

Yet now these Eagles have their wings clip't, and all they can do is but to flutter about *Germany*, who hath an *Emperour* indeed, but his Empire but small in comparison of the extent of the Territories of old *Rome*; yea weak as well as small, *Tenue & exangue corpusculum, quod vix ossibus hæret.* The body of the Empire little better then skin and bone. What is now the reason of all this? is it not because *there is a God in the Heavens, who changeth the times and the seasons, who removeth Kings and setteth up Kings*? Yes verily so it is, and one of the proudest of the sons of men have acknowledged it: *Nebuchadnezzar* was made to know, *That the most High ruleth over the Kingdoms of men, and that he appointeth over it whomsoever he will.* But withal it is true, though *God made desolations in the Earth*, yet men deserve them. The *Tekel* is the reason of the *Mene, Mene, Men are weighed in the balances and are found wanting*, and that is the reason why *God numbers their Kingdoms and finisheth them.* Wanting indeed to God, and guilty of many sacrilegious impieties; but withal wanting to themselves, and to the due administration of their affairs. Either oppression and violence, or some other wickedness hath shaken the foundations of those Kingdoms and Monarchies, and at last ruined them. So the same Histories that tell us of the original and growth of Monarchies, give us an account

Sleidan. Dan. 2. Dan. 5. Psa. 46. Dan. 5.

Juſtin. of the decreaſe and fall of them. *Sardanapalus* his luxury and effeminateneſs tranſlated it from the *Aſſyrians* to the *Medes*. The cruelty of *Aſtyages* to *Harpagus*, was the occaſion of his revolt to *Cyrus*, and by that means it came among the *Perſians*. The ſoftneſs and delicacy of the *Perſians* betrayed them to *Alexander*, whoſe ſucceſſors, by their ſelf-deſignments falling off from, weakned one another; and it befel them that (as before the Cities of *Greece*) *dum imperare ſinguli cupiunt, imperium omnes perdiderunt.* Which advantage when the *Romans* had got, they lorded it for a great while, but at length ſuffered more then a nominal diminution; when *Auguſtus* dwindled into *Auguſtulus*: but really their greatneſs is eclipſed. They have been no more innocent, then other Empires before them, and they have at laſt ſuffered for their Ambition and Pride, and inſolent Uſurpations; ſo that there is little left beſides the name of *the King of the Romans*. Now it is to be conſidered, that there cannot be ſuch mutations in Kingdoms and States, but there are many miſeries and miſchiefs attend them, and fall upon the common people, who are involved in the ſame calamities with their Princes. Which changes and miſeries, though they may have other cauſes aſſigned them, yet evidently this is one, the wickedneſs and vice of the perſons concerned: and thus Immorality appears to be a pernicious thing, becauſe ſo many ſad events follow upon it.

The caſe of particular families is no leſs notorious: Many who have been born to good fortunes,

fortunes, have yet been impoverished and beggered by the riot and prodigality, and gaming or other wastfulnesses of their fore-fathers. How many have been undone, that very way by which their fathers hoped to raise them? if that observation be good,

De malè quæsitis vix gaudet tertius hæres,
Ill gotten goods do many times prove Snares,
If not to men themselves, yet to their Heirs.

Men would fain leave their Children rich, and therefore take care to get Estates any how, by cheating and couzenage, and for that purpose have many artifices and devices; but they do not consider all this while, that when they entail an Estate upon their posterity, they do at the same time entail a Curse upon the Estate; and this also adds to the proof, that wicked men do harm in the World.

If any thing else be needful to be said, I might say 4ly, The issues of private feuds, and grudges, and quarrels between Neighbour and Neighbour, make it manifest that the world is the worse for many of its inhabitants. When men are bent upon Revenge, they are set upon mischief at the same time. *A man shall be made an offender for a word.* An action of slander is commenced for a rash and unadvised word; or otherwise there are many waspish spirited men, that as soon as ever they are stirr'd will sting. Some men seek, and some make occasions to prejudice and wrong their Neighbours. Sect. 7. 4. Isa. 29.

5. Neither is yet this *Pandora's* box quite opened. Beſides what hath been already ſaid, the very example of wicked men leavens the World, and by making it a maſs of iniquity, increaſes the number of thoſe miſchiefs which peſter mankind. A Company of Drunkards are a Plague to the place they live in, and ſo are moſt other ſins; for they are catching and infectious, and many periſh by the evil example of other men. This and the former might be plentifully inſiſted on, but that they are obvious to every ones experience.

Sect. 8. 6. There is yet another great miſchief comes to the World by wickedneſs; it hinders the propagation of the Chriſtian Religion into other parts of the World. It might be a great motive to perſwade Infidels to have good thoughts of that Religion whoſe profeſſours live good and honeſt lives. We have a Prayer in our *Liturgy* (on *good Friday*) on purpoſe for *Jews*, and *Turks* and *Infidels*; that they may be *fetched home to the flock, and be made one fold, under one Shepherd Jeſus Chriſt our Lord:* and ſurely they do a ſervice acceptable to God, who are any ways inſtrumental in ſo glorious an undertaking: but how had the men need be qualified, who are like to do any good this way; they had need be men of excellent lives, and be very true to the exerciſe of thoſe Vertues, that have found ſo much praiſe among the Heathens. I have read ſomewhere of *Averroes* (if I miſtake not) that a point of Doctrine alienated him from the Chriſtian Religion, *Quandoquidem Chriſtiani adorant quod comedunt,*

ſit

sit anima mea cum Philosophis. Transubstantiation was then creeping into the Church, or if not, he did not rightly understand the Doctrine of the Sacrament. But corruption in practice will much more alienate: The *Spaniards* in some of their first dealings with the Savages in *America*, to perswade them to be baptized, told them, that they who were baptized should go to the joyes of Heaven, the rest should go to Hell: One of them, a person of quality, askt them whether they themselves (the *Spaniards*) were to go; they said to Heaven; then (says he) I had rather go to Hell with the unbaptized, than live in Heaven with so cruel a people. What marvel is it if a *Jew* or *Infidel* argue thus: I see these men that go for Christians, take little care of their lives, they pretend to the most excellent Religion in the World; but if we may judge of it by their actions, their profession is vile and contemptible. God doth not stand in need of the ministry of men, when it pleases him that *the fulness of the Gentiles shall come in, and all Israel shall be saved*; he can bring his own ends about, with any or without any means: But as to humane probabilities, how is this like to retard the spreading of the Gospel? *Blindness is hapned to Israel*, and it continues upon the Infidel, but they are not so blind as not to see that *True Religion* includes Morality. If therefore in all our Negotiations with them, our Merchants and Factors, or whoever any ways converse with them, would not only exactly observe the rules of Justice (which it is to be hoped they do) but

Heylin Geogr.

Rom. 11.

Rom. 11.

would alſo take care and pains in the governance of themſelves, that they be diſcreet and ſober, and adviſed in all their behaviour; it might be hoped that Infidels would by degrees entertain bette thoughts of Chriſtian Religion than yet they do: But alas this is the very thing to be feared, Chriſtendom it ſelf is in a great many places over-grown with Barbariſm: We may ſend them word to *China*, and the *Indies* and *America*, that Vertue is no where ſo much honoured and owned as among Chriſtians; but when they come to hear, that Pride, and Revenge, and Covetouſneſs, and Senſuality, and all manner of Vice doth prevail, as much with us as in any other parts of the World; our ſin hath the ſame aggravation with that of *Eli*'s Sons:

1 Sam: 2. *The ſin of the young men was great before the Lord, for men abhorred the offering of the Lord.* It is no wonder if Heathens abhor Chriſtian Religion, when they ſee Chriſtians live ſuch horrid lives: Though this be not indeed the fault of our Religion, but of the profeſſours of it, yet it will be interpreted ſo; and this miſchief is added to all the reſt, men of immoral wicked lives, hinder as much as in them lyes (ſo far as they are wicked) the ſpreading of Chriſtian Religion. Wherefore if we would do good in the World, we muſt abound in Moral Vertues, for the contrary Vices are much to the detriment and damage of Mankind.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

BY being Vertuous, men become profitable, Sect. 1.
and their Vertue makes them so; where- 2.
fore these things are said to *be good and profita-* Tit. 3.
ble to men. These are the men whom the world can ill spare, for they are useful in their places: There is no Creature in the world, be it never so mean, but so far as it is useful is to be accounted of: even the Ass and her Colt, had a value put upon them, because *the Lord* Math. 21.
had need of them. This is to be said in the behalf of Vertue, there is need of it: It makes men fit to do good service, and therefore ought to be encouraged and practised. And that which was named last but one in the last Chapter, I now begin with. Good men do 1.
good by their good examples: As men of naughty and vitious lives corrupt the world, so here doth Vertue countermine vice. He hath but little observ'd the world, who doth not see what a mighty force example hath almost every where: Now though examples of Vertue do not so much good as bad examples do hurt, because men are generally most inclin'd to that which is worst; yet some good they do, and many times a great deal: For were it not out of this perswasion, why do we read History? It is no doubt a pleasant thing, and as much a recreation as an employment, to look beyond our own Times and Countries, and see what hath been done in the World in former times, and what is elsewhere: But if there

were

were nothing elſe but bare pleaſure, there may be as much ſaid for *Romances* as for *real ſtories*. There is a profit as well as a pleaſure, *Studia abeunt in mores*, as the *Lord Bacon* obſerves; and then when men faſhion their lives and manners according to their ſtudies, whereas other ſtudies make men witty and ſubtle, this peculiar effect hath *Hiſtory*, *it makes men wiſe*: And how is that, but by obſerving the examples of others, and improving them to our advantage. So thought another Wiſe and Learned Man: *Deſixum hoc habuit, conferre maximè Hiſtoriam componendæ vitæ, cenſebat enim quodammodo efficaciorem Philoſophiâ, quod hæc quidem verbis homines erudiat, ſed illa exemplis accendat*, &c. Now the good we get by ſuch examples, is an Argument that Vertuous men do good in the world, becauſe they help to make others good: They ſtir them up to the ſame practices, by breeding ſuch an emulation in them, as *Miltiades* did in *Themiſtocles*: he was converted as I may ſay, (*i. e.*) he was chang'd in his behaviour, from a debauch'd vitious man, by the ſame *Miltiades* got at the Battel of *Marathon*: So he gave this reaſon of his change, *Miltiades his Trophy will not let me ſleep, or be dull and idle.* Yea there are ſuch inviting provocations in good examples, that our *bleſſed Saviour* himſelf thought good to make uſe of this Argument, to teach his Diſciples humility and condeſcenſion: *I have given you an example that ye ſhould do as I have done to you.* It is a great happineſs when Parents or Maſters of Fami-

Eſſay of ſtudy.

Peireſkius. Gaſſend. de vitâ ejus.

Plutarch. *Apophtheg.*

Joh. 13.

lies, or any Publick persons who have the governance of others, are Vertuous themselves; for they can then urge the same Vertue with the greater Authority upon others: Otherwise there is a great difference between the precepts and instructions of those who practise Vertue, and those who neglect it: Such as we read between *Christ* and the *Scribes*, *He taught them as one having Authority, and not as the Scribes.* How did they teach? They taught, but they did not practise, *They say and do not*: But (though other interpretations may be given of the words, this is a truth) *Christ* spake with Authority, he did enforce his Doctrine by his own example. A Picture may be well drawn, and if it flatter, may be handsomer then the person it represents; but there is life in the person, which is wanting in the Picture: In like manner Vertue may be pourtrayed, as to its lineaments and colours, in good advice, and Moral precepts, and there may be Rhetorical insinuations which may flatter it, and express some Heroical degrees which are scarce practicable and attainable by flesh and blood; yet for all these flourishes of Rhetorick, there is that same ἐνάργειά τι still wanting; there is a certain lifeness in Vertue which cannot be express'd but by a good example. Now the world being so much advantaged this way, this good Vertue doth, that they who practise it, do good by their good examples. Math. 7. Math. 23.

Honest and Vertuous men by their very presence do good. After that *Moses* had been Sect. 2. 2.

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converſing with God in the *Mount*, the ſhinings
Exod. 28. of his face ſtrook an awe in the people of *Iſrael* at their approaches to him: So in ſome ſort doth the exerciſe of Vertue give a luſtre to the perſons of Vertuous men. Wicked men have ſuch a Regard and Reverence to them, that they will not commit thoſe ſins in their preſence, which yet they have a mind to commit, and would fain be in other company, that they may be more bold in: So doth it frequently happen, that thoſe men who will ſwear, and ſcorn, and ſcoff at all manner of goodneſs; yet in the preſence of ſome men, whom they know to have a hatred to their practices, they can contain themſelves: and they who will ſwear among their fellows, yet will not before men of more ſevere Principles. Now as wickedneſs and vice doth harm by hindring good, (as hath been ſaid) ſo is Vertue hereby advantagious; it lays a reſtraint upon wicked men, at leaſt ſo as to prevent ſome Acts of ſin, if not to extinguiſh the Habits. There is one and the ſame reaſon given why *Herod* delayed to kill *John Baptiſt*, and why the *Phariſees* would have delayed to take
Math. 14. *Chriſt; he would have killed him but he feared the multitude*: They would have taken our Saviour,
Math. 26. *but not on the Feaſt day, leſt there ſhould be an uproar among the people.* Now though it may be all this multitude were not indeed good and throughly honeſt, yet this good they had, *they counted* John *as a Prophet*; and likewiſe they had a great eſteem of Chriſt becauſe of his Miracles. Many ſuch men there are in the world,

world, who in this, as in other things, are Hypocrites as the *Phariſees* were; they have a mind to ſin, but they are loth to be ſeen in it: By how much the more Vertuous men are ſcattered about the world, they do help to looſen the knot, and weaken the conſpiracy of wicked men, that they cannot ſo confidently carry on the deſigns of Hell and Darkneſs. There was ſomewhat in the preſence of *Ariſtides* that did diſcountenance diſhoneſty; and that was the reaſon that *Themiſtocles* (who though not ſo debauch'd as before, yet was ſcarce honeſt) and others contriv'd to baniſh him by the *Oſtraciſme* (a cuſtome among the *Athenians*) that he might not be at home to divert and reſtrain their indirect dealings.

It is well for the world that there are Vertuous men, for they do greatly help to preſerve the reſt of mankind from Univerſal Ruine. The ſame men who are the *light of the world*, are the *ſalt of the earth*: they who are exemplary in their lives, do ſeaſon the reſt of the world, and preſerve it from being corrupted and deſtroyed. It pleaſeth God to have Reſpect to the Prayers and Perſons of his Holy Ones; and for their ſakes to forbear that puniſhment which he hath threatned to wicked men: So is the Language of the Scripture, when God doth ſeem reſolv'd to deſtroy *Iſrael* in a moment; yet *Moſes* prays and beſeeches God, *And then the Lord repented of the evil which he thought to do to his people.* And *Moſes* his interceſſion is given as the reaſon why he ſpared them: *He ſaid that he would*

Sect. 3. 3.

Math. 5.

Exod. 32.

Pſa.106. *would deſtroy them, had not* Moſes *his choſen ſtood before him in the breach, to turn away his wrath leſt he ſhould deſtroy them.* Again, it Gen.18. ſeems *Ten Righteous Men* would have preſerved *Sodom*; yea, God had ſo much Reſpect to the perſon of *Lot* (we do not read that he prayed for *Sodom*) that ſo long as he ſtaid there, he did as it were hold Gods hands that he could do nothing: So may we with Reverence ſay, according to thoſe words in Scripture ſpoken Gen.19. to *Lot* in his going to *Zoar*, *Haſte thee eſcape thither, for I cannot do any thing till thou be come thither.* Yea, it pleaſed God to have Reſpect to *David* and his Poſterity after him; ſo that he would not rend the Ten Tribes from *Solomon* for *David* his Fathers ſake; ſo is 1 Kings 11. it ſaid to *Solomon*, yea, and to *Rehoboam* there is a promiſe with a threatning, *I will not rend* Ibid. *away all the Kingdom, but will give one Tribe to thy Son for* David *my ſervants ſake.* This regard God hath, not to the merits of men; there is no man that ſins (as *every juſt man* Eccleſ.7. *upon the earth doth*) who is able to expiate for his own ſins by his own merits, (for then he would not need a Saviour) and if not ſo, how then ſhould he deſerve mercy for other men? The *Papiſts* ſpeak of a Treaſury of the Saints merits, which is one foundation of their Doctrine of *Indulgences*, as alſo a ground why they hope the ſooner to be releaſed out of *Purgatory*; but this their Treaſury is a well without water: yet though not for their deſerts and merits, for his mercies ſake it pleaſeth God ſo to honour righteous and holy men, as to let the

the wicked world know, that they are the better for their righteous neighbours. As God doth many times send evil when they are taken away, and therefore it is said; *The Righteous is taken away from the evil to come*: so doth he stay and forbear to send it as long as they remain: Wherefore good men are the props and supports of the world. There are a sort of men who (as the men of *Sodom* were weary of *Lot*) are weary of the company of honest men; and would be glad if there were no body in the world but of their Gang; but it is because they do not consider who are their best Friends: It is for the sake of the Wheat that the Tares are suffered to grow till Harvest. There is a mixture of good and bad together, in Nations, and Cities, and Towns, and almost in all Societies of men: Now there are blessings deriv'd upon wicked men, because they are in company with those who are better then themselves, and whom God hath a regard to: This is more to the commendation of Vertue, it keeps the world a foot, it doth stay, and uphold, and preserve mankind from falling to that decay and corruption to which vice doth naturally tend; and so is an instance of what good Vertue doth.

Isa. 57.

Math. 13.

Vertue must needs turn to advantage; for they who are throughly and sincerely Vertuous, make Conscience of doing good; they who are so out of good Principles, καλῆ ἕνεκα, out of a love to Vertue, will believe themselves obliged to the practice of every Vertue, which they are in capacity for: They will endeavour

Sect. 4.

vour to make good that common obſervation, that there is a connexion of Vertue, inſomuch that he who is Vertuous in one, will be ſo in all, or will ſtrive ſo to be: and he that ſtrives to be compleatly Vertuous, how can he forget that Noble and Excellent diſpoſition of Charity, which the Scripture makes ſo much of, that all our behaviour toward our Neighbour
Rom. 13. is comprehended in this, *Thou ſhalt love thy Neighbour as thy ſelf.* He who is Vertuous, will be Charitable and well diſpoſed; and he who is ſo, how much good will he do? Here is a cluſter of Proofs, which (as the cluſter of
Numb. 13. Grapes from *Eſhcol* was born between two) is ſomewhat too big to be crowded within one Argument: but becauſe I would multiply as little as I can, I include them all here. *Cha-*
1 Cor. 13. *rity is kind*, there are many good offices are perform'd by a Charitable man: to Feed the Hungry, and Cloath the Naked, and relieve thoſe who are in want and diſtreſs; to reſolve doubts and ſatisfie ſcruples; to correct errour and inform ignorance; to pity and comfort the ſad and dejected ſpirits of other men; to be helpful in all ſtreights, to bear the burdens of others, that they may be eaſed; to become all things to all men, that by all means we may do good to ſome, this is the Trade of a good man: and when all theſe rills are united in one, they make a forcible ſtream that cannot eaſily be dam'd up: Suppoſe this good ſpirited man to have ability and opportunity thus to let out his ſpirit, it is not eaſie to divert his good intentions, nor to take him off from his endea-

endeavours of doing good: So that this is a pregnant instance how advantagious Vertue is, because this doing good is it self a Vertue; in which it were easie to enlarge, but that I consider I am slipt into a particular consideration, which doth not so much belong to Vertue in the general, as to one part of it; therefore I go no farther in it.

Vertue is not only singly serviceable, but it is like the Salt that *Elisha* made use of to heal the naughty waters; it doth sanctifie other accomplishments, and convert them to do good service: other endowments, whether of the body or the mind, are (as we say of the passions) neither good nor bad, but according as they are used: Now (if that fancy may be Moralized) Vertue is the Philosophers Stone that turns all into Gold; for which several instances might be given, I take up with two: Knowledge and Riches are two such things, which when they are *found in a way of righteousness*, are greatly serviceable to the world; otherwise they are better lost then found. A man had better be without a Knife then cut his Neighbours Throat with it; so is it less criminal for a man to be a Fool then a Knave, or to be Poor then to have Riches and abuse them to the wrong and prejudice of other men; wherefore this good Vertue doth, it teaches a man the right use of these things. Sect. 5. 5. 2 Kings 2.

Where an able head and an honest heart dwell together, that man is well qualifyed for a serviceable man. Bare knowledge is no great perfection, no more then bare power, for it 1.

may be an instrument of much mischief: *The*
2 Sam. 16. *Counsel of* Ahitophel *was as if a man had enquired at the Oracle of God*, but if it had been successful it would have ruined *David*. We use to compare crafty men to Foxes, and they are
Judg 15. more like to none than to *Sampsons Foxes*, commonly they carry firebrands in their tails: The end of their contrivances and designs, is to waste, and consume, and destroy. But the *wis-*
Matth. 10. *dom of the Serpent*, and the *simplicity of the Dove*, are a happy pair when matched together. There is no man who doth not set his wits to work if he have any; now Vertue corrects and restrains the extravagant sallies and wildnesses of wit, and purifies wisdom from those dregs which make it earthly, sensual, and deviliſh; it alters the property of wit, and makes it wisdom. The head receives influence from the heart. An honest good man is more conscientious than to abuse his parts, and knowledge, and skill, to the hurt of his Neighbour: He doth not study a *cunning*
Eph. 4. *craftiness, whereby he may lye in wait to deceive*; but his *wisdom is from above*, for it hath the
James 3. same characters, it is *full of mercy and good*
Herbert. *fruits. Wits an unruly Engine*, and it is not every man knows how to use it: There is a
1 Cor. 8. great deal of *knowledge that puffs up*, and doth not *edifie without Charity*, which is Vertue: There is a great deal of learning in the World, skill in Languages, knowledge in Arts and Sciences; and many men that have these, are *but as*
1 Cor. 13. *sounding brass or a tinkling Cimbal*; they want grace to sanctifie their gifts. There is then this

great

great piece of service Vertue doth, it makes men φρονειν εις το σωφρονειν, their wisdom is a sober well governed wisdom; the more Vertuous and good any man is, the better use he makes of his Learning and parts, not to his own vain-glory, or to the prejudice of other men, but to their benefit and advantage as much as he is able. Rom. 12.

A vertuous man makes a like improvement of his estate, that he doth of his knowledge; that is, he doth good with it. Riches are things which certainly may be made use of to good purposes. He that threw his money into the sea because it should do him no harm, was either a low-spirited man (according to *Seneca's* observation, *Infirmi animi est pati non posse divitias*; *It is an Argument of a weak mind not to be able to bear riches*) or else he was strangely humorsom, if not worse; *Lactantius* could not tell what to think of him, whether he were in his wits or no: *Quid ille, qui patrimonium in nummos redactum projecit in Mare, ego dubito utrumne sanus an demens fuerit:* and his reason is to my purpose, *fac beneficium*, &c. he might have done good with it, &c. riches are the gift of God *who gives power to get wealth*, and it cannot reasonably be thought they are given to be thrown away. But why then are they improved no better? men either hoard up their money or throw it away. Many are the men who make no use at all of their money, onely to tell it, and bless themselves that they are rich. And then *this love of money is the root of all evil.* This greedy desire Epist. 5. De falsâ sap. Cap. 23. Deut. 8. 1 Tim. 6.

of gain hath brought along with it many miſchiefs into the world, and almoſt undone it. *Vere affirmare poſſumus mundum novum quodammodo perdidiſſe mundum veterem, nam mentibus noſtris avaritiam inſevit, & mutuum amorem extinxit,* &c. ſince Silver and Gold have been ſo plentifully brought from *America*, the new world hath deſtroyed the old, by introducing Covetouſneſs, and extinguiſhing Love and good will among men. On the other ſide ſome are as Prodigal as others Covetous: There are, that will venture almoſt all they have upon a caſt at Dice: there are (and they are not all younger Brothers neither, as he in St. *Luke*) *who waſte their ſubſtance with riotous living.* Theſe are now the extreams, and it is nothing but Vertue will keep a man within the mean. A man that makes Conſcience of his doings, believes that God hath made him rich in this world, *that he may do good, that he may be rich in good works, ready to diſtribute, willing to communicate.* It is want of will rather then want of money that is the reaſon why there is no more good done in this kind: if men were well diſpoſed and vertuouſly inclined, the rich diſcoveries that have been made in the Weſt-Indies, of gold and ſilver mountains rather then mines (ſuch as is that of *Potozi*) would have helped to have reſtored the world to its golden age, in the ſame ſenſe the Poets ſpeak of: men would be well furniſhed for the mutual ſervice and ſupply of one another, and it is well for the whole where the parts agree, and are helpful to each other.

Campan. de Monarch. Hiſpan.

Luke 15.

1 Tim. 6.

So

So far as Vertue prevails it conquers Vice (as hath been said) so then hereby it is that a man gets rid of his covetous and prodigal humour both. A good man who is likewise willing to do good, he doth neither hold too fast, nor doth he let go too soon; but as there is occasion, he makes his estate serve him, and not he that. And thus is Vertue advantagious to the world, it makes a man a good steward of those things he is entrusted with, particularly of his knowledge and riches.

The same may be said of Authority and places of publick trust; of Credit and reputation, of time and leisure; the more vertuous a man is, the more Conscience he will make of making a right use of all these things. But it is time I made haste to the Conclusion of this Argument; I have therefore but one thing more to adde.

Vertue is much for the worlds advantage, Sect. 6.
for it is a firm and solid foundation for true 6.
friendship. There is no friendship we can confide in any farther, than we can have assurance that the reason and cause of that friendship doth remain and abide; therefore when either prosperity or adversity, or meer Neighbourhood of place or interest (as all these do) make men friends; this is an uncertain friendship, because the foundation is uncertain. Where prosperity makes friends, if one be falling into adversity, the other forsakes him, like Rats and Mice that run away when the House is falling: So did the Ro-

mans fall off from *Sejanus*, when he was neer his ruine: Yea and St. *Peter*, as holy a man as he was, was for a while tempted to deny his *Maſter*, when he came into trouble. Again, two men whom the Priſon hath reconciled, preferment hath ſevered and diſtanced from one another. Mens Neighbourhoods and Intereſts alſo vary: If there be nothing elſe but theſe to glue mens affections together, they will not always hold. If Vertue be not in the caſe, we are at a loſs for a firm Baſis to found friendſhip on. *Hoc ſentio niſi in bonis amicitiam eſſe non poſſe*; for why ſhould I make that man my Friend, whom I cannot truſt? how can I truſt a man, unleſs I believe him to be an honeſt and juſt man? Again a proud man is unfit for a friend: there is a kind of equality among friends (not of ſtate and condition, as the Levellers would introduce, but) the humility and condeſcenſions of the Superiour, will meet with his friend, and in the ſimpathy of their Souls there is a likeneſs and an oneneſs. Pride therefore makes men unſociable, ſo doth Anger and quarrelſomeneſs, and ſuch like evil diſpoſitions. Still therefore we want that which cements friends together, and we ſhall not find it till we come to Vertue: that is a a thing to be confided in. Not that I would make every man my friend, whom in charity I ought to judge honeſt as to the main (as we uſe to ſay) for there are many ſuch men, who are yet guilty of many unhappy failings and weakneſſes. Every one is not fit to keep a ſecret, and it is not ſafe to unboſome our Souls

Cicer. Lælius.

to

to them. Some are censorious (a distemper that spreads very far this day in *England*) and other things there are that make men less apt for these purposes: but then it is to be observed, all this is want of those degrees of Vertue which we ought to aspire to; still therefore so far as men are vertuous they have the right disposition for friends; for hereby men are taught to perform all good Offices for their friend that they are able (as hath been lately said, Vertue sets men on work to do good) and also it doth restrain men from doing those that are not good. There is a kind of obstinate friendship, which many times proceeds to a Brotherhood in iniquity: Men are so resolved to humour and gratifie their friend, that they will do evil for their sakes. So was *C. Blossius* to *Tiberius Gracchus*, he was so much his friend, he said, that he would do any thing for him; and when the question was asked, what if *Gracchus* should bid you fire the *Capitol*, would you do it? he answers he would not bid me do such a thing; but if he should, I would do as he bid me. So had *Herod* passed his word and his Oath to the Daughter of *Herodias*, to do for her whatsoever she should ask; and when she required the head of *John Baptist*, he would not deny it to her. Now here is an excellent use of Vertue, to keep friendship within its right Channel. A Vertuous man will do all the good he can to his friend, but (unless he fail in his Vertue) he will not prophane that sacred thing, by entring into a

Cicer. Lælius.

Matth. 14.

League to maintain friendſhip, whether by lawful or unlawful means. Now true friendſhip is a noble and gallant thing, an excellent attainment of humane Nature; but that Ceremonies and Complements have almoſt either obſcured it where it is, or crowded it into ſome few corners of the World, that it is ſcarce any where to be found. Surely civility, and affability, and courteſie, is a fine accompliſhment; yet I am of opinion (and though I be accounted a Clown for ſo thinking, I am not much ſollicitous) that as *Sarah* turned *Hagar* out of doors for her ſcornful Imperiouſneſs; ſo if ever friendſhip get any conſiderable dominion in the World, ſincerity and plainheartedneſs muſt keep ſomewhat a ſtricter hand over diſſembling Complements. I fear men muſt grow leſs Complemental, if they would approve themſelves real friends; but I am going out of the way: I could not chuſe but ſalute friendſhip when it came in my way; I return and make this uſe of this ſhort digreſſion: If friendſhip be ſuch an excellent thing, then is this greatly to the commendation of Vertue, that it doth ſo help to make and keep men friends. Which is the laſt inſtance I give (and I cannot conclude with a better) that it is much for the profit and advantage of mankind, that men ſhould live in the exerciſe of Moral Vertues. Which was the proof of the fourth Reaſon I have given in this kind; Vertue is neceſſary (*Neceſſitate Medii*) as a means in order to an end. If we would live good

lives,

lives; if we desire to dye in safety; if we would have our lives and deaths Comfortable to our selves; and if we believe our selves bound to live profitably to the advantage of others; It is necessary for us (all of us Christians as well as other men, and Christians more than other men, because of the commands before-mentioned) to abound in Moral Vertues.

Moral

Moral Vertues Baptized Christian:

OR,

The Necessity of Morality among Christians.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Sect. 1. THe second and third Book have contained the proof of the second general proposition, as I at first summed up my discourse: There are great, and strong, and unanswerable Arguments, which prove it necessary for a Christian to be a Moral man: A double necessity I have assigned, each of which have been distinctly handled. I am now towards my Conclusion, only I remember I did promise somewhat by way of appendix to adde to this last consideration; That as there is a necessity of Moral Vertue, so likewise is there an excellency in it: and this will require

a

a few words; but I will not multiply many.

Vertue is not only neceſſary, but it is an excellent, brave, becoming thing, a thing lovely and of good report: It cannot otherwiſe be, if that be true which is already ſaid; that which is ſo good and comfortable to our ſelves, ſo good and advantagious to others, if we do not admire it, we do greatly undervalue it; we do not well underſtand it, if we do not believe it to be very excellent. So much hath been ſaid to thoſe heads, that I am loth again to refer to them: Any one may eaſily apprehend the force of an Argument, that which hath the qualifications before-mentioned, is very Excellent: wherefore paſſing that by, I adde two things more: There is a great excellency in Moral Vertue, for it is an imitation of God, and a Type of Heaven. Both which muſt be underſtood with ſome caution.

By being vertuous we do imitate and reſemble God and Chriſt. It is true, we call God holy and not vertuous, for the holineſs of God is not to be deſcribed after the ſame manner that we define Moral Vertue. Our paſſions are the ὕλη, the matter that our vertue works upon, which paſſions are not aſſignable to God: And there are ſome particular vertues which we cannot attribute to God; as Temperance, which ſuppoſes us in a bodily ſtate, and Humility, which at beſt ſuppoſes us in a creature-ſtate (for though it pleaſes God in Scripture to ſay he humbles himſelf, yet that doth no more prove that he is humble in our notion, then his re- Sect. 2.

penting proves that he doth repent as we do) yet notwithſtanding by vertue we reſemble God. The holineſs of God is the perfection and rectitude of his Nature; ſo our vertue, though alone it be not our perfection, yet it belongs to our integrity and rectitude: When we are commanded to *be holy, in all manner of Converſation*, how can we fulfil that Command, if we do not exerciſe thoſe vertues without which our Converſation cannot be as it ought to be? Now this holineſs is a conformity to God,
1 Pet. 1. for in the ſame place it followeth, *becauſe it is written be ye holy, for I am holy.* And in many particular caſes, that Juſtice and Righteouſneſs in our dealings, and that Truth and faithfulneſs in our word and promiſe, which makes
Pſa. 145. us honeſt, is an imitation of God, *who is Righteous in all his ways, and holy in all his works*;
Pſa. 89. and who doth not *ſuffer his faithfulneſs to fail.* When we are kind and charitable, and deſirous
Matth. 5. to do good, *then are we the Children of our Father*
Luke. 6. *which is in Heaven*, and are *merciful as our Father alſo is merciful:* Again, when we are gentle and meek, then we are like that God who is *Merci-*
Exod. 34. *ful and Gracious and Long-ſuffering*, &c. whence it doth appear that this Moral Vertue is a true and a conſiderable part of godlineſs: that man is a beaſtly man, who lives like a beaſt, and he a manly man who lives and acts like a man; accordingly, he who is thus God-like, doth ſo far deſerve the name of a Godly man. The Heathens had the ſame apprehenſions of their Vertues, though they fel ſhort of the attainment,

yet so far as their Philosophy made them vertuous, it did πρὸς τὴν θείαν ὁμοίωσιν ἐπαράγειν. Hierocl. And is not this a great ennoblement of our souls, that we may be raised up to be like God? doth not God infinitely excel all his creatures? wherefore though we come infinitely short of the divine perfections, yet so far as we do attain to any resemblance of him, it is our excellency to be like that God, who doth so infinitely excel. To be transformed into the Image of our Creatour, what can be more desirable? yea, may we not say, (if we should suppose that which yet cannot possibly come to pass) that if it were possible for holiness and happiness to be separated from one another, it were a greater perfection and glory to be like God in holiness then in happiness. The state of happiness in Heaven we call a glorious state, and it is a greater glory then we can now conceive: But is not holiness more glorious? if unholiness be worse then unhappiness, then is holiness better then happiness: now so it is, for unhappiness is our misery, but unholiness is our sin, and therefore more to be avoided. Where are now the men that dare sit in *the Seat of the Scorners*, to despise and laugh at all manner of Goodness and Vertue? is it nothing to be like God? should we chuse to be like the Devil in Malice and Revenge, and ill will, and such like evil dispositions, is it a thing to be gloried in? is there any will glory that he is going to Hell to keep company with the Devils? surely we do not understand our Natures, or we cannot but

but acknowledge, it is a great excellency to be like God, as we are, in the exerciſe of theſe Moral Vertues. To which might be added as a conſideration contiguous to this; the life of Chriſt doth greatly commend Moral Vertue: He was Temperate, and Meek, and Humble, *he went about doing good*; and many proofs in the Goſpel there are, that in all his dealings with all men he behav'd himſelf as did become him; which may help to confirm us in a belief of the excellency of Vertue; it is ſuch an imitation of God, as the life of Chriſt was very remarkable for. But I adde no more to this firſt Inſtance.

Sect. 3. 2. To live in the exerciſe of Moral Vertue is a Type of Heaven: So do the Angels and Saints live in Heaven, though in greater perfection, as being altogether in a ſinleſs ſtate: Not in every particular ſo, that kind of Juſtice and Honeſty that is of uſe now in this world, and we call Commutative Juſtice, is of no uſe there: There is no need of Buying, or Selling, or Exchanging; for there is no need of Eating, and Drinking, their bodies after the Reſurrection are made *glorious and ſpiritual bodies*: and 1 Cor. 15. therefore for the ſame reaſon they will not exerciſe that Vertue of Temperance as it is here exerciſed: but the carriage and behaviour (as there muſt be ſome) whereby they behave themſelves one towards another in that Glorious Quire, is always as it ought to be: There is Love, and Meekneſs, and Humility, and ſuch like good Affections; there is no Envy,

Envy, nor Pride, nor ill Will, nor any such Hellish quality; their *Charity* is particularly said never to fail. 1 Cor. 13. Indeed there is somewhat else in Heaven that doth augment the glory of the place, and their happiness who are taken up thither; they are in close Communion with God, in whose *presence is fullness of joy, and at his right hand are pleasures for evermore.* Psa. 16. Yet as it is an accessory to their glory to be in company with one another; so is this somewhat not to be despised, that their love is made perfect, and all the correspondencies of Heaven are sinless and pure: Hell shall be shut up in Hell, all Deviliſh qualities shall be banished Heaven, and Holiness and Righteousness will be in its Triumphancy in that Church Triumphant. Now if this be the utmost perfection of which our natures are capable, to be translated into this state; how must it needs be an excellent attainment, to be in any measure like those glorified spirits? There is somewhat in our natures, that doth mind us of an imperfection, in every state and attainment in this world; for it is natural for us to desire a change: There are the strivings of the Infant in the womb, which discover the inclinations of its nature to be born into the world, and to be at liberty: Boys would fain be Men, and Men notwithstanding that they despise Old Age in others, yet would live to be old themselves: an Apprentice would be out of his time, to set up for himself; and a Servant hath a great desire to become a Master.

There

There is scarce any thing in the Universe, but would be graduate, and commence some higher degrees of perfection, then it hath yet attained. All this would not be, if there were not a belief, an imagination at least, that there is some greater excellency in those states, to which we are not yet arrived, then for the present we do enjoy: wherefore if ever we desire after Heaven, while we are upon Earth, (as we ought always to do) this supposes we believe it to be a place of more glorious excellencies, then any we have yet seen or tasted now in this world; and if it be so, then we must go on to argue, that (in regard it is not so much the place, as the the state that makes the happiness) the nearer we come in the disposition of our minds, and the tenour of our lives, to that Heavenly state, our lives are so much the more excellent. And this being true of a Vertuous and good life, that it is some resemblance to, and some weaker degrees of the life of Heaven; it adds to the Argument, that as there is a great necessity of, so there is a superlative excellency in Moral Vertue.

CHAP. II.

Sect. 1. AND now I think these premises are strong enough to bear and inforce the Conclusions I would draw from them, which are

1. only these two. I infer, 1. A just Apology

logy for thoſe who preach up Morality. 2. An Expoſtulatory Plea againſt thoſe who do not practiſe it. 2.

Here is Apology enough for thoſe Preachers of the Goſpel, who Preach the Moral Law in Goſpel times; who would put Chriſtians in mind that they are men ſtill, and muſt not forget the duties of man to man: It is a Doctrine that we have this only reaſon to be aſham'd of, that we who Preach it to others, do ſo little practiſe it our ſelves; elſe if we ſuffer in our good names for this kind of Preaching, we *ſuffer for righteouſneſs ſake*, and we may well glory in our ſufferings. Where a People have conceived a prejudice againſt their Miniſter, there is ſcarce any kind of Preaching, but they will cavil at: If we endeavour to give them ſatisfaction concerning the order and diſcipline of the Church, and tell them what reaſon they have to be peaceable and modeſt, and not to make diviſions; then *we are the men who are all for conformity and the ſervice of the outward man; and if we can but bring our people to conform, we do not care what lives they live.* This we would not be thought to do, to neglect to give our people good inſtructions for their lives; and therefore we inſiſt upon Moral Vertues ſometimes, and would perſwade men to be juſt, and honeſt, and charitable, *&c.* but then we are in danger of being counted Popiſh: *theſe men ſure hope to be ſaved by their good works, they extol them ſo much, and preach them up ſo often:* No not ſo neither, 1. 1 Pet. 3.

we do not truſt in our ſelves, nor put any confidence in the fleſh, but in the merit of our Saviour; therefore *we lay the foundation of Repentance from dead works, and Faith towards God*; and we inſiſt upon the great priviledges of believers, that they are redeemed from the curſe of the Law, and the wrath of God; and though they be guilty of many failings, yet *is there no condemnation to them that are in Chriſt Jeſus.* Now haply it will be ſuſpected we are *Antinomians* or *Solifidians*, *we attribute ſo much to faith, that it may be our hearers may the leſs regard good works.* When we explain the Articles of our Creed, and ſo have occaſion to mention ſome of the more abſtruſe Doctrines of Chriſtian Religion; it will be ſaid *theſe are dark myſterious things, and we do not know how to underſtand them; we have more need of milk then of this ſtrong meat*: If therefore we condeſcend to the meaneſt capacities of our Auditors, and preach plain matters of practice, in a plain and familiar way then ſhall we be cenſured for dull and plain ſouls, that have no Scholarſhip at all in us: And I would there were no Scholars this day in *England*, that do exalt knowledge above goodneſs; and that chuſe rather to have their fancies tickled, then their affections warmed. I fear it is an objection, that many of the Learneder ſort will make againſt Preaching Morality, (eſpecially when we Countrey-Preachers preach it in our plain way, ſuitable to thoſe that hear us) theſe are things that every

Heb. 6.

Rom. 8.

ry body knows well enough; and why should we trouble our selves so often to speak of these things? If now among all these Cavils, there be any, who (upon any reason whatsoever) do under-value this kind of Preaching; my answer to them who are thus quarrelsome, might be this; Have we not power to make choice of what Texts and Subjects we apprehend useful to those to whom we Preach? and why should we be abridg'd of this our Liberty? But I say moreover;

They who are thus angry with us, for Sect 2.
dwelling so long on these things, either they themselves practise the Vertues we Preach or they do not: If they do, it is to be hoped they understand what they do, and why; they believe a necessity of these things, and then either they must believe all the rest of their neighbours to be as Vertuous as themselves, or else why do they not give us leave to tell other men of their faults? And if vices be faults and sins, why should it be thought o r fault, to do now as in the times of old; *Cry aloud, and* Isa. 58.
not spare to shew men their transgressions and their sins? But it may be these men themselves are in the same condemnation with other men; it may be they are Immoral themselves, notwithstanding all their pretences to Faith, and the priviledges of Believers: And if so, then it is no wonder if the Horse kick when he is pinch'd in a sore place; Men are troubled because we speak home to their Consciences, and tell them of their faults; but then we are so

much the more justifyed in what we do. There is need enough we should Preach up Vertue, and we must do so, till men do more live it up: and when we can see the time that our people will leave off their dishonesty and unrighteous dealings, they will lye, and cheat, and be drunk no more, *&c.* we will encourage and commend them for doing their duty; and will proceed to tell them of their blessed estate, that they *who know these things*, are to be pronounc'd *happy*, because *they do them*. In the mean time, I think that mans boldness was not the confidence of a Fool, of whom I have heard, that being abroad upon a visit, and desired to give his Friend a Sermon, he Preached against Swearing; and having occasion to stay there longer, the second and the third time he Preached over the same Sermon; when being asked if he had not forgot himself, in Preaching the same Sermon thrice together, he says no; I Preached it once, and I observed little good came of it, you went on to swear; therefore I repeated it again, and yet you did not mend; and now after the third time, it may be you will not leave it: therefore I Preach over the same Sermon, because you practise over the same sins. Is there not need we should re-inforce and renew our Sermons and Exhortations in this kind; for when we have done all, we prevail little, still the world continues wicked and immoral? And this is no unjust Apology for our selves, who Preach such Doctrines as these are. But we are yet more then barely

Joh. 13.

barely excusable; I suppose we are to be encouraged in these undertakings, if that be true which hath been already said: If Moral Vertue be so necessary and excellent, (and if it be not, *cedo rationem*, they who are of the opinion, but that they cannot, would do well to undeceive the world, that mens Consciences may not be over-awed by Bug-bears, and Specters, and Fancies; as *Numa Pompilius* made use of the *Goddess Ægeria* among the *Romans*) then why are we not praise-worthy who do tell men so? And this is my first Conclusion in Apology for our selves who Preach Morality. *Liv.*

CHAP. III.

THat which now only remains, is to expostulate with those who neglect the exercise of these Vertues. I would not be so proud of my self, nor so insensible of the head-strongness of my own passions, and the other errours and failures of my life, as to excuse my self, while I am reproving others: Nor am I so severe to others, as not to acknowledge there are compassionable infirmities of humane nature. Wherefore having made this acknowledgment, I hope my Reader will have so much charity for me as to believe, I will charge my self where I find any thing amiss, and therefore will not upbraid me with *Physitian heal thy self.* Sect. 1. 2.

In which confidence I proceed to conclude in a few words; happy then is he that Sect. 2.

Rom. 14. condemneth not himſelf *in that thing which he alloweth*: We all allow Vertue to be excellent and praiſe-worthy; happy is that man, and happy is that party of men, whoſe judgement doth not condemne its practice. When then ſhall our zeal be more *hearty* then *heady?* When ſhall the earneſtneſs of our ſpirits, which provokes us to contend in matters of opinion, be ſpent this way, ſome of it, to *pro-*
Heb. 10. *voke one another to good works?* It was an office of great repute among the *Romans* to be *Cenſor morum*; by which it appears what an excellent opinion they had of Vertue, and what care they took to correct vice, becauſe this was one of the moſt honourable offices in the Common-wealth. But now adayes how is every body almoſt got into this Office! Oh when ſhall our cenſurings of others be turned to a ſelf-judging, and that end in a ſelf-amending? when ſhall we ſtrive who ſhall live the beſt lives?

Sect. 3. Thus far we are all agreed, and not we only but the whole World, ſo far as it is under any form of government, and manner of Civility; for there is no Nation under Heaven, but ſo far as it is governed by Lawes, the intent of thoſe Laws is to encourage Vertue, and to reſtrain wickedneſs and ſin. The *Jew*, the *Mahometan*, and the *Infidel*, though they do all oppoſe the Chriſtian Religion, yet herein they do agree both with that, and with one another; they acknowledge a certain *decorum* to be obſerved in our actions, and they applaud Vertue ſo far as they underſtand it. Among

Among the many Traditions that the *Jewish* Writers abound with, those which they call the *seven precepts of Noah*, are not the least considerable (of which see *Ainsw.* upon *Genes.* 9. 4. and *Weemse's Exercitat. Divine, pag.* 41.) now they being some of them restraints upon Immorality, are some evidence in the case: but besides, the *Jew* acknowledges the *Old Testament* for the word of God; at least the *Five Books* of *Moses*, are owned by all of them, and there being commands (as hath been before said) for a Moral conversation, it cannot be that they should deny the necessity of Vertue.

The *Turks* are a rude and unmannerly people, yet have they likewise a kind of *Religion* and *Gospel* among them; and of those 8 Heads to which their *Alcoran* is reduced by a learned man: these are 4, *Giving to the Poor*; *Obedience to Parents*; *Against killing*; and last of all, *Do to others as thou wouldst be done unto thy self.* (Upon which last let it be observed, that as it is a grand Maxime of the Gospel, so hath it found universal entertainment all the world over, in so much that *Alexander Severus*, though a *Heathen Emperour*, and one who is said to have been at first harsh to the Christians; yet he thought this a fit *Motto*, onely turning the Affirmative into a Negative; *Quod tibi non vis, alteri ne feceris, Do not to another what you would not have him do to you*) Yea concerning the *Turks* it is worthy to be added, that one who was an Eye-witness and a diligent observer of their

Heylin Geogr. Arab.

Prideaux.

Joh. Latus.

Busbeq. Epist. 1.

their State-policies, gives this Character of them; *In eâ Gente, Dignitates, Honores, Magiſtratus, Virtutum & Meritorum præmia ſunt; Improbitas, Ignavia, Inertia, nullo honore penſantur.* I am ſorry he had occaſion to adde, and more ſorry if it ſhould ſtill be true in Chriſtendome; *Apud nos aliis vivitur moribus, virtuti nihil eſt relictum loci, omnia natalibus deferuntur.*

Ibid.

Sect. 4. Yea the very *Pagans* and *Infidels* are not without an apprehenſion of the excellency and becomingneſs of Vertue; the Philoſophers of old have been produced before, and it might be enough to ſay of them in the general what *Grotius* doth; *Inter Paganos non defuerunt qui dixerint ſingula, quæ noſtra Religio habet univerſa. Thoſe precepts of Vertue that are gathered together in the Goſpel, are ſcattered up and down the ſeveral writings of the Pagans.* But I find in a late Authour, one paſſage very conſiderable to this purpoſe. In the great Empire of *China* (though it be far removed from thoſe parts of the World where Chriſtian Religion principally obtains) the *Chinois* have ſuch honourable thoughts of Moral Vertue, that it hath been a ſtated Cuſtome among them, (if the late invaſions of the *Tartars* have not interrupted it) that at every *New* and *Full Moon*, throughout that vaſt Kingdome, there have been ſome publick Officers appointed in every Town, to proclaim a little before the Sun-riſing, theſe ſix Rules of life.

De verit. Chriſtianæ Relig. L. 4. ad finem.

1. *Parentibus omnes obedianto.*

2. *Su-*

2. *Superioribus Honorem & Observantiam deferunto.* Theophil. Spigelius De Re literariâ sinensium.

3. *Inter proximos & vicinos concordiam & pacem concilianto.*

4. *Liberos & nepotes literis & honestis disciplinis instruunto.* Sect. 12.

5. *Partes & officia sua quilibet debitè exequatur.*

6. *Nemini ulla injuria irrogetur, sive corporis læsione, sive Adulterio, sive Furto.*

That is, 1. *Let all obey their Parents.* 2. *Let them reverence and honour their Superiours.* 3. *Let Neighbours make and keep peace with one another.* 4. *Let Parents bring up their Children in good Learning, and honest Trades or Callings.* 5. *Let every one look to the due discharge of his office and place.* 6. *Let none hurt another, neither by any corporal Violence, nor Adultery, nor Theft.* How like is Vertue to the *Sun* in the Heaven, or to the Heaven it self, upon this as well as other accounts! *There is no speech nor language, where the voice of Vertue is not heard.* Psal. 19. But to come neerer home; within the Christian World, there is the *Papist* and the *Protestant*; within the *Reformed Churches*, there are names and notes of difference more than I am willing to reckon up; among all these are feuds, and quarrels, and contentions; yet these all (though they are not of one heart and mind) yet thus far they are of *one Language*, or *one Lip*; take them together, or take them apart (excepting a few *Strange-spirited Antinomians*) and they profess to believe the necessity Sect. 5. Gen. 11.

and

and excellency of Moral Vertue. Thus far we have all attained to believe and know, that it is neceſſary for us to live upright, and honeſt, and vertuous lives. Here we are all of one judgment (though haply as to particular caſes and circumſtances of life, there remain doubts and difficulties, as to what is fit to be done, and what not, which is Vertue, and which Vice.) Wherefore we are all concerned in the exhortation of the Apoſtle, if we apply it to the matter in hand. There will be differences in opinion and judgment, perhaps as long as the world ſtands; *Nevertheleſs whereto we have already attained, let us walk by the ſame Rule, let us mind the ſame thing:* Even this ſame thing among others, that I have all this while been recommending; viz. *Moral Vertue.* The *Rule* whereby we ought to walk in the exerciſe of it, is the dictates of our own Conſcience, when it is rightly informed by the *word of God. And as many as walk according to this Rule, peace be on them, and mercy, and upon the whole Iſrael of God*, and upon all thoſe who *let their light ſo ſhine before men, that they may ſee their good works, and glorifie their Father which is in Heaven.*

Philip. 3.

Galat. 6.

Math. 5.

FINIS.

Mr Geo. Herbert, *Page* 80:

¶ Vertue.

Sweet day, ſo cool, ſo calm, ſo bright,
The bridal of the Earth and Skie:
The dew ſhall weep thy fall to night;
For thou muſt Dye.

Sweet Roſe, whoſe hew angry and brave
Bids the raſh gazer wipe his Eye:
Thy root is ever in its grave,
And thou muſt Dye.

Sweet Spring, full of ſweet days and Roſes,
A box where ſweets compacted lie;
My Muſick ſhows ye have your cloſes,
And all muſt Dye.

Only a ſweet and Vertuous ſoul,
Like ſeaſon'd timber, never gives;
But though the whole world turn to coal,
Then chiefly lives.

ERRATA.

THe ſlips of the Preſs are not many, nor very conſiderable; ſome Comma's and periods are miſplaced, and ſome Letters and Figures are miſtaken, which the Readers ingenuity (going along with his Eye) will pardon as he finds them. What in any kind is moſt conſiderable let it be thus corrected.

P. 8. *lin.* 21 *read* kick it out. *p.* 26. *In Marg. r.* Lib. 1. verſ. finem. *p.* 27. *In Marg. r.* Συμπόσιον *p.* 42. *l.* 14. *r.* Manichees. *p.* 48. *l.* 2. *r.* as much as ſafely: *p.* 57. *l.* 29. *r.* ſo not to recompenſe. *p.* 70. *l.* 26. dele theſe. *p.* 79. *l.* 1. *r.* ὠφέλιμα. *p.* 87. *l.* 26. *r.* deſerve it. *p.* 115. *lin.* Antepen. *r.* It is not hard. *p.* 128. *l.* 31. *r.* and this Joy.